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"WE THE PEOPLE"

AND OUR ENDURING VALUES
Susan Bandes*
TIa

CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:

FIRST PRINCI-

By Akhil Reed Amar. New Haven: Yale University Press.
1997. Pp. xi, 272. $30.
PLES.

Let me give you a lesson in American history: James Madison never
intended the Bill of Rights to protect riffraff like you.'
Akhil Amar2 chides legal scholars for believing that the current
system of criminal procedure, both substantive and remedial, is
constitutionally compelled. He writes, "Scholars should know better, but too few of those who write in criminal procedure do serious,
sustained scholarship in constitutional law generally, or in fields like
3
federal jurisdiction and remedies" (p. 115). Amar believes, as I do,
that criminal procedure has been impoverished by its failure to connect to "larger themes of constitutional, remedial and jurisdictional
theory" (p. 115). But as one who has done serious, sustained scholarship in all the areas Amar mentions - or so I like to think - I
have grave concerns about Amar's first principles and their remedial implications. As an admirer of his work in the field of federal
jurisdiction, I have been deeply puzzled by his treatment of the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, which is fundamentally at
odds with his attitude toward the substantive and remedial structure of the remainder of the Constitution.
My thesis is that Amar has been led astray by the very fact that
these amendments are about criminal procedure. His attitude toward crime and criminals has led him to conclude that the first principles underlying the criminal procedure amendments are the
protection of the innocent and the pursuit of truth. Indeed, he conflates even these two principles, so that the pursuit of truth becomes
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. B.A. 1973, Buffalo; J.D. 1976,
University of Michigan. - Ed. I wish to thank Erwin Chemerinsky, Thomas Davies, Barry

Friedman, and Stephan Landsman for their helpful comments; Michael Carter, Julie DiCaro,
Marlo Johnson and Manuel Rupe for their research assistance; and the DePaul Law School
faculty research fund for its support.

1. J.B. Handelsman, NEw YORKER, Aug. 13, 1990, at 35 (caption in cartoon depicting
judge talking to defendant).
2. Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
3. See Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The State's Right to a FairTrial,

60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1020-21, 1053 (1987).
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another way of saying that the innocent must be sorted from the
guilty. Amar's monolithic focus on protecting the innocent is
wrongheaded as a matter of constitutional text, history, structure,
and spirit. It has led him to make startling claims about the reach
of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments
and the remedies that
4
ought to flow from their violation.
It is important to examine Amar's claims carefully for a number
of reasons. First, Amar is absolutely correct about the need to discuss the values animating constitutional criminal procedure.
Amar's ambition is nothing less than to "fundamentally reorient the
field" (p. ix). He is energetic and fearless in his determination to
examine a concededly ingrown, contradictory, and polarized field
from a fresh perspective. He seeks to take nothing for granted, and
he does succeed in raising hard questions about some of the Warren
Court's conventional wisdom. It seems de rigeurto refer to Amar's
analysis as provocative, 5 and surely he would not excite so much
critical comment if he had not hit a nerve. Amar deserves appreciation for taking great intellectual risks. He is correct that it is time to
take a long, careful look at the current state of criminal procedure
and ask whether we are comfortable with the values and interests it
embodies, whether it is a workable system, and where it fits in the
greater constitutional scheme.
Second, it is important to respond to Amar's substantive analysis because it rests on assumptions that are disturbingly ascendant
in current criminal jurisprudence. Amar's analysis must be critiqued for its misidentification of the values of innocence and truth
seeking as animating the criminal procedure amendments, its focus
on ultimate disposition and away from process, its unworkable remedial proposals, and its consistent undervaluing of the concern
with the abuse of governmental power. Ironically, despite Amar's
sense of his scholarship in this area as revolutionary, the same values and assumptions he espouses have increasingly informed the
Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence. In my opinion, this ap4. For example, he advocates jettisoning the warrant and probable cause requirements in

favor of a flexible reasonableness analysis that he argues would permit more direct recognition of the innocence-protecting, truth-seeking values he espouses - and then jettisoning the
exclusionary rule for violations of this reasonableness standard. Pp. 31-45. He advocates

admitting virtually all physical fruits of compelled testimony because of their reliability, and
compelling criminal suspects to testify in pretrial hearings. P. 47. He comes perilously close
to suggesting that the right to counsel is a right against erroneous conviction of the innocent,
rather than a right belonging to all those accused of crime. Pp. 138-41.

5. See Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law:
"Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again," 74 N.C. L. Rnv. 1559, 1562 (1996); Yale
Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testi-

mony, 93 MicH. L. REv. 929, 930 (1995); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth
Amendment is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S.CAL_ L. Rnv. 1, 1 (1994); Carol S.Steiker,
Second Thoughts About FirstPrinciples,107 HARv.L. REv.820, 821 (1994).
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proach signals a deeply unfortunate turning away from "enduring
values that Americans can recognize as our values" (p. 155).
Finally, it is important to respond to Amar's analysis because it
is Amar's analysis. He is a highly respected legal scholar with a
well-deserved reputation for brilliant iconoclasm. His early works
advocated a generous and attractive vision of full remediation for
governmental wrongs, and indeed this theme recurs in his current
work. Yet, despite his stated desire to integrate the criminal procedure amendments into the Constitution as a whole, his vision for
these amendments is far less generous or attractive. More accurately, its superficial attractiveness lies in its appeal to simplicity
and "common sense" - dangerous attributes when they jibe so
neatly with the reflexive us/them attitude that too often pervades
debate in this area. In practice, Amar's proposals would weaken
greatly the substantive and remedial structure undergirding the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. Amar has testified in Congress and elsewhere on these issues, advocating, among other
things, an end to the exclusionary rule.6 Such testimony coming
from one viewed as a liberal, civil libertarian law professor is extremely powerful - and extremely troubling. Thus, the disjunction
between Amar's views on protections for noncriminal litigants and
his views about criminal defendants must be illuminated.
I.

"WE THE PEOPLE" AND OUR ENDURING VALUES

Amar's chapter on the future of constitutional criminal procedure contains a key paragraph about his interpretive vision for this
field:
A Constitution proclaimed in the name of We the People should be
rooted in enduring values that Americans can recognize as our values.
Truth and the protection of innocence are such values. Virtually
everything in the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments, properly read,
promotes, or at least does not betray, these values. [p. 155]
This paragraph cries out for the punch line: "What do you
mean, we?" I do not mean this comment glibly. Amar's assumptions about what we value, and indeed about who we are, are deeply
problematic. Amar claims, here and throughout the book, to be
describing societal values that are both deeply rooted in history and
at the core of contemporary concerns. To the extent he roots his
claim for enduring values in the concerns of the Founders, his historical analysis is unpersuasive. It suffers from precisely the same
flaw as does his analysis of the contemporary factors shaping the
evolution of the criminal procedure amendments: it consistently
underplays or even denigrates the concern for the abuse of govern6. See Senate Committee Considers Replacing Exclusionary Rule with Civil Remedy, 56

Cpiu. L. REP. (BNA) 1545-47 (Mar. 15, 1995).
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mental power. This concern is our value in the sense that it
animated the framers, and in the sense that it has endured. The
exclusive focus on truth and innocence reads out the values of fairness, judicial integrity, equality, and, most of all, the political concern for the abuse of government power that - I will argue - are
the enduring values we do and should recognize as our values.
When Amar fails to include the fear of abuse as one of our enduring values, it is important to understand how he defines the
"We." He consistently uses the phrase "We the People" to describe
innocent people, as, for example, when he suggests that instead of
excluding tainted evidence, damages ought to be assessed to comfort victims of violent crimes, which would "be more apt to make
the people 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects' than
would freeing murderers and rapists." 7 There is "We the People,"
and then there are the criminals.
There are a number of problems with a theory of criminal procedure that rests on separating the innocent from the guilty and
ensuring that innocent people are protected and guilty people are
not. Even assuming that truth and innocence are the values that
belong at the pinnacle of the hierarchy, Amar makes several errors.
He employs a simplistic, whodunit version of the concept of innocence. In addition, although he identifies the pursuit of truth as a
primary value, he conflates the pursuit of truth with the protection
of innocence. Finally, his chronology is problematic: he assumes
that innocence can be determined prior to determining what protections are due.
A.

When Truth and Innocence Are Overrated

[T]he thing is, you don't have many suspects who are innocent of a
crime .... If a person is innocent of a crime, then he is not a suspect.
8
-Remarks of Attorney General Edwin Meese
In exalting the value of innocence protection, Amar has signed
on to one of the fastest growing, and most dangerous, trends in contemporary criminal jurisprudence: the trend toward separating the
innocent from the guilty before determining what protections to afford. Taken to its logical extreme, it has the potential to gut constitutional protection for those accused of crime.
7. P. 29. In Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,

1180 (1991), Amar says that "the core rights of 'the people' were popular and populist rights
-

rights which the popular body of the jury was well suited to vindicate," as opposed to

countermajoritarian rights. As I will discuss later, this assessment bodes ill for the protection
of unpopular groups such as those accused of crime, as well as racial minorities and the poor.

See infra text accompanying notes 134-39.
8. Quoted in Reagan Seeks Judge with "Traditional Approach," U.S Nnws & WoRLD

REP., Oct. 14, 1985, at 67.
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Consider the Fourth Amendment. In a group of cases in the
late 1970s and early 1980s dealing with the definition of a search
and the requirements for standing - a group of cases that Amar
calls "one sensible corner of current Fourth Amendment law" (p.
112) - the Court transformed the Katz v. United States9 reasonable
expectation of privacy test into a legitimate expectation of privacy
test. Whereas Katz itself had found a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a phone call, despite the fact that the call
concerned illegal gambling activities, United States v. Jacobsen'o and
United States v. Place" put a moral spin on the reasonableness standard. These cases held that a suspect had no legitimate expectation
of privacy in illegal activity - that he could assert a Fourth Amendment claim only to the extent that the government intruded on his
noncriminal activities. In Rawlings v. Kentucky,' 2 the Court held
that a suspect had no legitimate possessory interest in contraband
and thus could not complain about the seizure of that3 contraband,

though he was ultimately convicted of its possession.'
In short, the question of whether a defendant can claim Fourth
Amendment protection now hinges on whether the defendant can
show, at the outset, that his noncriminal activities were intruded
upon. The focus is squarely on the nature of the interest asserted,
rather than on whether society ought to tolerate the techniques
po4
lice use to intrude upon these "illegitimate" interests.'
9. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
10. 466 U.S. 109, 121-22 (1984).
11. 462 U.S. 696, 701-02 (1983).
12. 448 U.S. 98, 104-06 (1980).
13. John Burkoff refers to this result as a classic example of Orwellian doublethink. See
John M. Burkoff, When Is a Search Not a "Search?" FourthAmendment Doublethink, 15 U.
TOL. L. REv. 515, 535-37 (1984).
14. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 140-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (refusing, for lack of standing, to review a government sting operation that included hiring a female private detective to entertain a Bahamian bank official so that IRS agents could steal his briefcase, photocopy over 400
documents, and use the contents against the suspect). The Court's refusal to suppress the
evidence in Paynercame despite the fact that the sting was organized precisely to take advantage of the fact that neither man would have standing to challenge the misconduct. See 447
U.S. at 742-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Yale Kamisar, Does (Did)(Should) the Exclusionary
Rule Rest on a "PrincipledBasis" Rather Than an "EmpiricalProposition?"16 CREiHtrroN
L. REv. 565, 636-38 (1983) (condemning the Payner decision on these grounds); see also
Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (refusing to adopt a rule against pretextual
searches); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (permitting unregulated searches of
open fields on suspect's property by focusing on the suspect's reasonable expectations, rather
than the need to control police intrusions); United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981)
(holding that, absent prejudice, dismissal of indictment was inappropriate though investigator's meeting with defendant outside counsel's presence and suggestion that defendant retain
different counsel was a deliberate violation of the Sixth Amendment); United States v.
Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that conduct of law enforcement officers
in eavesdropping on conversations between defendant and his counsel was not reversible
error absent prejudice).
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Amar approves of this line of cases 15 because it advances the
value he identifies as most important: protecting the innocent. He
would call these police actions searches and seizures, but would find

them reasonable because he believes reasonableness incorporates
the "common sense" intuition that the Fourth Amendment protects

law abiding citizens and victims, not criminals. He says:
And the reason these searches were reasonable is that, although they
could ruin a drug runner's day, they posed little threat to the privacy
interests of law abiding folk. Lawbreakers as such have no legitimate
interest in privacy, and are at times entitled to less peace of mind than
are the law-abiding. [pp. 112-13]
,
Whether the introduction of the evidence is achieved through

narrow definitions of search, expansive definitions of reasonableness, or eviscerating the exclusionary rule, each of these paths leads

to the same troublesome destination: a belief that it is possible and
desirable to identify the guilty prior to trial - and indeed prior to
the suppression ruling - and to deny them the right to complain
about governmental misconduct. 16 This belief is based on a credu-

lous acceptance of the possibility of intruding only upon the "illegitimate" interests of guilty suspects and a recasting of the criminal
procedure amendments as personal rights of the good guys. The
case law exhibits a utopian -

or dystopian -

faith in the possibility

that technology can find ways to discern only illegal activities, without intruding upon legitimate privacy expectations - a faith apparently unshaken by technology's failure to rise to the challenge, 17 or
by the danger of post-hoc justification. Indeed, as Justice Brennan
15. To be precise, he does not approve of classifying the police actions as "nonsearches"
and "nonseizures." He calls current definitions of search and seizure narrow and "unjustified" (p. 19) and argues in favor of expanding them in order to bring more conduct within the
Fourth Amendment. He would, however, uphold the searches and seizures as reasonable. In
addition, he would not exclude the fruits of such searches, even if the searches were found
unreasonable, because "contraband or stolen goods... were never one's property to begin
with .. " P. 22.
16. As the Red Queen said: "Sentence first - verdict afterward." Lawis CARROLL, ALICE IN WoNDERLAND 137 (Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 1946) (1865).
17. The dog sniff cases provide an illustration of the fallibility of methods designed to
expose only illegal interests. In United States v. Lyons, 957 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1992), the court
confronted the case of a drug-detecting dog who became agitated and tore the package in
two, spewing the contents on the floor and ingesting cocaine. The court determined that the
dog's conduct could be likened to a "natural occurrence" and could not be attributed to the
police - thus, no search had occurred. There have also been numerous cases in which such
dogs have badly bitten their quarry, and one in which a dog killed a burglary suspect. See
David G. Savage, When Bites Are Worse Than Barks, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1996, at 38; Robinette
v. Barnes, 854 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1988). Even if the "sniff" goes as planned, moreover, it
cannot be separated neatly from the intrusions that accompany it. See United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, 710 (1983) (holding that seizure of luggage during 90-minute wait for dog to
arrive was unreasonable); Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting
from denial of cert.) (arguing that dog sniff of high school students is an unconstitutional
search). See also Kamisar, supra note 5, at 960-64 (advocating that intrusion must be evaluated in light of entire chain of events).
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pointed out, the focus on the illegitimate product of the search
threatens the fundamental principle that "[a] search prosecuted in
violation
of the Constitution is not made lawful by what it brings to
8
light."1
On a similar note, in his discussions of Gideon v. Wainwright19
and the right to counsel in both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment
contexts, Amar makes plain his belief that the only true purpose of
supplying counsel is to ensure that the innocent are not wrongly
convicted. In the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination context, his
concern is with the possibility of an unreliable confession - one
elicited from a defendant who is actually innocent. He believes that
out-of-court protections should be keyed to minimizing this danger.
Thus, he advocates a supervised, civilized "deposition approach" to
interrogation, coupled with compulsion for suspects to talk truthfully (pp. 76-77).
Though Amar's proposals in the Fifth and Sixth Amendment
contexts diverge significantly from current law, the seeds are there.
The ever-expanding notion of harmless error reflects the belief that
so long as the trial verdict correctly separates the innocent from the
20
guilty, constitutional error during the trial need not be addressed.
21
Recently, in Arizona v. Fulminante, the Court even extended
harmless error analysis to the admission at trial of coerced confessions. Strickland v. Washington22 held that ineffective assistance of
counsel is not reversible error unless it likely affected the outcome
of the trial. Innocence appears to be on an inexorable rise to the
top of the values hierarchy - except, ironically, when to recognize
innocence would expand, rather than contract, the rights of
defendants.3
18. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 140 (Brennan, I., dissenting) (quoting Byars v. United States,
273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927)); see also United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,595 (1948) (holding that
a post-hoc justification for a search is impermissible). Amar notes with at least a hint of
approval that at common law, ex post facto success was a complete defense to an unlawful

search or seizure. P. 7.
19. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
20. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (rejecting rule that all constitutional
violations constitute reversible error); see also WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD) H. ISRAEL,
CRIMUNAL PROCEDURE § 27.6 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing harmless error doctrines); Tom Stacy
& Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 79 (1988)
(critiquing Supreme Court's harmless error jurisprudence); Daniel B. Yeager, Categorical
and Individualized Rights-Orderingon FederalHabeasCorpus, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 669,
709 (1994) ("Between 1967, when the Court decided Chapman v. California,and 1991, when

it decided Arizona v. Fulminante, the range of constitutional trial errors forgivable on appeal
went from none to nearly all.").
21. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
22. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
23. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (holding that absent exceptional circumstances a claim of actual innocence is not by itself sufficient reason for a federal court to
entertain a habeas petition, because it does not rise to the level of a constitutional claim); see
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In this section, I will discuss two major objections to identifying

innocence as one of our core values. First, Amar's conception of
innocence is simplistic and unworkable, and his belief in the possi-

bility of sorting the innocent from the guilty before determining
what process is due is both unrealistic and ill-advised. Second,

there are serious normative problems with claiming innocenceprotection as a core constitutional value - either historically or
currently.

The first step in illustrating the dangers of enshrining innocence
is to examine Amar's use of the term. Amar treats innocence es-

sentially as the question of "did he do it or not?" The innocent in
his world are those who did not commit murders, rapes, armed robberies, and other violent crimes: those who are or could be
threatened by the murderers and rapists.24

There are several problems with basing an overarching theory of
criminal procedure on such notions of innocence. First, notice that

Amar's paradigmatic guilty person is a murderer or other violent
felon. Indeed, the murderer's bloody knife appears again and again
in the pages of this book.25 Yet empirical data indicates that the
exclusionary rule that is the target of many of Amar's policy arguments has almost no negative impact on the prosecution of these
violent crimes. To the minimal extent that evidence is suppressed,
26

suppression occurs most often in drug cases.
Second, as the reach of criminal law expands, it becomes more
and more difficult to isolate Amar's paradigmatic innocent person.
In 1954, Professor Louis Shwartz observed, "The paradoxical fact is
that arrest, conviction, and punishment of every criminal would be
a catastrophe. Hardly one of us would escape, for we have all at
also Susan Bandes, Simple Murder: A Comment on the Legality of Executing the Innocent, 44
BuFF.L. REv. 501 (1996) (discussing Herrera).
24. The book is replete with comments like: "even a good lawyer cannot always save an
innocent but unpersuasive-sounding client from being demolished on the stand," p. 85; "even
an innocent person may say seemingly inculpatory things under pressure and suspicion and
when flustered by trained inquisitors," p. 71; "indictments can at times be laced with technical legal language that an accused person - especially, perhaps, if wholly innocent (say, in a
case of mistaken identity) - may not understand," p. 139; and "to throw out highly reliable
evidence that can indeed help us separate the innocent from the guilty - and to throw it out
by pointing to the Constitution, no less - is constitutional madness," p. 155.
25. See, e.g., pp. 26, 30, 160.
26. See Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn)
About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost"
Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FoUND.Rns. J. 611, 614-15, 637-38; Yale Kamisar, "ComparativeReprehensibility" and the FourthAmendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MicH. L. REv. 1, 26 n.120, 2728 (1987); Maclin, supra note 5, at 44; see also The Jury and the Search for Truth: The Case
Against Excluding Relevant Evidence at Trial: Hearing on S.3 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 143 (1995) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Prof. Thomas Y.
Davies) (positing that if similar statistics were available and analyzed today, they would reflect an even lower number of lost arrests, due to the more flexible probable cause standard
and the good faith exception).
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one time or another committed acts that the law regards as serious

offenses." 27 The difficulties in remaining "innocent" have multi-

plied in the past several decades. The Court permits various intrusions, including custodial arrest, for a host of minor traffic
infractions, such as driving with a burned-out tail light or license
plate light, failing to signal a turn, driving seven miles over the
speed limit, or having a loud muffler.28 Cars may be pulled over at
sobriety checkpoints. 29 Even pedestrians are not exempt from the

long arm of the law. 30 The growing administrative state offers numerous opportunities to violate regulatory statutes. 31 Homes may
be searched for faulty wiring,32 students may be searched for ciga34
rettes,33 and back yards may be surveilled for marijuana plants.
in the face
Can any one of us confidently claim long-term innocence
35
lawbreaker?
a
become
to
of so many opportunities
Finally, even if we confine the conversation to the paradigmatic
violent felon, the hurdles are insuperable. For one, Amar's view
ignores the degrees of culpability and the degrees of punishment

that must be assessed in, for example, a homicide investigation.
Michael Seidman said it well:
Since ultimate truths, even of the factual variety, are notoriously elusive, separating the innocent sheep from the guilty goats can be a difficult task. Moreover, much of the system's time and effort is often
diverted from this task to the infinitely more subtle and intractable
job of differentiating between types of goats. Even if the defendant is
guilty, the36questions remain how guilty he is and what we should do
with him.
27. Louis B. Schwartz, On Current Proposals to Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA. L.
REv. 157, 157 (1954).
28. See Carol M. Bast, Driving While Black: Stopping Motorists on a Subterfitge, 33
CRim. L. BULL 457, 482-86 app. A (1997). See also David Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority
Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 Sup. CT. REv. 271, 298-99 (observing that because almost everyone violates traffic rules sometimes, this means that the police,
if they are patient, can eventually pull over anyone they are interested in questioning).
29. See Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
30. See Norimitsu Onishi, Giuliani Crows as Theft Suspect is Caught on Jay Walking
Charge, N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 21, 1998, at B1 (jaywalker unable to produce identification was
brought to station, found to be a robbery suspect, placed in a lineup, and booked).
31. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
32. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
33. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
34. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1985).
35. Moreover, even those who have broken no law at all are at risk of being subjected,
albeit mistakenly, to overbearing police tactics. See, e.g., Bob Herbert, Reprise of Terror,
N.Y. TrAms, Mar. 12, 1998, at A25 (recounting two completely mistaken police intrusions on
the same day in each of which the police conduct was shocking and egregious).
36. Louis Michael Seidman, FactualGuilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 436, 441 (1980) (emphasis
added).
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A defendant who unquestionably has committed a homicide may
be exonerated for acting in self-defense or convicted of voluntary or
involuntary manslaughter. What, for example, would Amar do with
a case like Spano v. New York? 37 Spano, a 25-year-old, unsophisticated, emotionally unstable immigrant with a poor command of
English, was indicted for capital murder. Spano did not involve
strong-arm tactics that led to a false confession. The defendant
really did kill the deceased, and eyewitness testimony was available
to corroborate his confession. Instead, the case involved unconscionable police tactics which overbore the defendant's will, including lying and betrayal by a police officer who he thought was his
close friend, repeated denials of his requests to see his attorney, and
nearly twelve hours of incessant nighttime questioning. Spano
showed the value of a confession to law enforcement - it enabled
prosecutors to add to their homicide case Spano's statements that
the deceased was always "on his back," "always pushing" him, and
that he was "not sorry" he had shot him. What might have been
voluntary manslaughter or even self-defense could now be prosecuted successfully as first-degree murder. Is there room in Amar's
world view for gradations of factual innocence, or does the fact that
Spano really did shoot and kill a man irrevocably categorize him as
guilty?
Amar's attitude toward factual innocence reminds me of a question that countless laypeople asked me when I was an appellate defender: how could I defend people I knew were guilty? An
example I often used to illustrate the difficulty of "knowing"
whether my clients were guilty, despite the fact that they had all
been convicted of felonies, was my defense of Rosa Bennett. Ms.
Bennett was a battered woman who unquestionably had shot and
killed her husband. Ms. Bennett testified that her husband had
come home drunk and had physically and verbally abused her over
a period of several hours. In doing so, he tore and bloodied her
sweatshirt. In fear for her life, she shot him. The state claimed
that, contrary to Bennett's assertion, it did not have in its possession her torn and bloodied sweatshirt that would have corroborated
her claim that her husband had attacked her. Indeed, the state's
case rested on the lack of any physical evidence supporting Bennett's claim that she had acted in self-defense. Fortunately, an inventory slip revealed that the state indeed had taken the sweatshirt
from the crime scene. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed her
conviction.38 Even so, Bennett was not ultimately found "factually
innocent." She was convicted of voluntary manslaughter rather
than murder and was released from prison immediately rather than
37. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
38. See People v. Bennett, 402 N.E.2d 650 (I1 Ct. App. 1980).
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serving several additional years. Does she fall into the group of
law-abiding innocents whom Amar finds worthy of protection, or is
she one of the lawbreakers who receive such benefits as right to
counsel and right to discovery only as an unavoidable byproduct of
their provision to the law-abiding?
The descriptive problems with identifying the innocent are accompanied by another obstacle: the chronology problem. At what
point should it be determined who are the innocent who are worthy
of constitutional protection, and who are the guilty who are unworthy? It is often impossible, as it was with Rosa Bennett or Joseph
Spano, to separate the effects of evidentiary rulings from the ultimate degree of guilt or innocence. The difficulty of making this
determination at the outset was one salient lesson of the evolution
from Betts v. Brady39 to Gideon v. Wainwright,40 an evolution of
which Amar speaks with approval (p. 140). Because Clarence Earl
Gideon had a retrial, with counsel, in which witnesses were adequately cross-examined and the jury was introduced to the state's
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it was possible
41
to determine that he had been wrongly convicted in his first trial.42
How will we ever know whether Betts was wrongly convicted?
The concept of guilt or innocence gives no guidance in determining
his need for counsel. Amar and the current Supreme Court would
agree that a Gideon violation cannot be harmless error, but they
both miss the larger lesson - that the concept of innocence provides no coherent measure of what procedures ought to be followed
pretrial or at trial.
Amar claims innocence as a core value of the framers as well as
of contemporary society. Yet Amar's conception of innocence is
especially ironic and troubling because it is so relentlessly apolitical
and ahistorical. The colonists whose victimization led to the
Revolution were, for the most part, guilty as charged. They did
smuggle molasses for the manufacture of rum as well as other contraband, and they did violate the seditious libel laws. Their factual
innocence was hardly the source for the outrage of the colonists.
39. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
40. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
41. See ANTHoNY LEwis, GIDEON's TRUMPET 234-50 (Vintage Books 1989) (1964).

42. In an article in the 1962 University of Chicago Law Review, Professor Kamisar took a
fascinating and extensive look at the record of the Betts trial. He found the record to be rife
with error - suggestive lineup, failure to exclude witnesses from the courtroom while other
witnesses testified, possible fabrication of evidence, ambiguous identification, failure to sum-

mon key subpoenaed witnesses, and more. In addition to error, the record reflects innumerable lost opportunities to make a stronger defense - failures to call certain witnesses, failures
to cross-examine, Betts's own decision not to take the stand, failures to object to evidence,
and Betts's questionable decision to use an alibi defense, among others. See Yale Kamisar,
The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive

Right" of an Accused, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 42-56 (1962).
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The outrage stemmed from official repression and abuse - in the
way the crimes were defined, in the way investigations were conducted, and in the way convictions were obtained. Perhaps Amar
would like to argue that those were political dissidents, not real
criminalslike our current rapists and murderers, and that therefore
they were entitled to protections to which current real criminals are
not entitled. But he makes no case for the claim that the concern
for official lawlessness animating the Founders differs in kind from
the concern for official lawlessness that continues to affect our soci43
ety today.
What degree of liberty would our citizens - including our less
powerful citizens - experience under Amar's proposals? The dangers of Amar's focus on innocence are well illustrated by the widespread problem of racially and sexually discriminatory law
enforcement. Amar makes a powerful claim for his proposals that they will better enable questions of racial and sexual discrimination to be taken seriously (p. 150). But if this is the goal, his
analysis will have - to use his phrase - an "upside-down effect"
(p. 28). As I will discuss in detail below, the Court currently uses
innocence as a way of avoiding questions of racial pretext, discriminatory enforcement, bad faith, sexual harassment, and other forms
of official abuse. The focus on innocence is a very poor means of
achieving equality of treatment; instead, it works to inhibit it.44
One final significant problem with the focus on innocence is that
it ignores the concept of reasonable doubt. Amar treats the notion
of innocence as if it were objectively ascertainable, rather than an
often difficult task of sorting out conflicting and ambiguous evidence. Indeed, if factual innocence were as readily ascertainable as
Amar suggests, it might raise questions about the need to give the
state a handicap. Amar makes statements such as: "[W]e must remember that integrity and fairness are also threatened by excluding
evidence that will help the justice system to reach a true verdict" (p.
43. Consider the words of Professor Louis Schwartz:
Make no mistake about it. These are not rules for the protection of the innocent alone.
They are rules which operate and were intended to operate before anyone could decide
whether the suspect was innocent or guilty ....
Their particular usefulness to the
"guilty" is no accident, for many of these rules were written into the Constitution by real
"criminals," fresh from experience as smugglers, tax evaders, seditionists and traitors to

the regime of George III. Theirs was no mawkish sentimentality for miscreants. They
understood, as we must understand, that the law enforcement net cannot be tightened
for the guilty without enmeshing the innocent; that decent law enforcement is possible
without impairing the bulwarks against injustice and tyranny; and that the worth of a
society will eventually be reckoned not in proportion to the number of criminals it crucifies, burms, hangs or imprisons, but rather by the degree of liberty experienced by the
great body of its citizenry. There have never been more determined law enforcers than
Nazi Germany or the Soviet [Union].

Schwartz, supra note 27, at 158.
44. Amar suggests that the reasonableness focus will permit courts to focus on equality of
treatment. Here, too, his logic is upside-down. See infra text accompanying notes 83-104.
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25). What Amar fails to acknowledge is that, given the difficulties
and ambiguities of weighing the evidence, and the impossibility of
omniscience, a tiebreaker is needed. Further, he simply seems to
reject the notion that the tie should go to the defendant - that it is
better to let several guilty men go free than to convict one who is
innocent.
Amar pays tentative lip service to the state's burden, but he ap45
pears uncomfortable with it.
Amar does not seem to accept that
the state's burden reflects and flows from the recognition that the
Bill of Rights exists to help correct a severe power imbalance between the defendant and the awesome power and massed resources
of the state.46 This power imbalance, which Amar recognizes and
decries in every other area of scholarship, 47 is invisible in his work
on criminal procedure. The world he describes here is one in which
the state and the defendant are on an equal footing in the contest to
establish the truth.48 Indeed, any burdens and presumptions that
do exist should work in favor of the prosecution:
Given the almost metaphysical difficulties in knowing whether the
bloody knife or some evidentiary substitute would have come to light
anyway, should not the law strongly presume that somehow, some
way, sometime, the truth would come out? Criminals get careless or
cocky; conspirators rat; neighbors come forward; cops get lucky; the
truth outs; and justice reigns - or so our courts should presume, and
any party seeking to suppress truth and thwart justice should bear a
heavy burden of proof. [pp. 26-27]
This quotation brings us face to face with, not just Amar's conception of innocence, but his conceptions of truth and justice. Let us
turn to an examination of truth, and its interactions with innocence
and justice, in Amar's hierarchy of values.
Amar says that the pursuit of truth and the protection of innocence are the first principles animating the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments. But when he talks about the pursuit of truth, it becomes clear that it, too, is merely a subsidiary of the primary value
- protecting the innocent. For example, he refers to "the basic
trial value of truth seeking - sorting the innocent from the guilty"
(p. 3). He criticizes "modern doctrines that - in the name of the
Constitution, no less - exclude evidence the public knows to be
true" (p. 119). He goes on to say that "the gap between public truth
and truth allowed in the courtroom can demoralize the public,
45. See, e.g., p. 142 ("Counsel's line here is a fine one - between asking questions that
imply factual innocence and asking questions that merely imply reasonable doubt - but, in
principle, a workable one.").

.46. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); Bandes,
supra note 3, at 1032.

47. See infra notes 105 and 106 and accompanying text.
48. See Bandes, supra note 3, at 1022-31.
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whose faith in the judicial system is a key goal of the public trial
ideal" (p. 119); and again: "Truth and accuracy are vital values. A
procedural system that cannot sort the innocent from the guilty will
confound any set of substantive laws, however just. And so to
throw out highly reliable evidence that can indeed help us separate
the innocent from the guilty ...is constitutional madness" (p. 155).

Thus, truth, accuracy, and reliability seem to possess no identity
independent of their service to the ideal of protecting the innocent.
Truth becomes another way of asking whether the suspect really did
what he is accused of doing. Each trial is an individual exercise in
assuring that the correct person is put behind bars - nothing
more.49 Amar's equation of this exercise with the public interest is
especially interesting, because it suggests that societal values are affirmed by a just conviction. This comment in itself would not be
startling, but there is no counterbalancing recognition that the public interest is served by any values that do not promote sorting the
innocent from the guilty.
Let's examine these values in the context of the jury trial. If the
sole duty of the trier of fact were to establish factual innocence,
then the jury would not be the best body to perform this duty. The
jury symbolizes societal willingness to risk nonconviction for the
sake of other values. One such value is the community's ability to
mete out justice or exercise mercy on a local level. If the trier of
fact were expected merely to weigh the proof and apply the law, a
judge would be able to perform this duty at least as well as a jury.
Amar recognizes this. He talks at length of the colonists' distrust of
magistrates, for example, and their preference for juries, who, presumably, would nullify the oppressive laws of the Crown.50 He says
the proper response to crime is not merely good factfinding but
moral judgment by the community via the jury (p. 124). The question then becomes, if a jury trial is important for reasons other than
determining factual innocence, what are those reasons?
Perhaps Amar addresses this issue by his use of the phrase "normative innocence," which he defines as "I did it, but I did not
thereby offend the public's moral code," in contrast to "factual innocence," which he defines as "I didn't do it" (p. 90). But it is difficult to tell what "normative innocence" encompasses. If the phrase
encompasses values that provide a counterweight to factual inno49. In the criminal context, Amar seems oddly derisive of the idea that the trial serves a

public norm-creation function. See, for example, his discussion of the "Leavenworth lottery," pp. 157-58, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 178-180.
50. Pp. 11-12. He also argues that the jury is less corruptible than the judge, and that fear

of judicial corruption was a major reason for the colonial preference for jury trials. P: 121.
Tracey Maclin argues that Amar's history is incomplete and selective and that the vast majority of colonial judges refused to issue writs in the face of demands by the Crown, though it
meant risking their livelihood. See Maclin, supra note 5, at 21-25.
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cence, such as all the moral, political, visceral, and other community
values a jury might bring to bear, does this also lead to a concept of
normative truth - a truth which is moral and political, as well as
factual? If so, how does Amar square this with his evident faith
that guilt and innocence are objectively ascertainable? Moreover, if
finding the truth becomes a moral rather than a factual search,
which might lead to acquitting a factually guilty person because of
government oppression, then why should this idea of truth not encompass other nonaccuracy values, such as the need to exclude oppressively gained evidence to preserve judicial integrity?
Amar talks frequently about evidence the public knows to be
true or that will help the justice system reach a true verdict. He
does not come to terms with some essential truths about the trialrelated rights - that they set up hurdles for the government in order to attempt to counterbalance the threat of overzealous government prosecution, that they create a risk of nonconviction for the
sake of process rights,5 1 that these process rights must inhere across
the board in order to ensure both justice and the appearance of
justice, and that norms are created that transcend the particulars of
individual cases. Truth is just one of the values encompassed by
justice. As for truth itself, we should remain wary of those who
claim special access to it.
B.

The Values Animating Our "Profoundly Antigovernment"52 Constitution

Amar's scholarship on the criminal procedure amendments was
published as a series of articles before becoming a book. The article on the Fourth Amendment in particular, 53 and the Fifth Amendment article to a lesser extent,5 4 have elicited substantial critical
commentary.5 5 Articles by Donald Dripps, Yale Kamisar, Tracey
Maclin, and Carol Steiker take varied approaches to assessing
51. See, e.g., Conner v. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 3 Binn. 38 (Pa. 1810) ("The
suggestion that the party might escape is not of the least importance; it might be made in any
case, and thus turned into an instrument of the grossest oppression. The Constitution prefers
the escape of ten culprits, to the adoption of a practice which might lead to the imprisonment

of one innocent man." Therefore, the warrant must be based on probable cause and oath or
affirmation.).
52. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the FourthAmendment, 58 MiNN. L. REv.
349, 353 (1974).
53. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv. 757
(1994).
54. Akhil Reed Amar & Rene B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self
IncriminationClause, 93 MIcH. L. REv. 857 (1995).

55. See supra note 5 (listing articles). Amar's article on the Sixth Amendment, Akhil
Reed Amar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment FirstPrinciples,84 GEo. L.J. 641 (1996), was pub-

lished shortly before this book's publication. I therefore suspect the reactions to the Sixth
Amendment work will come in the form of book reviews rather than responses to the article.
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Amar's work. Each is must reading for those who wish to evaluate
Amar's approach to criminal procedure - including his historical
analysis, his assessment of the development and state of current
doctrine, his political and policy choices, his jurisprudence, and his
methodology. Despite their differing approaches, the articles sound
one common theme: that a great, and perhaps fatal, weakness in
Amar's analysis is its failure to confront the fact that the criminal
procedure amendments are meant to control governmental abuse
and overreaching.
As I have indicated, I share this view. In his focus on innocence,
Amar reads a host of precious values out of the Constitution. Many
of these values serve to address the inequality of power between
the government and the individual and the need to curtail abuse of
that power. Amar is well aware of the governmental oppression
that shaped the Constitution. In noncriminal contexts, as I will discuss below, governmental accountability is one of Amar's highest
values. But in the criminal context, he finds it too easily trumped
by another value: getting the bad guys.
Amar rests his conclusion that law enforcement interests trump
concerns for governmental abuse on the following reasoning. First,
he assumes that the interests of the prosecution and the defendant
are on par,56 an assumption that fails to confront the difference between the rights of the defendant, which are constitutionally enshrined, and the interests of the prosecution, which are not.
Second, he unfairly weights the interest in prosecution by assuming
that it is congruent with the interests of society, or "the people." 57
In doing so, Amar makes some peculiar assumptions about who
"the people" are and how the people's trust and confidence should
be earned. He assumes that "the people" is an entity completely
separate from those accused of crime. Indeed, he seems to assume
that "the people" gain when all the evidence comes out and when
the guilty are put behind bars. He says, for example: "[w]hen the
murderer's bloody knife is introduced, it is not only the government
that profits; the people also profit when those who truly do commit
crimes... are... convicted" (p. 26). But the presumption of innocence, evidentiary protections, the concern for judicial integrity,
and the control of governmental misconduct are all societal interests. Except for those as sure as Amar that they can identify the
bad guys and that the bad guys are not us, these protections them-

56. See, e.g., p. 25 ("[W]e must remember that integrity and fairness are also threatened

by excluding evidence that will help the justice system to reach a true verdict.").
57. He adds the "rights" of victims to this side of the equation as well. See, e.g., p. 26
("When rapists, burglars, and murderers are convicted, are not the people often more 'secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects?"').
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selves increase societal trust and confidence in the fair and evenhanded administration of the criminal justice system.58
Amar's focus on innocence and what he calls truth-seeking impedes recognition of many of these values. Evidentiary rules exclude substantial amounts of evidence that are "true" and
"accurate" in some sense of the words, but which are inflammatory,
prejudicial, irrelevant, or redundant. 59 Exclusion often serves values other than truth and accuracy. This is particularly true of
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rules, which, as Seidman says,
pose the pure case for the efficacy of truth-denying rules. 60 But it is
also true of the dignitary concerns underlying the right against selfincrimination 61 and the assurance of fair trials for all defendants
contained in the Sixth Amendment. 62 Respect for the autonomy
and dignity of the accused, the assurance of fair and evenhanded
processes, concern for the integrity and accountability of the institutions that administer criminal procedures - these are all truth-disabling values at times. They impede, and are intended to impede,
the government from doing all it can to put the guilty behind bars,
at least when the government attempts to do so in derogation of
other values.
Amar would not be particularly disturbed by my objection. Indeed, his whole point is that the values that impede truth-seeking
are the wrong values, precisely because they impede truth-seeking.
Unfortunately, even apart from the questionable and controversial
historical and doctrinal support he garners for his argument and
even apart from his failure to account for the vast changes in society
in general and police practices in particular since the time of the
framers, and even apart from the violence his proposals would do to
dignity, autonomy, and evenhanded process, Amar's proposals
should also be faulted because they will not achieve much of what
he himself wants to achieve. Let us assess his proposals in light of
58. As I have observed elsewhere, the legitimacy of the jury system, historically, depended in large part on the good opinion of those whose cases it adjudicated. If the jury

system maintained the appearance of justice in the eyes of the accused, it was more likely
that the community would accept its decisions as just. See Bandes, supra note 3, at 1046; see
also Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving"Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV.
545, 552 (1975).

59. See U.S. v. Quasar, 671 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1982) (unfair prejudice may be present when
inflammatory or otherwise shocking physical evidence or photographs are offered); see also
U.S. v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1981).
60. See Seidman, supra note 36, at 449.
61. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (stating that privilege reflects many of our fundamental values and noble aspirations, including our desire to protect
against statements elicited by inhumane treatment, our sense of fair play and our respect for
the inviolability of the human personality and each individual's right to lead a private life).
62. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968) (stating that the right to a jury trial
is essential for preventing miscarriages of justice andfor assuring that fair trials are provided
for all defendants).

May 1998]

"We the People"

1393

the dignity and judicial integrity values to which he assigns a low
priority, as well as in light of the equality value he holds dear.
1.

Dignity

Amar's proposals denigrate dignity in both expected and unexpected ways. Predictably, they are based on a lack of concern for
the dignity of the "guilty." But in addition, they would promote
widespread assaults on the dignity of society at large.
Assuming for the moment that the innocent can be sorted neatly
from the guilty, one deeply troubling aspect of Amar's elevation of
innocence is its corollary: that the guilty are not entitled to protec63
tion. In my view, every human being is entitled to some dignity.
Even someone who has murdered in cold blood is entitled to a lawyer at his trial to ensure fair process, a warrant before his home is
searched to ensure reason for the intrusion, warnings before he decides whether to confess to ensure free will and lack of coercion,
and, at bottom, the recognition that he is still a part of the human
community. Amar, as I understand it, simply disagrees with the
proposition that the guilty are entitled to dignity by virtue of their
humanity.64 At that level of disagreement, the Constitution and the
Federalist Papers can advance the conversation only so far.
Ironically, Amar's proposals would also damage the dignity of
those he seeks to protect. Amar briefly acknowledges that his reasonableness regime brings the danger of "too much arbitrariness
and ad hoc-ery, unbounded by public, visible rules.. ." (p. 38). His
solution to the problem is that "a broader search is sometimes better -

fairer, more regular, more constitutionally reasonable ..

."

(p. 38). This is precisely the reasoning behind the ever-growing category of special needs searches, extending governmental invasions
of privacy to high school athletes, customs employees, railroad employees,65 members of the President's cabinet 66 and others not usu63. See Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CBS. L.

REv. 361, 412 (1996).
64. Amar does recognize that forcible pumping of a suspect's stomach "without sufficient

justification is horribly wrong." P. 251 nA3. Of course, the "sufficient justification" escape
hatch raises questions about what Amar would consider adequate justification for forcible
stomach pumping. Apparently, he advocates an ad hoc reasonableness inquiry in these cases,
too. He would allow judges to weigh the invasiveness or humiliation of the examination or
act against the gravity of the charged offense and the importance of the evidence to the

prosecution's case. P. 83. Under such criteria, it seems likely that Professor Maclin is correct
that the Rochin holding itself might not survive. See Maclin, supra note 5, at 52-53 (discussing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)).
65. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).

66. See ROBERT REICH, LocKED N THE CABin'ar 46 (1997) for an amusing description of
the urine test administered to the Secretary of Labor.
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class,"' 67 without the

requirement for individualized suspicion or a warrant. Amar would
like to extend this reasoning beyond special needs cases, to cases in
which criminal activity is suspected.68 He suggests that if such
searches land disproportionately on certain groups, such as poor
persons or persons of color, the government may claim that such
groups are also disproportionate beneficiaries of the scheme, because the search is designed to reduce their risk of victimization. 69
Thus, Amar advocates widening the net that will enmesh both innocent and guilty. In evaluating Amar's proposals, we should recall
Professor Shwartz's warning that "the worth of a society will eventually be reckoned not in proportion to the number of criminals it
crucifies, burns, hangs or imprisons, but rather by the degree of liberty experienced by the great body of its citizenry.

' 70

Most of all,

we should recall the words of Justice Jackson, written three years
after he returned from prosecuting the Nuremberg defendants:
[O]ne need only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people
possessed of many admirable qualities but deprived of [Fourth
Amendment] rights to know that the human personality deteriorates
and dignity and self-reliance disappear where homes, persons and
possessions are
subject at any hour to unheralded search and seizure
71
by the police.
2. Abuse of Power

Amar is derisive about the values of judicial integrity and fairness, which he calls a "slogan [which] sits atop a pile of dubious
assumptions and inferences" (p. 25). Amar discusses these values
67. See Note, "SpecialNeeds" and the FourthAmendment: An Exception Poised to Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 529, 541-42 and nn.96-100
(noting that lower courts have permitted suspicionless drug testing of emergency medical
technicians, Federal Bureau of Prisons employees, certain Department of Education employees, Detroit police officers, and airline industry employees in safety-sensitive positions).
Scott Sundby makes an insightful point in this regard. He argues that the very category of
special needs searches is a shift from the usual presumption of innocence: it permits government "to treat citizen as rule-breaker even in the absence of a fair probability that the citizen
is not obeying the law." Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman"s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or
Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. Rv.1751, 1799 (1994).
68. P. 32 (calling the present regime "upside down."). Special needs searches have already been extended to some criminal investigations. See Michigan Dept. of State Police v.
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (permitting sobriety checkpoints).
69. This reasoning was properly rejected in Prattv. Chicago Hous.Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792
(N.D. IlM.1994) (holding the CHA housing sweeps violative of the Fourth Amendment). If a
group desires to be searched, each member of the group is free to consent to a search. It is
only the powerless, however, who have to choose between rampant crime and the wholesale
waiver of constitutional rights. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent.").
70. Schwartz, supra note 27, at 157, 158.
71. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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and their impact on the exclusionary rule in a section entitled
"Modern Moves" (pp. 25-31). The discussion is revealing both for
what it says and for what it leaves unexamined. Amar discusses
judicial integrity and fairness solely in the context of the exclusionary rule, and thus he dismisses them in part because other American civil courts and criminal courts in other countries do not use the
rule but do not lack integrity (pp. 25-31). But judicial integrity and
fairness are not just "slogans" or "moves" to defend the exclusionary rule; they are both important values in their own right, and aspects of a larger concern animating the Constitution: concern
about lawless and abusive governmental tactics.
Amar treats judicial integrity as a purely symbolic concern and one we can no longer afford to honor. He treats it as if it exists
in a vacuum, unconnected to police abuse. I will discuss Amar's
consistent practice of isolating and atomizing governmental conduct
in more detail in the next section. Here is one excellent example of
how it works: Amar can dismiss the need for exclusion of tainted
evidence because he focuses solely on the ultimate product of the
trial, which he views as the verdict. He fails to focus on the entire
chain of governmental conduct and misconduct at issue.7 2 Then he
defines his task as determining which is more harmful to the acceptability of the verdict, the use of tainted evidence at trial or the failure to convict one whom the people know to be guilty. But
evidence does not spring fully formed into the courtroom. It was
obtained through police misconduct on the street, and often makes
its way to court through additional police misconduct as well as the
misconduct of other governmental agents. Police sometimes coerce
confessions, make wrongful searches, write false police reports, or
fail to turn over exculpatory evidence, and then lie, both out of
court and in court, about having done so. 7 3 Such police conduct is
repugnant regardless of whether it affects the innocent or the guilty.
The court's use of evidence' obtained through police misconduct
compromises the fairness and integrity of the trial. The judicial use
of tainted evidence not only fails to condemn governmental lawlessness but also encourages it to continue, by sending the clear
message that the evidence is welcome and will increase the chances
of conviction.
Why police misconduct is not repugnant in its own right, even
when it is directed at the guilty, is an issue Amar never confronts
directly. For example, he says:
72. Kamisar makes this point powerfully in his critique of Amar and Lettow's proposal to
admit the fruits of compelled statements. See Kamisar, supra note 5, at 960-64; see also Amar

& Lettow, supra note 54.
73. See Bandes, supra note 23, at 514-15 & nn.73-76.
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Once we realize, as did the Founders, that we must provide deterrent
remedies for innocent citizens, we can put an analytically proper remedy in place, and exclusion is no longer necessary to deter. And, not
coincidentally, our proper remedial scheme will be right side up, making innocent citizens whole and denying guilty defendants windfalls.
[p. 138]
In other words, there is simply no need to deter police from illegally
searching or seizing the guilty - if the guilty avoid subjection to
such illegal police conduct as a byproduct of the protection of the
innocent, then they receive a windfall.
Nor does Amar explain why police misconduct should be laundered by placing it in the hands of court personnel. He elides the
fact that the very use of tainted evidence has serious consequences
that are both symbolic and pragmatic. It threatens both the equitable stance of the court and the appearance of justice, thus compromising the court's authority to pass judgment on the lawless. As the
Supreme Court observed, "The criminal goes free, if he must, but it
is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government
more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its
disregard for the charter of its own existence. ' 74 As Justice Holmes
similarly observed in his famous dissent in Olmstead, "[N]o distinction can be taken between the Government as prosecutor and the
Government as judge. If the existing code does not permit district
attorneys to have a hand in such dirty business it does not permit
the judge to allow such iniquities to succeed. '75
But this concern is not merely symbolic. The refusal to condone
police misconduct provides a judicial check on the continuation of
the unconstitutional behavior. 76 The judicial use of wrongly obtained evidence, conversely, has the real world effect of encouraging the police to continue breaking the law, because it gives them
every incentive to do so. 77 Even in Amar's universe of values, this
is a highly problematic result, because such lawbreaking will not be
confined to the guilty. But in addition, Amar's willingness to condone a judicial system comfortable with the use of illegal evidence
helps explain his dismissive attitude toward "fairness." He sees it as
a process value which is important only when it affects the innocent.
His approach is firmly fixed on the bottom line - the reliability of
the conviction, the search, the confession, and little concerned with
74. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,659 (1961); see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
222-24 (1960).
75. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
76. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring ConstitutionalViolations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLuM. L. Rav. 247, 282

(1988).
77. See infra text accompanying notes 150-172.
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the way in which the conviction, the contraband, or the confession
is obtained.
The same bottom-line approach characterizes his Fifth and Sixth
Amendment analysis. His overriding concern about confessions is
with their reliability, and the means by which they are obtained
seem to concern him most when they impinge on reliability. His
concern about the right to counsel is with ensuring vindication of
the innocent, and his argument for the right contains no theoretical
support for the notion that all accused persons are entitled to counsel. It would have been interesting to see a more nuanced treatment of some of the attorney misconduct issues that often arise.
For example, it is unlikely that Amar would object to improper
closing arguments, or perhaps even shoddy and unprepared counsel, where there was sufficient independent evidence of guilt. He
describes the importance of a public trial in terms of factfinding, in
terms of normative judgment toward the accused, and in terms of
the education of jurors. But he barely mentions its importance in
terms of safeguarding the fairness of the process and in preserving
the appearance of justice (p. 122).
The right Amar recognizes is, simply put, the right not to be
wrongly convicted. Safeguards governing the conduct of police investigative techniques or the conduct of trial carry little weight unless they can be shown to have affected this ultimate right. The
argument is, taken to its logical conclusion, an efficiency argument
one that devalues process and all that process protects, and asks
only whether the correct result was achieved. 78
Amar's singular focus on the ultimate right is exemplified by his
high regard for the inevitable discovery and independent source
doctrines, to which he complains that courts have given "too little
rein.'79 These doctrines are premised on the assumption that the
78. Although Amar says he breaks with Judge Posner's "crude cost-benefit analysis" (p.
35 and n.168), he does not explain how his theories stop short of Judge Posner's efficiency

model, see, e.g., Hessel v. O'Hearn, 977 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1992). Indeed, in his analysis of
how a remedy would work in the speedy trial context, Amar argues that a guilty person who
was wrongly incarcerated pretrial but who would eventually be incarcerated posttrial deserves no remedy, because his detention "does not appear to have caused any incremental
deprivation of liberty." P. 111 (referring to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971)). This reasoning recalls one of the cruder
examples of Judge Posner's application of economic principles to constitutional values: his
argument that the victim in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. ofSoc. Servs., 812 F.2d 298

(7th Cir. 1987), had no right violated, as he "would probably have been no better off if the
negligent caseworker had never intervened; he would simply have been beaten into a vegetative state by his father that much earlier." Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1225 (7th

Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., concurring). See also Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A
Critique, 88 MicH. L. REv. 2271, 2290 (1990).

79. P. 156 (arguing for expansion of the inevitable discovery doctrine in the Fourth
Amendment context). See also p. 60-61 (arguing that in the Fifth Amendment context, law
should establish an irrebuttable presumption that the truth and the fruits of compelled testi-

mony would have come to light anyway).
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police should be put in the position they would have been in had
they not violated the Constitution, as it is more important to solve
crimes than to create disincentives for police misconduct.80 Would
Amar's theories not validate a confirmatory search, 81 for example,
on the theory that the police could have obtained a warrant, and
therefore should not be penalized for conducting a warrantless
search in order to save the time it would take to go downtown?
Would they not validate knowing and repeated improper closing
arguments by a prosecutor, so long as the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming in each case? Would they not validate
threats of violence calculated to elicit a confession, if independent
reliable evidence of the defendant's guilt existed? Do they not
adopt Justice Powell's position in Kimmelan v. Morrison,82 that the
failure to object to illegally seized but reliable evidence does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel? If not, Amar has not
explained why not.
3.

Equality

Amar's tendency to downplay or ignore the concern with police
misconduct leads to many of his most troubling, and normatively
unattractive, "big ideas. '8 3 Most troubling of all, it directly interferes with one of his dearly held goals - to promote equality of
treatment.
Amar's proposal to replace the requirements for warrants and
probable cause with a reasonableness regime is a case in point.
Amar's use of textualism takes him to a very odd place. He reasons
that the colonists feared judges above all, and that therefore they
80. Cf Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988) (adopting the independent
source doctrine, based on the rationale that while government should not profit from its

illegal activity, neither should it be placed in a worse position than it would otherwise have
occupied); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441-44 (1984) (adopting the inevitable discovery

doctrine, based on the rationale that police should not be put in a worse position than they
would have occupied absent their unlawful conduct); Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95

YALE L.J. 906 (1986) (arguing that the deterrence rationale requires that government illegality should place government in worse position than it would otherwise have occupied). Indeed, as Professor Kamisar points out, Amar's and Lettow's Fifth Amendment argument to
admit all physical fruits of coerced confessions would actually put the police in a better position than they would have been in, absent their misconduct, since it would admit the fruits
regardless of whether they would have been discovered in any event. See Kamisar, supra
note 5, at 1004.

81. A confirmatory search is a warrantless search conducted by police in order to deter-

mine whether it is worth the trouble to get the requisite warrant. See Murray, 487 U.S. at 547

(Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing confirmatory searches). Amar comes close to approving
confirmatory searches. P. 26.
82. 477 U.S. 365, 396 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
83. See p. 65 ("What's the Big Idea?"); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Fifty-Seventh
Cleveland-MarshallLecture: The Bill of Rights and Our Posterity, 42 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 573,
585 (1994) (discussing the importance of finding "the big idea," or core concept, underlying
constitutional provisions).
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did not mean to elevate the judicial warrant requirement (pp. 1017). Rather, they meant to give power to juries (pp. 10-17). Amar
has been criticized for his reading of history and for his on-again,
off-again textualism. 84 But even apart from these grave problems
with his analysis, he makes some outrageous leaps. He reasons that
because the warrant requirement was not very important to the
framers, neither was the probable cause requirement that is nested
in the same clause. Therefore, the linchpin of the Fourth Amendment must be the other clause - reasonableness. He accuses supporters of probable cause of "doubly flawed logic," but this is
precisely the problem with his own reasoning. He uses his misreading of the historical importance of the warrant clause to "drag[ ]
along its yoked mate, the probable cause requirement"8 5 - or drag
them both down together, to be precise.
Once Amar has disposed of the Warrant Clause and the probable cause requirement,8 6 he argues that a reasonableness regime
would accomplish a number of goals. He argues that it would allow
a more calibrated notion of what searches ought to be permitted.
For example, more serious crimes might require less reason for intrusion (p. 33). A reasonableness regime would permit the interests
of victims to be placed in the balance (pp. 37-38). It also would
allow the jury to do much of the balancing, because "the jury is
perfectly placed to decide, in any given situation, whom it fears
more, the cops or the robbers."8 7 On top of all that, a reasonableness regime would allow us to deal more openly and honestly with
questions of race and gender discrimination (p. 38).
Amar is undoubtedly correct that a reasonableness regime
would encourage more of a sliding scale, more balancing, more concern for victims, and more room to factor in fear of robbers, or
respect for cops. But all this is a good thing only for someone who
84. See Maclin, supra note 5, at 4-25; Steiker, supra note 5, at 826-30.
85. P. 18. Tracey Maclin's article contains an excellent and extended rebuttal to Amar's
historical arguments against the importance of the warrant clause. See Maclin, supra note 5,

at 10-25; see also Hearing,supra note 26, at 133-38 (statement of Prof. Thomas Y. Davies)
(refuting Amar's contention that reasonableness was the Framers' core concern).
86. Amar never really explains how he can read them both nearly out of the Fourth
Amendment while still taking the text seriously. He explains that the "warrant" and "probable cause" language cannot mean what some scholars claim, because the language does not

say, and cannot mean, that warrants and probable cause are required in all cases. See p. 152.
See also Akhil Reed Amar, The FourthAmendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30

StrFoLK U. L. REv. 53, 74-75 (1996). But this is a straw argument. He cites no one who
argues that the presumption in favor of warrants should be irrebuttable. See Maclin, supra
note 5, at 5-8. In any case, Amar does not explain the prominence of the language in the text
of the Fourth Amendment, nor does he explain the "puzzling persistence of the warrant

requirement." Steiker, supra note 5, at 847.
87. P. 44. But see Steiker, supra note 5, at 850 ("[J]uries will almost always fear the
robbers more than the cops, but this fact does not necessarily mean that everything the cops

do is 'reasonable."').
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believes that the police can be trusted to make these determinations
without meaningful prior guidelines. The puzzling question is why
someone with Amar's knowledge of and sensitivity toward the Civil
Rights era and its legacy would believe such a thing.
Amar cites Terry v. Ohio88 to support his claim that his proposed reasonableness analysis will advance the values of equality.
He says it is "probably no coincidence" that Terry, which carved out
exceptions to the probable cause and warrant requirements, contained "one of the most open discussions of race to date" (p. 37).
But in fact, Terry is both a cause and a prime illustration of the
damage that reasonableness analysis has done to equality values in
the Fourth Amendment context. Though Terry has been salutary to
the extent it has brought street level practices within the reach of
the Fourth Amendment, it has been a disaster to the extent its reasonableness analysis has begun doing exactly what Amar advocates:
swallowing up the Warrant Clause. Thanks to Terry and its progeny, we need not speculate about the effects of a reasonableness
regime. We can simply observe that nearly every time the Terry
balancing methodology has been employed, the needs of law enforcement have outweighed the rights of defendants. 89 We can also
note that the street level practices Terry sought to regulate through
this balancing regime are rife with massive, race-based harassment
and abuse. 90 And when the Court has acknowledged racial concerns in this context, it has found pretextual stops91 or drug courier
profiles 92 to be reasonable, without regard to race. Some lower
courts have found race to be a reasonable profiling factor in authorizing a Terry stop under some circumstances. 93
Many of the most flagrantly discriminatory abuses of police
power take place in the context of traffic stops. These include persistent and notorious patterns of stopping disproportionate numbers of black motorists for minor. violations - for example, a
88. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
89. See Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 660-64 (1995); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 618-33 (1989);
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); Pennsylvania
v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-12 (1977); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-50 (1972).
90. See Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MiAMi L. REv. 425, 428-32
(1997); Elizabeth A. Gaynes, The Urban Criminal Justice System: Where Young + Black +
Male = Probable Cause, 20 FoRDHAm UirB. L.J. 621, 625 (1993).
91. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
92. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); see also Michael Higgins, Looking
the Part, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1997, at 48, 50 (describing airport stops apparently based solely on
race or alienage, such as stopping passengers with Arabic-sounding surnames).
93. See United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1992). But see City of St. Paul v.
Uber, 450 N.W.2d 623 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that racial incongruity is not a proper
basis for a Terry stop). See also Sklansky, supra note 28, at 317 (arguing that although Terry
itself made explicit its concern with race, that "theme has largely disappeared from Fourth
Amendment law").
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burned-out tail light or a failure to signal a lane change - and then
finding various pretexts to search their cars or persons for drugs. 94
The Court has declined every opportunity to regulate this misconduct. It has given police wide latitude to make warrantless custodial arrests, refusing to require any local rulemaking on the subject
of what sorts of crimes may lead to custodial arrests. 95 It has refused to inquire into whether police conduct was pretextual - that
is, whether a reasonable officer would have made an arrest based
on the conduct at issue.96 It has refused to require an officer who
has completed a Terry stop to inform the suspect that he is free not
to answer
subsequent questions unrelated to the purpose of the
stop. 97 It consistently has reaffirmed that its only concern is
98
whether the officer had the authority to make the arrest or search.
In other words, was the motorist guilty of driving with a burned out
taillight, or was he not? Was he driving with an expired license or
not? If he was not factually innocent of the crime charged, the
Court finds no cause to complain about further search. 99
We also should note that if juries are asked whom they fear
more, the cops or the robbers, evidence shows that race will likely
figure -

to the detriment of minorities -

in their decisions about

whom to fear and whom to value.100 For example, the Baldus studies have demonstrated that race plays a significant role in determining which defendants are sentenced to die. 10 1 There is something
chilling about Amar's frequent use of the term "common sense."'10 2
Experience shows that our folk wisdom about who is "just
plain
1 03
folks" often acts to exclude those who are not "like us."'
Of course, these are not results that Amar desires - quite the
opposite. But his regime will not protect minorities. His structure
simply does not account for police behavior in the real world. Ex94. See Bast, supra note 28; David A. Harris, Factorsfor Reasonable Suspicion: When
Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 679-81 (1994); Sheri Lynn
Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspec; 93 YALE LJ.214, 225-30 (1983).
95. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224-37 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414
U.S. 260, 263-66 (1973).
96. See Whren, 116 S.Ct. at 1772-74.
97. See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S.Ct. 417, 421 (1996).
98. See Whren, 116 S.Ct. at 1774; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
99. See Whren, 116 S.Ct. at 1774; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236. The Court also has raised
substantial hurdles to claims of racially discriminatory enforcement. See United States v.
Armstrong, 116 S.Ct. 1480 (1996).
100. DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JusTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYsis 148-49 (1990).
101. See id.; cf.McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,291 n.7 (1987) (assuming the validity of
the Baldus study conclusions); Bandes, supra note 63, at 398 n.187.
102. See p. 32 (discussing common sense (tort) reasonableness).
103. See Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 SMU L. REv. 373, 374-75 (1992) (describing
the dangers of judging competency and sanity based on "ordinary common sense").
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perience shows again and again that preclearance, 1 4 limits on discretion, and neutral third parties are essential when the
opportunities for abuse and discrimination are as rampant as they
are on the street. It is true that these safeguards will also act to
protect the bad guys - there is no way around it.
II.

AMAR'S ATOMISTIC CONSTITUTION

[T]he Constitution draws its life from postulates that limit and control
lawless governments, not postulates that limit and control citizens in
their efforts to vindicate constitutional rights.' 0 5

I have long admired Amar's federal courts scholarship. Perhaps, in retrospect, it was an instance of reading what I wanted to
into another's scholarship, but I do not think so. Certain values
emanate from Amar's work on government liability: the constitutional mandate for full remediation; the inherent value of constitutional rights -

independent of their private law analogues and

independent of the will of the majority; the flexible and evolving
nature of constitutional norms; the overriding importance of governmental accountability; and the systemic nature of much governmental misconduct, and therefore the need for systemic remedies to

combat it.106 I also have admired Amar's determination to read the
Constitution as a whole and to identify its overarching values.'0 7

In Amar's treatment of the criminal procedure amendments,
these values are lost, or at least very hard to find. Here he seems
blinded to the deep structure of the substantive and remedial model
he champions elsewhere. The most salient characteristic of his
analysis in this area is its tendency toward atomization - of governmental conduct, of the interests of defendants, of remedial options, and ultimately, of the Constitution itself - as Amar's
analysis in this area stands in isolation from even his own approach
toward the remainder of the Constitution. In this section, I will examine the ways in which Amar's ideas about criminal procedure
diverge from the values of connectedness, accountability, full
remediation, the inherent value of rights, and an evolving Constitution. I divide the analysis into two sections. The first section argues
104. Amar allows that "[p]reclearance might also help firm up the record of what facts
the government had before the intrusion, thereby preventing officials from dreaming up post
hoe rationalizations" and that at times prior approval from a "more neutral and detached
decision maker" might be needed to pass constitutional muster. Pp. 38-39. But his baffling
proposal is that the decision to require preclearance should be "pragmatic, contingent, and
subject to easy revision" and should be based on whether preclearance is reasonable under
the particular circumstances. Pp. 38-39. He offers no further details of who would make
these decisions, at what point in the proceedings, and based on what actual criteria.
105. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1485 (1987).

106. See id.; Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 7.
107. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 7, at 1131 (calling for a holistic interpretation of the Bill
of Rights and the Constitution).
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that Amar views the constitutional rights of the accused - or at
least, those he would view as justly accused - as having no inherent value, but instead as worthy of protection only to the extent
they jibe with majoritarian preferences. The second section examines his atomistic view of the wrongful conduct these amendments
seek to regulate and the remedies that should flow from their
violation.
A.

What is the Worth of UnpopularRights?

Amar has often spoken with admiration of the principles embodied in the cases of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics'0 8 and Ex Parte Young.10 9 For example, in
First Principles, Amar advocates "a Section 1983/Ex Parte Young!
Bivens model featuring before-the-fact prevention via injunctions
and after-the-fact compensation and deterrence via damages" (p.
115). Amar explained that the major achievement of Bivens and
Young was their recognition of the self-executing nature of the
Constitution, and therefore of the Court's power to infer a damage
action directly under the Constitution. 110 He lamented the fact that
the promise of Bivens was only partially fulfilled, as it permitted
only a suit against individual, possibly judgment-proof, officers and
not against the governmental entity, though "a governmental wrong
...seems naturally to call for governmental liability." ''
Why was it so important for Bivens and Young to recognize the
self-executing nature of constitutional rights, and what precisely is it
that these cases recognized? Prior to Bivens, the only damage remedy generally provided for unconstitutional searches was a private
trespass suit against the agent." 2 The other possible source of a
damage suit was a statute, though it is well known that there was no
113
federal statutory cause of action available to Webster Bivens.
The importance of Bivens and Young was twofold. It flowed from
their recognition that, first, the constitutional right itself has inherent value, apart from its incidental congruence with common law or
private law protections (pp. 106-07), and second, the constitutional
right has value apart from the willingness of an elected legislature
108. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Amar cites Bivens 14 times in the FirstPrinciplesbook alone.
See pp. 29, 41, 110-11, 115, 139, 180 n.4, 193 n.139, 194 n.151, 199 n.209, 209, 210, 236 n.78, 237
n.86, 239 n.111, 252 n.48.
109. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
110. See Amar, supra note 105, at 1507-08.
111. Id-at 1507-08.
112. See id. at 1506-07.
113. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("For people in Bivens'
shoes, it is damages or nothing.").
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to grant it statutory protection. 114 The problem with the cases, as
both Amar and I have pointed out, is that the recognition is incomplete - the Court is too tied to the private law model to create the
enterprise liability that would provide full remediation and the
most effective assurance of governmental accountability. 1" 5
In light of Amar's admiration for the Bivens principle, it is surprising to find that his views of the criminal procedure protections
paint a considerably less generous portrait of the worth of the underlying rights and the need for full remediation. What is the worth
of the rights of the accused? Oddly, Amar heaps a host of conditions on the recognition of these rights. These conditions are directly antithetical to the ideals of Bivens. In fact, several of them
are in conflict with the very notion of the Constitution as a
countermajoritarian document that will safeguard rights despite the
popular will. It seems that Amar will assign value to the criminal
procedure rights only if at least one of the following conditions is
met:
(1) The right jibes with tort or property notions.
(2) The legislature passes a statute recognizing the right.
(3) A jury is willing to compensate the loss of the right.
(4) The remedy for the right is spelled out in the Constitution.
1. The Right Jibes with Tort or Property Notions
Amar's reliance on the common law antecedents of criminal
procedure is particularly surprising. He uses the Constitution's
"background common law principles" both to define the rights involved and to define the proper remedies - specifically, to argue
against the exclusionary rule. As to the definition of the right, for
example, he argues that tort law, because it is keyed to the invasion
of the search itself, "focuses precisely on the scope of the [Fourth
Amendment] violation" (p. 158) in a way that our current regime,
which focuses on exclusion and deterrence, does not. He argues
that the language protecting security in "'persons, houses, papers,
and effects' should remind us of the background common law principles... [of] the law of tort.""116 He criticizes the exclusionary rule
because it is based on no common law antecedents and because
114. See Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL.

L. REv. 289, 293-320 (1995); see also Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The

Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1532, 1540-43 (1972).
115. P. 110. See Bandes, supra note 114, at 325-34.
116. P. 20 (referring to the language of the Fourth Amendment). See also pp. 152-53
(repeating the assertion that the Fourth Amendment conjures up tort law).
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"tort law remedies were ... clearly the ones presupposed by the
117
Framers of the Fourth Amendment."'
Yet the central lesson of Bivens was precisely counter to these
arguments. Bivens stated, most famously, that an abuse of power
by a governmental agent is different and more serious than a similar
abuse by a private person. It rests on the insight that there is a
constitutionally significant difference between a trespass, battery, or
false imprisonment by a private person and an illegal search or
seizure by a government agent, and that both the scope of the right
and the nature of the remedy need to reflect that difference. 118 It
observed that "[o]ur cases have long since rejected the notion that
the Fourth Amendment proscribes only such conduct as would, if
engaged in by private persons, be condemned by state law." 1 9 Bivens's achievement - its recognition of the self-executing Constitution - was made possible by its rejection of the notion of a suit
against government as a tort-like proceeding between private parties. Its limitation - its failure to recognize governmental liability
- was a product of its vestigial loyalty to the private rights model.
Amar attempts to finesse the inconvenient parts of the tort
model - such as its inability to accommodate enterprise liability by arguing that it must be "supplemented," (p. 159) "translated,"
(p. 159) and "brought into the twenty-first century" (pp. 29-30).
Conveniently for his thesis, he finds that the twenty-first century
version of the framers' intent would accord precisely with his proposals. The modem version would account for the vast changes in
government, police practices, and race relations since colonial
times 120 by upgrading "the civil model rather than inventing out of
whole cloth a criminal one" (p. 30). It would compensate the innocent but not the guilty, it would replace the warrant and probable
cause requirements with a regime of "common law (tort) reasonableness"' 121 and it would permit class aggregation techniques, civil
injunctions, a ten percent sentencing discount for defendants with
valid Fourth Amendment claims, and enterprise liability, but not
the exclusionary rule. Why? Because "[t]he modern-day
117. P. 21. But see Hearing, supra note 26, at 133-38 (statement of Prof. Thomas Y. Da-

vies) (offering an interesting historical account of the late appearance of the exclusionary
rule).
118. See Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, at 392.
119. See Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, at 392.
120. See Steiker, supra note 5, at 830-44. Amar responds to Steiker's point that police are

far more organized and dangerous than they were in the 1780s by suggesting that "we should
further ask whether violent criminals are also more organized and dangerous." P. 197 n.190.
121. Pp. 32-35. Amar suggests that tort concepts of reasonableness must be understood
in the context of constitutional law. He illustrates with examples of how the protections of
the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments should be read in conjunction with the Fourth

Amendment. Pp. 35-40. But these illustrations fail to address a basic point - how the constitutional concept differs from the tort concept as to the Fourth Amendment itself.
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equivalent of a horse and buggy is a car, not an Andy Warhol
22
poster."1
Amar never deals with the evidence - both empirical and anecdotal - that tort remedies have been massively ineffective in cases
against police officers. For multiple reasons, including lack of incentive to sue, lack of jury sympathy for defendants, state-law immunities, and the fact that police misconduct often consists of small,
incremental violations rather than dramatic episodes, the likelihood
of significant damage awards is extremely small. 12 Moreover, even
a longstanding series of large settlement awards, totalling tens of
millions of dollars a year, has failed to cause cities like New York or

Chicago to re-examine their policies on police brutality, or even to
discipline the individual officers involved. 124

Amar advocates the use of minimum presumed damages in
Fourth Amendment cases (p. 42). Ironically, the Court's current
treatment of presumed damages is grounded in the tort law principles Amar espouses and gives direct evidence of the worth of the
rights in a private law context. In Carey v. Piphus'25 and Memphis
Community School Districtv. Stachura,126 the Court held that dam-

ages could be awarded based not on any inherent or presumed
value or importance of constitutional rights, but only on the actual
injury suffered, with possible consideration of punitive damages in
the former case. The actual injury would be measured by... tort
concepts! If the plaintiff had not suffered a common law harm such
as bodily injury, economic or property harm, or emotional distress,
he could recover no more than one dollar in nominal damages.
122. P. 30. Amar turns for support to Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation,71 TEXAS
L. REv. 1165 (1993). P. 194 n.152. Yet Amar's version of fidelity theory as it applies to the
Fourth Amendment seems far more limited than both Lessig's own version and Amar's version when dealing with noncriminal constitutional protections. See, e.g., William Michael
Treanor, The Original Understandingof the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95
CoLum. L. REV. 782 (1995) (arguing that fidelity theory is consistent with using the takings
clause to create a new cause of action to advance environmental justice, a use of which Lessig
explicitly approved); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint,65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365,
1381-84 (1997) (generally approving Treanor's analysis as a proper application of fidelity theory). Amar himself has argued that the Thirteenth Amendment can be used to create a cause
of action against child abuse in a DeShaney-type situation, see Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel
Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105
HAxv. L. REv. 1359 (1992), and against hate speech. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the
Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124 (1991).
123. See Meltzer, supra note 76, at 272 & n.125, 284; see also Amsterdam, supra note 52,
at 429-30.
124. See Deborah Sontag & Dan Barry, Using Settlements to Gauge Police Abuse, N.Y.
TAmms, Sept. 17, 1997, at Al; Andrew Martin, Daley Backs Officers in Death of Honduran,
Cm. Tnm., Feb. 5, 1998, § 2, at 1.
125. 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978) (stating that only nominal damages are available for the
violation of a constitutional right, absent proof of "actual injury).
126. 477 U.S. 299, 310 (1986) (stating that no compensatory damages are available for the
"abstract importance of constitutional rights").
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Such is the worth of the right
when viewed against the background
127
of state and common law.
2. The Legislature Passes a Statute Recognizing the Right
Much of Amar's proposed regime, particularly in the Fourth
Amendment context, depends on legislative enactment, as several
commentators have noted.12 One such proposal is enterprise liability (p. 41). Amar makes, as he has elsewhere, a powerful case for
the importance of enterprise liability in regulating the police. In
addition, Amar wants legislatures to fashion rules delineating the
search and seizure authority of governmental officials. Indeed, he
announces that legislatures are obligated to do so (p. 43). He also

believes that legislatures will be moved to do so when they see governmental entities paying damage awards (p. 41).
The problem is not with the content of the proposals themselves. The problem is that Amar presents them as a package enact these proposals and jettison the exclusionary rule. The package is not addressed merely to scholars. Not only has Amar written
in favor of jettisoning the exclusionary rule, he has testified to that
effect before Congress. 129 It may be clear to his scholarly audience
that he offers a package. It is unlikely to be clear to congressional
foes of the exclusionary rule that Amar's opposition is conditioned
on their responsibility, or that of their state counterparts, to enact
broad-based remedies like enterprise liability, intrusive remedies
like state-level rulemaking, and unorthodox remedies like a tenpercent sentence discount for defendants with valid Fourth Amendment claims - substituting for the other ninety percent a structural
remedy that will flow to the benefit of law-abiding citizens. Amar
often writes as if lawmakers of all three branches of government
enact overarching plans - as if they decide to weaken one protection only when strengthening another. Is it not also possible that
lawmakers hostile to criminal defendants will weaken protections
across the board?
The other part of the problem is that to assume any of these
proposals will be adopted is, to borrow Amar's phrase from another
context, "pure fantasy" (p. 157). Amar talks about the twentieth
century's "woeful failure to nurture the civil model" (p. 30), but of
course he cannot point to a historical period in which such a model
was even partially adopted to regulate police, and he cannot explain
why the current period - so hospitable to draconian crime preven127. See Bandes, supra note 114, at 331-32.
128. See Maclin, supra note 5, at 59-65 (criticizing Amar's reliance on legislative action);
Steiker, supra note 5, at 848-49 (questioning the use of legislative action in Fourth Amendment damage awards).

129. See supra note 6.
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tion legislation - should be different. As others have pointed out,
the history of statutory attempts to regulate police departments has
amounted to a "wholesale 'legislative default"' from the inception
of professional policing until today.130 Mapp held the exclusionary
rule applicable to the states only when they utterly abdicated their
responsibility to adopt alternative means of police regulation, despite ample warning that they must do so.131 Bivens itself is the
paradigmatic case in which the Court had to act to protect Fourth
Amendment fights because Congress had not done so. Bivens
stands for the proposition, which Amar elsewhere holds dear, that
every wrong deserves a remedy. The legislature will not act unless
it perceives, at minimum, an ongoing pattern of violations. 132 The
exclusionary rule, on the other hand, is predicated on the duty of
the courts to remedy violations in every case before them.
Amar says that "proper methodology of constitutional criminal
procedure does not blind itself to practical effects" (p. 154). Considering practical effects is never more important than when a
highly respected scholar suggests real-world changes in criminal
procedure to bodies with the power to change the law. 133
3. A Jury Is Willing to Compensate the Loss of the Right
In his article "The Bill of Rights as a Constitution," Amar states
that "the central role of the jury in the Fourth Amendment should
remind us that the core fights of 'the people' were popular and populist fights - rights which the popular body of the jury was well
suited to vindicate.' 3 4 Although Amar also says that "the key role
of the jury was to protect ordinary individuals against governmental
overreaching,' 3 5 apparently he is using the word "ordinary" to describe individuals who were seeking to vindicate popular, majority
rights, as opposed to the countermajoritarian rights he argues were
not a core concern until the time of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 6
Even if we assume the correctness of Amar's colonial history, it
tells us little about the role of the jury in our post-Fourteenth
130. See Steiker, supra note 5, at 835 (citing Amsterdam, supra note 52, at 378-79). See
also id.
at 848-49.
131. See Yale Kamisar, Remembering the "Old World" Of CriminalProcedure: A Reply
to Professor Grano, 23 U. MicH.J.L. REFORM 537, 565 (1990) (recalling that during the 47year period between Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 384 (1914), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), "none of the many states whose courts permitted the use of illegally obtained evidence developed an effective alternative safeguard"); Maclin, supra note 5, at 60.
132. See Meltzer, supra note 76, at 288-89.

133. See id. at 288-89 (detailing obstacles to legislative enactment of remedies against
police misconduct).
134. Amar, supra note 7, at 1180.
135. Id. at 1183.
136. See id. at 1180.
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Amendment, pluralistic society. Is Amar really arguing that the
jury's role is to protect only popular majority rights against government overreaching, and to allow unpopular minorities to fend for
themselves? To unpack this claim would take far more space than I
have here, but that argument raises serious questions about both
the nature of the Bill of Rights and the nature of the Constitution
itself, not to mention the relevance of changing conditions to constitutional interpretation. As Carol Steiker points out, Amar describes the transformation of the F irst Amendment after
Reconstruction from a protection for popular speech to a protection for unpopular speech. Why not bring
the same recognition to
137
the criminal procedure amendments?
Reluctantly I must conclude that Amar really does believe that
in the criminal realm, the role of the jury is to vindicate "popular
rights" - an oxymoron, in my opinion. There is ample evidence of
this throughout the book, such as his assertion that "the jury is perfectly placed to decide, in any given situation, whom it fears more,
the cops or the robbers" (p. 44), or his assertion that "[w]hen rapists
are freed, the people are less secure in their houses and persons" (p.
30). In the Fourth Amendment context, the dominant legal issue
for the jury, under Amar's proposals, would be whether the police
conduct was reasonable. The reasonableness calculus would permit
the jury to balance, in each case, the importance of the law enforcement interest, the severity of the crime, the interests of the victims,
as well as whom the jury fears more. The jury would make these
decisions in light of its common sense.
As I said earlier, much is chilling about this formulation. Let us
consider Amar's plan in light of his desire to advance the principle
of equality. He asserts, "[I]n a variety of search and seizure contexts, we must honestly address racially imbalanced effects and ask
ourselves whether they are truly reasonable" (p. 37). As I have discussed elsewhere, juries are made up of human beings whose common sense often allows them to empathize most closely with those
who are most like them. "As for people from backgrounds - ethnic, religious, racial, economic - unlike [their] own, however, there
is a pervasive risk that [their] ability to empathize will be inhibited
by ingrained, preconscious assumptions about them."'1 38 Their notions of common sense also may permit them to assume that their

137. See Steiker, supra note 5, at 844-46. See also Amnar, supra note 7, at 1150-52.
138. Bandes, supra note 63, at 399. See also ROBERT L. KATZ, EmPATHY: ITs NATURE
A
UsEs 5-6 (1963); Michael Franz Basch, Empathetic Understanding: A Review of the
Concept and Some Theoretical Considerations,31 J.AM. PsYco~ANA-ric ASSN. 101, 112
(1983); Heinz Kohut, Introspection,Empathy, andPsychoanalysis,7 J.AM. PsYcHoAAYurnc
AssN. 459, 463 (1959).
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assumptions and prejudices are factually based. 139 As Amar explicitly recognizes, jurors' fears may drive their decisions when criminal
defendants are concerned. The Baldus studies demonstrated 140
as
much, and more - that these fears are often racially based.
Amar believes that the jury will sort out the innocent from the
guilty and will despise only the guilty. Even apart from the simplistic notion of guilt and innocence this belief bespeaks, it also reflects
an amazing faith that all those "we" care about will be on the right
side of the scales.
4. The Remedy for the Right Is Spelled Out in the Constitution
The most ironic deviation from Amar's Bivens paradigm is his
argument against the exclusionary rule on the ground that "[t]he
text of the Fourth Amendment says nothing about criminal exclusion" (p. 107). As he puts it later: "This rule is, quite simply, not in
our Constitution" (p. 150). This is the classic argument that proves
too much. As Amar himself notes, the "only provision in the entire
Constitution addressing the technical issue of remedies with any
specificity" is the protection of habeas corpus (p. 106). Of course,
none of the remedies he suggests in the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth
Amendment contexts is in the Constitution- not structural injunctions; or any kind of equitable relief; or the Bivens action, which has
often been attacked on the same grounds;' 4' or even judicial review
itself,' 42 much less a ten-percent sentencing discount for defendants
with valid Fourth Amendment claims. I feel sure - given his prior
scholarship - that Amar would not argue that the failure of the
Bill of Rights to spell out specific remedies renders the first ten
amendments merely precatory.
But my complaint really is not about Amar's inconsistency in
claiming textual support for his arguments touting some implied
remedies and trashing others. It is about the fact that asking for
explicit textual support for particular remedies is directly antithetical to the holding and spirit of Bivens. Apparently, Amar would
like to defend his allegiance to Bivens on the ground that Bivens
holds in favor of a damage remedy. But if this is all Bivens says, it
139. See Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudenceof Victimhood, 1991 Sup. CT. REv. 77, 94-

95; Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REv.
1016, 1027-29 (1988); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322-23 (1987); see also Perlin, supra

note 103, at 397.
140. See BALDUS ET AL, supra note 101; see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291

n.7 (1987) (assuming arguendo the accuracy of the Baldus studies' statistical findings); Johnson, supra note 139, at 1019-21 (discussing what exactly Justice Powell accepted about the
Baldus studies).

141. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 35 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Bandes,
supra note 114, at 312.
142. See Bandes, supra note 114, at 312-14.
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does not say very much. Its more important point - that the remedy is not dependent on legislative enactment - is lost in Amar's
analysis. As I have argued elsewhere, "requiring a clear statement
of judicial.., power ... protects the political status quo from the

possibility of judicial reform. It ratifies the choices of the powerful,
and relegates the powerless to explicit legislative remedies they are
unlikely to secure.' 43 If the worth of the right depends on what is
spelled out in the Constitution, on legislation, on jurors' common
sense, and on congruence with common law, the dollar permitted
by Carey v. Piphus 44 might be an optimistic assessment.
B. Atomizing ConstitutionalWrongdoing
In this section, I argue that Amar's treatment of the criminal
procedure amendments is flawed by his tendency to atomize the
governmental misconduct at issue. I first discuss Amar's atomistic
portrayal of the constitutional wrongs themselves. Specifically, I
discuss the ways in which Amar disaggregates complex chains of
governmental misconduct, portraying them as a series of discrete,
individual acts connected by simple, mechanistic causal links. Second, I argue that the atomistic view of wrongs leads to an atomistic
view of the proper remedies. The view of wrongs as discrete rather
than interconnected is consistent with narrow notions of what is
preventable, with an emphasis on damage actions, and with a somewhat jaundiced attitude toward the concept of the private attorney
general. I examine each of these remedial notions.
The tendency to atomize governmental conduct is common
enough, 145 but its appearance in Amar's jurisprudence is surprising
and inconsistent. In Of Sovereignty and Federalism, Amar makes
an eloquent case for enterprise liability. His "first principle" in
those pages is the maxim that where there is a right, there should be
a remedy.146 He explains that individual liability is often an inadequate remedy for government wrongdoing for a number of reasons,
such as the fact that "[p]ervasive and systematic illegality will not
always be traceable to specific individuals who can be called to account" and the fact that "the governmental entity will often be in a
far better position than any individual officer to restructure official
conduct in a way that avoids future violation of rights."'1 47 Amar's

strong position for enterprise liability, and the reasoning he uses to
advance it, suggest to me not only that he places a high value on
143. Id. at 314.
144. 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1998).
145. See Susan Bandes, Narrative Coherence and the Anecdotal Turn: Stories of Police

Brutality (manuscript on file with author).
146. See Amar, supra note 105, at 1485-86. See also p. 41.
147. Amar, supra note 105, at 1487-88.
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government accountability, but also that he recognizes the complex
ways in which individuals can act together to create systemic misconduct and the importance of deterrence to systemic reform.
On a particularized and literal level, Amar's proposals for reforming criminal procedure in First Principles are consistent with
his proposals in the earlier article. Amar consistently argues for
injunctive and damage actions, coupled with enterprise liability.
But here again the generous and protective spirit that animates the
earlier work is transformed when the criminally accused are the
beneficiaries. The larger insight of enterprise liability - that compensating each individual may not constitute full remediation when
government is the wrongdoer -

is lost.

1. Atomizing Governmental Wrongs
Amar defines governmental wrongs atomistically and narrowly.
Amar's earlier insights about the ways in which pervasive and systemic illegality occur are hard to find in this arena. Here, instead,
he is much more likely to view systemic conduct as a series of isolated instances. To begin, he views police conduct as a series of
discrete, unconnected acts as opposed to part of a causal chain. He
finds the search of the white powder in Jacobsen148 or the dog sniff
in Place149 for example, to be reasonable because he is willing to

see them as discrete acts, with no connection to the intrusive
searches and seizures that often follow at their heels. 50 He argues
that physical fruits of compelled confessions ought to be admissible,
because he makes little connection between the illegal interrogation
and the later discovery of its fruits. As Kamisar says, Amar focuses
"exclusively on the last step of a multistep course of action by the
police."' 51 As I argue above, this focus can be explained, at least in
part, by his lack of interest in process values and by his overriding
concern for his bottom line: the accuracy of the conviction.
In addition, Amar's attitudes toward causation shed light on his
unwillingness to see linkages. Consider his attitude toward the
fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine. Amar takes issue with the
doctrine because it would engender a "causation gap." In other
words, it raises the possibility that suppression might occur in cases
in which the primary illegality was not a but-for cause of the introduction of its fruits into evidence.' 5 2 Based on the possibility of
148. 446 U.S. 109 (1984).
149. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
150. Cf. Kamisar, supra note 5, at 960.
151. RL
152. The two examples he gives of evidence excludable because of a causation gap, see

pp. 26-27, would both be admissible under current exceptions to the exclusionary rule: the
good faith and independent source exceptions.
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such situations, he would jettison the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree
doctrine. This reasoning is unconvincing. The disagreement cannot
really be about the mechanics and proof of but-for causation. 1 3 As
54 the length of
Justice Andrews explained in his dissent in Palsgraf,:
the causal chain depends on what social goals we want to accomplish. In early exclusion decisions like Silverthorne155 the Court
wanted to preserve the integrity of the courts by ensuring proper
56
routes for review of evidence. In later decisions like Wong Sun,'
the grounds for the poisonous tree doctrine had shifted, and the
Court was concerned about deterring future police misconduct up to a point. Though Wong Sun is premised on the assumption
that but for the initial illegality, the subsequent evidence would not
have been obtained, the doctrine itself sweeps less broadly than
would a but-for test.' 57 Yet it is still too broad for Amar's taste. He
prefers to assume that, somehow, the truth will come out, justice
will reign (pp. 26-27), and the causal link will not be provable.
Amar says, "Consider... the nice-sounding idea that government
should not profit from its own wrongdoing. Our society, however,
also cherishes the notion that cheaters - or murderers, or rapists,
for that matter - should not prosper" (p. 26). The questions are,
how much are we willing to trade to try to ensure that cheaters,
murderers and rapists will not prosper? And when we have traded
away so much that it interferes with our own prosperity and dignity,
will there still be time to turn things around?
As I discussed earlier, one of the values Amar is too willing to
trade away is judicial integrity. Amar's "causation gap", discussion
is another example of his proclivity for atomizing conduct. He will
not make the causal link between police misconduct and the introduction of the fruits of crime in court. On a purely descriptive
level, he approaches the integrity of the judiciary as if it floats free
from the actions of other governmental entities - as if what happens on the street has no bearing on what happens in the courtroom. This approach is problematic not only because it views the
court's integrity so narrowly, but also because of its implications for
the deterrence rationale. Naturally, once one rejects the causal link
between the introduction of evidence at trial and the improper
153. Amar admits as much when he says "even if a defendant could conclusively establish
but-for causation, the bloody knife should still come in as evidence." P. 27.
154. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).

155. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
156. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
157. In Wong Sun, the police made a concededly illegal entry into the sleeping quarters of
Toy. The police reaped several fruits from this entry, including narcotics and Wong Sun's
confession. The Court recognized that Wong Sun's confession would not have been obtained
had it not been for the illegal entry. Nevertheless, it found that, due to intervening circumstances, the confession was sufficiently attenuated from the initial illegality that police could

not have predicted it at the time they entered Toy's residence. 371 U.S. at 491.
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gathering of that evidence, exclusion will not seem like an effective
way of deterring the police.
2. Remedial Implications
Amar uses a combination of current doctrine and proposals for
reform to disconnect police misconduct from what occurs in court.
For example, Amar thoroughly approves of the Court's current
holding that a Fourth Amendment violation is complete at the time
of the search or seizure, not when the evidence is introduced at
trial. 158 Conversely, although the Court finds that the Fifth Amendment violation does occur when the confession is admitted at trial
(p. 24), Amar suggests that we "enforce the clause itself by excluding confessions and allowing fruits" (p. 61). In the real world, the
theoretical debate about when the violation is complete seems singularly unhelpful. As to all police investigative techniques, whether
limited by the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments, or some combination of the three, a judicial open door policy creates obvious incentives for police.
a. Deterrence. Amar ignores the evidence that police think
about admissibility when performing searches and seizures as well
as when eliciting confessions. 159 He makes the point that police
conducting Terry stops to keep the peace will not be deterred by the
threat of exclusion (p. 157). But he says little about the converse
point - that police usually conduct seizures, searches, and confessions in order to gain admissible evidence leading to a conviction.
Police, "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime,' 60 are generally willing to conform to rules rather than lose
evidence and convictions, but they cannot be expected to ignore
gaping loopholes and incentives to cut corners.
Recall the reaction to Mapp' 6' by urban police departments like
New York and Los Angeles, who argued that with the advent of the
exclusionary rule, they would for the first time have to begin following the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. 162 The rule deters, and
164
disconnections between rule and remedy' 63 decrease deterrence.
158.
159.
160.
161.

P. 151 (discussing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-06 (1984)).
See infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

162. See Kamisar, supra note 26, at 43; Yale Kamisar, The ExclusionaryRule in Historical
Perspective: the Struggle to Make the Fourth Amendment More Than 'an Empty Blessing,' 62
JUDICATURE 337, 347-48 (1979).
163. See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolutionin ConstitutionalCriminalProcedure? 71vo

Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MIcH. L. REv. 2466, 2532-51 (1996) (discussing the concept of
"acoustic separation").
164. Amar claims that the rule both overdeters, by preventing any use of tainted evidence, even if it might have come to light anyway, and underdeters, by permitting police to

"We the People"

May 1998]

1415

If police want a confession, they may be willing to risk an illegal
arrest since they can "cleanse" the illegality by transporting the suspect to the station to interrogate him.165 Susan Klein talks about
the Tucson Police Department's practice of interrogating suspects in
violation of Miranda because they believed "that such statements
might be held voluntary and thus could be used to impeach the defendant, to keep him off the stand, or to deprive him of an insanity
defense.

'166

United States v. Payner167 is a classic example of the

knowing and cynical use of standing doctrine to insulate an illegal
search from challenge and ensure that its fruits will be admissible.
Theoretical distinctions about when the violation is complete fail to
describe the complex interaction of multiple players using a variety
of investigative techniques.
Of course, Amar does recognize that police departments at
times need systemic reform. His arguments for enterprise liability
are powerful (p. 41), although it should be noted that once his substantive reforms were adopted, police departments would not be
liable for all that much - mostly whatever a jury was willing to find
unreasonable. But even as he takes Professor Stuntz and others to
task for acting "as if the choice is tort law or exclusion" (p. 157),
Amar demands a choice - tort law and enterprise liability instead
of exclusion. What, then, is the problem with exclusion? Why is
tort law, of all things, more desirable?
b. Damages. Building on his assumption that the wrongs are
discrete and unconnected, and look like private law wrongs, Amar
argues that damages are a logical remedy. If the police officer was
wrong to coerce a confession from the defendant, but there are no
causal links among the interrogation, the actions of other officers in
seizing its fruits, and the action of the court in introducing those
fruits, then we are not dealing with a complex web of governmental
hassle people from whom they expect to find no evidence. P. 157. The overdeterrence argu-

ment seems to ignore the significant limits the Court has placed on the exclusionary rule
since Mapp. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), for example, permits the use of tainted

evidence if it would have come to light absent the illegality. The underdeterrence argument
has some truth to it;the exclusionary rule does not effectively deter police from hassling

people in situations not likely to lead to evidence. But this observation does not support
Amar's argument against the rule. First, Amar's proposals, such as damage actions, would be
equally ineffective at deterring hassling. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. Second,
if effective remedies for police hassling did exist, they could exist in tandem with the exclusionary rule, rather than replace the rule. Cf Meltzer, supra note 76, at 184-85 (discussing
overdeterrence and underdeterrence objections).

165. See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990); Steiker, supra note 163, at 2517.
166. See Susan R. Klein, Miranda DeConstitutionalized: When the Self-Incrimination
Clause and the Civil Rights Act Collide, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 417, 441 & n.98 (1994). See also
Jan Hoffman, Police Tactics ChippingAway at Suspects' Rights, N.Y. Tamms, March 29, 1998

at 1 (reporting that in California, many police departments train officers that they have "little
to lose and much to gain" by continuing to interrogate suspects despite invocation of Miranda protections).

167. 447 U.S. 727 (1980); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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misconduct, but simply a single wrongdoing officer. Why should he
not simply be assessed damages, as if he were an ordinary batterer
or trespasser?
The problems with this formulation are both symbolic and
highly pragmatic. As I discussed above, 168 a tort judgment against
an officer who is treated like a tortfeasor is not the same as a judgment that a governmental official violated one's constitutional
rights. 169 Symbolically, the tort judgment fails to provide the
"[a]ffirmation of the ... [rlights" 170 that the plaintiff is seeking and

that permits the development of constitutional precedent. Practically, damages have not been shown to be 7an effective way of deterring or reforming a governmental entity.' '
Amar argues that damages are needed in situations in which "a
constitutional violation has already occurred out of court [so that] a
court cannot really prevent it" (p. 116). This formulation speaks
volumes about Amar's views on prevention and deterrence. Because he atomizes conduct so habitually, he has an extremely narrow idea of what can be prevented. If the police officer is not
influenced in his behavior by whether his coerced confession or ilegally seized contraband will be admissible at trial, then the officer's
conduct cannot be prevented by threatening to exclude the evidence. But in "[r]eal life" (p. 9), the officer is influenced by exclusionary sanctions, and his conduct is therefore preventable. The
admission of the evidence constitutes judicial default and judicial
encouragement of illegality. It places the government's imprimatur
on illegally obtained evidence in the case at bar, and it sends streetlevel officers the unmistakable
message that such evidence is also
172
welcome in future cases.
c. The Private Attorney General. Amar recognizes that the
criminal defendant is meant to be a sort of private attorney general
but argues that he is "the worst kind" (p. 28). He is self-selected,
168. See supra text accompanying notes 116-27.
169. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 408-09 (Harlan, J., concurring); Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180; see
also Dellinger, supra note 114, at 1537-39; supra text accompanying notes 116-23.
170. Christina Whitman, ConstitutionalTorts, 79 MicH. L. RFv. 5, 52 (1980) (discussing
the importance of affirmation of the right); see also Susan Bandes, Monell, Parratt, Daniels,
and Davidson: Distinguishinga Custom or Policy from a Random, Unauthorized Act, 72
IOWA L. REv. 101, 124 (1986).
171. See PEER ScisucK, SUINa GovRNmEN-r 104 (1983); Bandes, supra note 170, at
120-27; Whitman, supra note 170, at 42.
172. See Arnold Loewy, The FourthAmendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent,
81 MIcH. L. REv. 1229, 1267 (1983) ("[I]t defies logic to believe that a policeman's willingness to search without probable cause or a warrant (and therefore possibly subject an innocent person to an unjustifiable intrusion of privacy) is unrelated to whether he can gain any
admissible evidence from conducting the search."); see also Milton A. Loewenthal, Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 49 UMKC L. REv. 24, 39 (1980) (arguing
that the police "have great difficulty believing that standards can have any real meaning if the
government can profit from violating them").
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self-serving, unrepresentative of law-abiding citizens, often despised
by the public, unsophisticated, and focused only on exclusion, and
he "rarely hires the best lawyer" (p. 28). The exclusionary rule rewards him "precisely because he is guilty" (p. 156).
I wonder how many of these arguments Amar would countenance in a noncriminal context. His criticism of the defendant has a
number of odd features, for example. The ideal plaintiff usually is
described as someone who will litigate the case strenuously, has
concrete facts to litigate, and is in an adversarial position toward
the opposing party. 173 In all these regards, the criminal defendant
seems to fit the bill. He certainly is adverse to the state, which
seeks to convict and imprison him. He has a ripe case replete with
concrete facts, and harm that is certain to occur if he loses. His
motivation to litigate the case strenuously is his desire for liberty an impeccable motive at least as good as the pecuniary and property interests the Court prefers.17 4
Amar would prefer litigants like those "the NAACP sought out
...to revive the equal protection clause.. ." (p. 28). I agree with
him that ideological zeal can make for a good plaintiff, 17 5 although
he and I have the weight of Supreme Court precedent against us in
this regard. 176 But is it either necessary or workable to ask plaintiffs in precedent-setting cases to be motivated primarily by altruism? In Mark Tushnet's book, Making Civil Rights Law, he
recounts that when the NAACP Legal Defense Fund was mounting
its legal attack on restrictive covenants, it often represented plaintiffs who were largely motivated by the desire to acquire a family
home. 177 In my own experience at the ACLU, I found my clients
were motivated by a variety of complex motives, which could not be
neatly separated into the self-serving and the altruistic. Would
Amar suggest a litmus test for unselfish ideological commitment
when a Title VII plaintiff sued to get her job back, or a Nazi sued
because he could not get a parade permit, or a victim of police brutality sued for a large monetary award? Is it necessary to ask
whether altruism was Webster Bivens's primary motivation for suing? Moreover, if altruism is the standard, it seems to comport
173. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Susan

Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. Rnv. 227, 258-64 (1990).
174. Notice that being "self-serving" in Amar's terms is not very different from being a
plaintiff with a concrete stake in the outcome and the requisite adversarial zeal.
175. See Bandes, supra note 173, at 258-63.

176. See Wright, 468 U.S. at 751-56 (rejecting ideological motivations as a source of standing); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 219 (1974).

177. See MARK V. TusHmN-r, MAKING CIVL RIHrTs LAw 86-96 (1994); see also TruthTelling on Race, THE NATION, Dec. 15, 1997, at 3 (recounting Thurgood Marshall's struggle
to represent plaintiffs "more interested in acquiring a family home than in advancing civil
rights through a test case").
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poorly with Amar's preferred tort vehicle, which provides only
money damages as a remedy.
What of Amar's claim that the criminal defendant is the "worst
kind" of private attorney general because he is unsophisticated and
cannot afford the best lawyer? On its face, this assertion is highly
questionable. Even apart from those who can afford the Johnny
Cochrans and Barry Schecks who litigate strenuously in criminal
cases, criminal defendants have the right to representation by the
public defender's office - a group of lawyers with a high level of
expertise in criminal matters. 178 In any case, in what other legal
field would Amar require a litigant to be sophisticated and flush
enough to afford expensive representation? Is he really suggesting
a standard whereby precedent should be made by those who can
afford the best lawyers, rather than those who themselves possess
the characteristics of good plaintiffs?
Amar's attitude toward private attorneys general in the criminal
context is ambivalent at best. He likens the exclusionary rule to
playing the "Leavenworth lottery," which he describes as: "Because the government violated the constitutional rights of A, judges
spin the wheel and spring some lucky (but unrelated) convict B
from Leavenworth" (pp. 151-52). But in a sense, what he describes
here is the private attorney general mechanism, which permits A to
make law that will also affect unrelated B. Indeed, it also describes
a number of other mechanisms for judicial norm creation and enforcement, including injunctive relief, the overbreadth doctrine, the
Bivens remedy, class action suits, and the very act of setting precedent which will bind future litigants.'7 9 It would be difficult to find
a case in which only A was affected, though such a case would more
likely be a private law matter than one in which constitutional issues were litigated. I do not think Amar's objection is really directed at most private attorneys general, but at "convicts" who get
"lucky" and are sprung from prison. 180
Amar's complaints about criminal defendants as private attorneys general are not, I think, importable to noncriminal contexts.
The key phrases here are that the defendant is "despised by the
public," "unrepresentative of the larger class of law-abiding citi178. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 402 N.E.2d 157, (1979) (refusing to adopt a per se rule

against appointment of the public defender when another member of the same office has a

conflict with the case). The Illinois Supreme Court said, "In many instances the application
of such a perse rule would require the appointment of counsel with virtually no experience in
the trial of criminal matters, thus raising, with justification, the question of competency of
counsel." 402 N.E.2d at 162.
179. See Bandes, supra note 173.
180. If the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally based - an assumption I reject, see
Bandes, supra note 114, at 336 n.225 - then not only is the Leavenworth lottery illegitimate,
but so is the Court's attempt to make the rule binding on state actors.
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zens," and rewarded "precisely because he is guilty" (pp. 28, 156).
The complaint is really the familiar one - the true first principle of
Amar's book - that criminals should not walk. But people who
are despised are often precedent-setting litigants - witness the
prevalence of Jehovah's Witnesses and communists in the United
States Reports. 181 Some might be rightly despised, such as Nazis
and racists, 182 and some might be wrongly despised. Some of the
wrongly despised are lawbreakers - like Hardwick, 183 or Baird, 8 4
or Shuttlesworth. 185 The dividing lines are not as clear as Amar
implies. He apparently does truly believe that he can draw a circle
around "We the People" and shut others out; 8 6 that inside the circle are those "good" colonial lawbreakers like John Peter Zenger,
William Penn and John Wilkes, and all the rest of us who deserve to
be safe in our houses, papers, and effects; and that outside the circle
are the bad guys who should be denied protection to the fullest
extent possible without infringing on the rest of us.
CONCLUSION

In a lecture he gave in 1994, Amar offered five lessons about the
Bill of Rights, and about communicating the teachings of the Bill of
Rights. The lessons were entitled: (1) keep it simple; (2) find the
big idea; (3) tell a story; (4) connect the dots; and (5) remember the
People. 87 In FirstPrinciples,Amar has had mixed results in living
up to these lessons. He has told a simple, powerful, and understandable story about the criminal procedure amendments - one
which "will be comprehensible to ordinary citizens"' 8 and scholars
alike. He has centered it around a big idea, or group of core concepts, about the rights involved. He has done so "in a way that
others may learn from or clearly take issue with. ' ' 189 On all these
181. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (involving Jehovah's Witnesses); Yates
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (considering Communists); Dennis v. United States, 341

U.S. 494 (1951) (involving Communists); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (regarding Jehovah's Witnesses); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
(involving Jehovah's witnesses); see also Fredrick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARv. L.

REv. 361, 377 (1985) (observing that free speech claims are often brought by members of
unpopular groups like Hare Krishnas and Jehovah's Witnesses, and by "the wicked," such as
Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan).
182. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (involving a member of the Ku Klux

Klan).
183.
184.
185.
186.

See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
See Belloti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out". Assimilation,

Indoctrinationand the Paradoxof a Liberal Education, 106 HARv. L. REv. 581 (1993).

187. See Amar, supra note 83, at 585-86.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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grounds, he has succeeded admirably. But I do not believe he has
connected the dots. Amar says the Constitution is not a grab bag of
separate, unrelated clauses, but a central weakness of his analysis is
that he does reserve these three amendments for separate treatment, despite his protestations to the contrary. His treatment of
these amendments, and the protections they afford, is inseparable
from the other weaknesses in his book. The story he tells is too
simple. It sacrifices the complexity of governmental conduct and
the play of competing societal forces for a clean narrative line
whose very simplicity is dangerous - because it confirms fears and
prejudices that thrive on oversimplification. The most dangerous
oversimplification of all is his failure to heed his own admonition to
"remember the people." He does not see that "We the People"
includes us all.

DID MILITARY JUSTICE FAIL OR PREVAIL?
Robinson 0. Everett*
SON THANG: AN A~MRIcAN WAR CRIME.

By Gary D. Solis. An-

napolis: Naval Institute Press. 1997. Pp. xix, 299. $29.95.
The subject of war crimes is now receiving significant attention.
On March 13, 1998, the United States Senate, by a vote of 93-0,
adopted a resolution urging the President to call on the United Nations to create a tribunal to indict and try Saddam Hussein for his
"crimes against humanity."' In the recent past, United Nations
tribunals have tried crimes against humanity perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda.
With Administration backing, Congress has also recently enacted legislation intended to confer jurisdiction on the federal district courts to try certain war crimes of which American nationals
are perpetrators or victims. The War Crimes Act of 19962 - which
is based on the power of Congress to define and punish offenses
against the law of nations3 originally concerned "grave
breaches" of only the Geneva Convention of 1949; but, as later
amended, it punishes violations of both the Geneva and Hague
Conventions. Congress apparently intended this grant of war crime
jurisdiction to federal district courts to supplement, not supersede,
the jurisdiction over violations of the law of war - part of the law
of nations - long exercised by American military commissions and
4
general courts-martial.
The War Crimes Act was prompted by the experience of a former Air Force pilot, who, after being shot down and spending several years in a North Vietnamese prison, was concerned about the
seeming absence of statutory authorization for the punishment of
persons who mistreat prisoners of war.5 Certainly the concern
* Professor of Law, Duke University; Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Military Appeals 19801990; Founder, Center on Law, Ethics, and National Security at Duke University School of
Law. A.B. 1947, J.D. 1950, Harvard; LL.M. 1959, Duke. - Ed.
1. S.Con. Res. 78,105th Cong. (1998) (enacted). See Senate Votes to Try Saddam for War
Crimes, THm NEws AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 14, 1998, at A6.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (1998)(codifying the War Crimes Act of 1996, as amended by Expanded War Crimes Act of 1997).

3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
4. See Article 18, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1994); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
5. How the former pilot, Mike Cronin, persuaded a freshman Congressman, Walter
Jones, Jr. (R, N.C.), to introduce the war crimes bill and how Jones, in turn, obtained bicam-

eral approval of the legislation within a few months is itself a fascinating story -

1421

which

1422

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:1421

about the welfare of prisoners of war is quite appropriate - and
6
perhaps overdue.
Although the impetus for recent war crimes legislation has been
a perceived need to assure the availability of a forum to try persons
who commit war crimes against American victims, we must never
overlook the possibility that Americans may perpetrate war crimes
against others. The recent commemoration of the thirtieth anniversary of the My Lai Massacre, which took place on March 16, 1968, is
one reminder of this possibility. 7 Publication of Son Thang" An
American War Crime, Gary D. Solis's gripping account of an incident that took place almost two years after My Lai, provides
another.
DEATH COMES TO SON THANG

On the evening of February 19, 1970, a five-man patrol went out
from Marine Company B of the 1/7 Battalion to search for Viet
Cong activity. At the time - and later during court-martial proceedings - the patrol was referred to as a "killer team," a term that
does not appear in any Marine Corps manual or instruction. According to Solis, the term was "essentially unique" to the battalion
in which these five Marines were serving (p. 29). One platoon sergeant defined the concept quite simply: "They go out in small
teams of four to five men and search out hamlets for weapons, rice,
different types of caches, and to make contact with the enemy, and
kill as many as possible" (p. 29).
Two of the Marines involved had spotty disciplinary records.
Heading the killer team was Randall Dean Herrod, a part Creek
Indian from Calvin, Oklahoma, who had enlisted in the Marine
Corps sixteen months before. In Vietnam, Herrod had engaged in
heroic conduct - including saving the life of his platoon leader, 2d
Lt. Oliver L. North. He received the Purple Heart, was recommended for a Silver Star, and was promoted to lance corporal.
However, apparently displeased with a transfer to the 1/7 Battalion,
Representative Jones narrated in November 1997 during an ABA annual conference on Na-

tional Security Law in Washington, D.C.
6. On April 9, 1998, the National Prisoner of War Museum was dedicated in Andersonvile, Georgia, honoring the estimated 800,000 Americans who have been held as prisoners of

war. According to the National Park Service, the numbers of American prisoners of war, and
those who died in captivity, for the Civil War and the wars of this century was: "CIVIL WAR:
approximately 462,000 Confederate prisoners held, 26,000 died; 211,000 Union soldiers held,
30,000 died. WORLD WAR I: 4,120 held; 147 died. WORLD WAR II: European Theater,
95,532 held; 1,124 died; Pacific Theater, 34,648 held, 12,935 died. KOREAN WAR: 7,140 held;
2,701 died. Vm'rNAm WAR: 766 held; 114 died. PERSIAN GuLF WAR: 23 held, none died."

See Dan Sewell, Civil War Prison Camp Site of POW Museum, THE CHATrANOOGA TiMEs,
Mar. 30, 1998, at Al.
7. Paul Alexander, Villages, Soldiers Revisit Memories of My Lai Massacre, THE
HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Mar. 16, 1998, at Al.
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he had absented himself without leave for two months. This absence resulted in a special court-martial sentence of reduction in
grade to private, forfeitures of seventy dollars pay for three months,
and three months of confinement. The confinement was subsequently suspended. 8
Pvt. Michael A. Schwarz - a twenty-one-year-old from rural
Pennsylvania who was the oldest member of the killer team - had
been in Vietnam for four months, but had been in his current battalion for less than a week. In his prior unit, Schwarz had disciplinary problems and had been considered for administrative
discharge because of "unfitness" (p. 38). It is not uncommon although not often admitted - to transfer disciplinary problems to
other units. Schwarz, who in his prior unit had participated in several reconnaissance patrols, was the killer team's point man, slightly
ahead of his comrades (pp. 37-38).
The other three members of the team had not previously been
in trouble as Marines. Pfcs. Thomas R. Boyd and Michael S.
Krichten were both nineteen. Boyd had been a member of the 1/7
Battalion since August 1969 and had experienced heavy combat activity in Vietnam. Krichten's record was almost identical; he had
joined the 1/7 Battalion within four days of Boyd, from which time
"they had served in the same fire team of the same squad of the
same platoon" (pp. 38-39). Eighteen-year-old Pfc. Samuel A.
Green, Jr., the only African American on the killer team, had arrived in Vietnam less than a month before, and this was his first
patrol. Green and Boyd had pre-enlistment problems as juveniles;
Green had spent twenty-three months in a juvenile facility. However, none of the men had experienced disciplinary problems while
in the service (pp. 38-40).
Son Thang 4 was a small hamlet on the boundary of a free-fire
zone - a geographic area "designated by the South Vietnamese
government as pre-approved for the employment of military fire
and maneuver because they were ostensibly free of Vietnamese civilians" (p. 40). From Hill 50, where the members of the "killer
team" were located, it was only a few hundred yards to Son Thang,
but it took about half an hour for the team to cover this distance.
As the patrol came to a group of the village's rough, thatchroofed huts - generally referred to by the Marines, and many
others, as "hooches" - Schwarz, acting at Herrod's direction, entered one and found it empty. The team turned their attention next
to another hooch about twenty-five yards away. Surrounding it,
they called to those inside to come out. Four Vietnamese emerged
- a fifty-year-old woman, a twenty-year-old woman (who was
8. Pp. 36-37. Although Herrod and everyone else thought of him as a "private" on Feb-

ruary 19, 1970, his reduction from lance corporal took effect a few days later. P. 37.
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blind), a sixteen-year-old girl, and a five-year-old girl. Schwarz
went inside to search and found no one there. At about this time,
Herrod shot one of the women and then, according to some accounts, gave orders to kill all of these Vietnamese. All four females
were killed by point-blank firing (pp. 44-45).
As they moved back towards the hooch Schwarz had first entered, the killer team heard voices from inside. This time Schwarz
found six Vietnamese women and children, and they were ordered
out. All were killed, apparently upon orders of Herrod. The dead
were a forty-three-year-old woman, a twelve-year-old boy, two ten
year-old girls and two little boys - one five and the other three
years old. Next the five Marines moved to a third hooch. This time
six more Vietnamese were killed - again all women and children
(pp. 46-47).
Marines at the team's nearby home base heard loud bursts of
gunfire and were concerned about the patrol's welfare. However,
in response to radio inquiries, the killer team reported that they had
some confirmed enemy KIAs - killed-in-action. A few minutes
later when they arrived back at their unit, Herrod and some other
members of the patrol recounted at an initial debriefing that they
had spotted some Viet Cong, set up a hasty ambush, and killed at
least six of the enemy (pp. 49-50).
Lt. Louis R. Ambort, the company commander of the five
Marines, apparently initially accepted the account they provided.
But later - prodded by questions from Maj. Richard Theer, his
battalion operations officer and an exemplary Marine - Ambort
became suspicious and further questioned the members of the
team. Now they told him that they had killed a number of women
and children after being fired upon by their victims. This explanation satisfied him for the moment. Theer, however, was not satisfied. The next day, a patrol sent to Son Thang found the bodies of
sixteen women and children. Theer began his own initial investigation and eventually obtained statements from the members of the
killer team that made it appear likely that serious crimes had been
committed. 9
9. Pp. 51-56, 59-64. As Solis points out, commentators have differed as to whether the
murder of hundreds of Vietnamese noncombatants by Army troops at My Lai was a war
crime. Maj. Gen. George S. Prugh, the Judge Advocate General of the Army, expressed the
view that the victims, citizens of an allied nation, South Vietnam, were not enemies protected
under the Geneva Conventions and that their murders were like other homicides involving
citizens of a host nation. P. 57. Telford Taylor, a chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, expressed
the contrary view that, since My Lai was considered to be controlled by the Viet Cong with
enemy resistance to be expected, it was "hostile territory" within the meaning of the Hague
Convention and that the laws of war applied. Id. A similar issue could be raised as to the
homicides at Son Thang - which was located only about twenty-five miles from My Lai. The
members of the killer team believed that they were killing enemies, however, and perhaps
their belief should be the governing consideration.
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As a result of Maj. Theer's investigation, members of the killer
team were charged with the murder of sixteen noncombatants in

violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. After a formal

pretrial investigation pursuant to Article 32 of the Code,' 0 military

judge Maj. Robert Blum"- recommended that all five killer team
members be tried by general court-martial on charges of premedi2
tated murder.'

THiE

TRIALS

Pfc. Krichten was never tried. Following a time-honored defense tactic, his military counsel negotiated immunity in return for
an agreement to testify truthfully (p. 89). Krichten, the only member of the killer team without prior civilian or military convictions,
had not been in charge and by all accounts had been less involved
in the killings than Herrod or Schwarz. Thus, he was an especially
suitable candidate for a deal; certainly from the prosecutor's standpoint it was helpful to have an eyewitness - particularly one whose
testimony would not require an interpreter.
The charges against the other four accused were referred for
separate trial, rather than a joint trial (p. 107). This choice seems
understandable, since separate trials would probably be simpler for
the judge and prosecutor, as well as less confusing for the triers of

fact. Moreover, a joint trial would have presented issues as to the
admissibility and use of the incriminating statements made by the
various accused.' 3 In separate trials the statements made by each
10. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1994). Unless waived by an accused, a pretrial investigation under
Article 32 of the UCMJ is a prerequisite for trial by a general court-martial. Unlike a grand
jury, its proceedings are open, the accused is represented by counsel, and the defense has a
right to cross-examine government witnesses and present its own evidence. See 10 U.S.C.
§ 832(b) (1994). However, even if the pretrial investigating officer recommends against trial,
this recommendation is not binding on the commander who convenes a general court-martial. See 10 U.S.C. § 832, 834 (1994).
11. Maj. Blum had also been the military judge who tried Herrod for his unauthorized
absence. P. 36.
12. Lt. Ambort, company commander of the killer team members, was separately
charged with failure to obey a division order to report any incident thought to be a war
crime; dereliction of duty for failing to take effective measures to minimize noncombatant
casualties and not ensuring that his men were aware of the rules of engagement; and making
a false official statement as to one matter concerning the killer team's activities. P. 91. These
charges were investigated under Article 32 by Lt. Col. James P. King - who years later
served as the senior Marine judge advocate. Pp. 93, 100. King recommended nonjudicial
punishment for Lt. Ambort for making a false official statement. P. 102. In accordance with
this recommendation, Ambort received a letter of reprimand - which inevitably has a very
adverse effect on the career of a Marine officer - rather than facing trial by general courtmartial on some theory that, as commander of the members of the killer team, he bore responsibility for the sixteen murders.
13. Cf.Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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accused could be received against that accused without a limiting
14
instruction.
The first trial was that of Pfc. Schwarz. This accused, whose IQ
was far below average, was among Marines who had been enlisted
under relaxed recruiting standards then in effect in the Armed
Services. 15 From the beginning, the trial did not go well for him.
Schwarz was represented by military counsel who unsuccessfully
made several pretrial motions, including one contesting the admissibility of Schwarz's pretrial statement. 16 Especially damaging, however, was the testimony of Krichten. He swore that he had seen
Schwarz personally participate in killing Vietnamese at the first and
third hooches. However, on cross-examination, some of Krichten's
answers tied in with a defense that Schwarz was only following orders (pp. 141-44).
The company commander, Lt. Ambort, testified for the defense
as to the hazards posed to the Marines by Vietnamese civilians even those nine to twelve years old. According to Ambort, his
"company policy" was to "[t]reat [noncombatants] with the utmost
of suspicion, but make sure, you know, protect them as well as you
can" (p. 148). With this and other testimony, the defense sought to
suggest that the Son Thang victims were not necessarily innocents.
Schwarz himself took the stand - partly in order to explain his
incriminating pretrial written statement. His testimony suggested
that to some extent his shooting of the civilians had been a response
to a directive to the killer team from their leader, Pvt. Herrod. Subsequently, in a forceful argument, military defense counsel contended that Schwarz had been acting under a perceived duty to
obey an order from the leader of the patrol (pp. 158-64).
The members of the general court-martial received detailed instructions from the military judge on such matters as aiding and
abetting, mistake of fact, extent of any duty to obey illegal orders,
testimony of an accomplice, and presumption of innocence. After
deliberating, the officers composing the court-martial found
14. An enlisted defendant is tried by a general court-martial composed solely of officers,

unless the defendant exercises the statutory right to request that at least one-third of the
court-martial members be enlisted persons.

See Article 25(c)(1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.

§ 825(c)(1) (1994). Thus, if there are two defendants, and either submits a request for enlisted members, that defendant will be tried by a court with some enlisted members and the
co-defendant will be tried separately by an all-officer court. Consequently, a defendant can
obtain a severance from a co-defendant by requesting enlisted members.
15. Pp. 108, 116. In October, 1966, the Department of Defense directed that 100,000
persons with "category four" intelligence be enlisted annually - even though some better
qualified volunteers would have to be turned aside to meet this quota. The effect of "Project
100,000" on discipline was harmful. See pp. 116-18.
16. Under Article 31 of the Uniform Code, pretrial warning requirements are imposed

which go far beyond those required by Miranda. See 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1994). One issue
concerned compliance with Article 31 in taking Schwarz's statement which the government
offered.
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Schwarz guilty of premeditated murder of the twelve Vietnamese at
the second and third hooches. 17 A sentence of life imprisonment
was then imposed (p. 185).
Pfc. Boyd, whose trial commenced soon after that of Schwarz,
was also a Project 100,000 recruit. However, unlike Schwarz, the
charges against him were for unpremeditated, rather than premeditated, murder.' 8 Moreover, unlike Schwarz, he was represented not
only by a Marine lawyer but also by a civilian attorney - Howard
Trochman, who was from Boyd's hometown, Evansville, Indiana
and was an avowed critic of the Vietnam War. Trochman neither
asked nor received compensation for his representation, and he
even paid his own expenses (pp. 189-91).
Lt. Col. Paul A. St. Amour, the military judge who had tried
Schwarz, was also to preside over Boyd's trial. From his observation of St. Amour during the preceding trial and his evaluation of
the attitude of typical court-martial members, Trochman decided to
gamble on a trial by judge alone (p. 192).
The Government case was much the same as in the trial of
Schwarz. However, Krichten, who was a close friend of Boyd, offered testimony indicating that the accused had fired over the head
of the civilians and had consciously avoided killing any of them.
Furthermore, Boyd's own testimony that he had religious convictions against killing and had not fired at the Vietnamese was corroborated by others. Because of a reasonable doubt as to Boyd's
guilt, the military judge acquitted him of all charges (pp. 196-99).
On August 13, 1970, seven weeks after Boyd's acquittal and less
than six months after the killings, Pfc. Green's trial began for sixteen unpremeditated murders. His military defense counsel offered
the defense that Green had not actually shot anyone and that, with
no combat experience before the Son Thang incident, he was too
junior and inexperienced to be considered an aider and abettor.
Green decided to exercise his statutory right to have enlisted members of his court-martial and, after challenges had been exercised,
he was tried by a court-martial with three officer members and two
senior noncommissioned officers. Lt. Col. St. Amour was again the
military judge. Rather than seeking to show that Green personally
killed anyone, the prosecutor focused on showing that Green
17. P. 183. Schwarz was not, however, found guilty of the first four murders. In a general
or special court-martial, findings of guilt require only a two-thirds vote, rather than unanimity. See Article 52, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 852(a)(2) (1994).
18. Maj. Blum had recommended that all five members of the killer team be tried for
premeditated murder. While this recommendation was followed with Schwarz and Herrod,
p. 225, Boyd and Green were charged only with unpremeditated murder. Pp. 194, 206.
Although Soils does not explain the reason for this difference in the gravity of the charges, it
is consistent with the differences in the roles of the five Marines. Schwarz was the leader of
the killer team, and Herrod, the point man, was more directly linked with the killings than
either Boyd or Green.
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shared in the criminal purpose and thus was liable as an aider and
abettor. Krichten's testimony that Green had fired at all three
hooches supported this theory (pp. 204-08).
The defense emphasized, on the other hand, that Herrod and
Schwarz had been the primary actors and Green had been in the
background. Green, testifying in his own defense, maintained that
although he had fired, he purposely aimed to miss and that he had
been acting only upon the repeated orders of Herrod, whom he believed to be an experienced leader (p. 207). The military judge's
instructions basically followed those given in the trial of Schwarz. 19
The members of the court-martial found Green guilty of fifteen
counts of unpremeditated murder. The sentence adjudged by the
members was five years confinement and a dishonorable discharge. 20 Green believed the sentence to be excessive. However,
to others -

including myself -

it appears remarkably lenient. In

this instance, as Solis agrees, any effort to portray Green, the only
African American on the "killer team," as a victim of racial bias
would lack foundation in fact (pp. 210-12).
The case of Pvt. Herrod, the last to be tried, aroused great interest in his home state of Oklahoma, and 160,000 citizens signed a
petition in his behalf that was sent to the Commandant of the
Marine Corps (pp. 217-18). Like Boyd, Herrod received uncompensated representation, from experienced Oklahoma civilian attorneys. 21 Additionally, 1st Lt. Oliver North, whose life Herrod
had saved, assisted the defense team in every way possible. Meanwhile, Lt. Col. St. Amour had been unexpectedly transferred to Japan; and Navy Commander Keith Lawrence was sent from the
Philippines to act as military judge for Herrod, who was charged
with sixteen premeditated murders. Herrod was tried by a panel of
seven officers - a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, four majors, and a
captain22 - all of whom had combat experience. In North's view,
19. As Solis notes, the defense counsel failed to request an instruction on accomplice

testimony - despite being almost invited by the judge to do so. P. 179. He offers no explanation for this omission, and none readily occurs to me.
20. In a court-martial, if the members of the court-martial decide on guilt or innocence,
they also adjudge the sentence. See Article 52, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 852(b) (1994). There is
no way for a servicemember to have the members determine guilt and the judge adjudge

sentence. I have strongly urged a change of the Uniform Code in this regard.
21. Denzil D. Garrison, Republican leader of the Oklahoma state senate, was defending
the nephew of a man who had helped save his life during the Korean war. He recruited Gene
Stipe, a Democratic state senator, who was a seasoned defense attorney with some prior
military trial experience. Each lawyer paid his own way to Vietnam. Later, there were two
other Oklahoma volunteers. Pp. 218-20.
22. The panel had originally consisted of eight members, but a lieutenant colonel had
been challenged. P. 229. In a general court-martial, the Government and the defense each
have a peremptory challenge. Although Soils does not state specifically that the member was

removed by a defense challenge, I assume this occurred because this would be consistent with
the "numbers game" played by counsel in general courts-martial. Since a finding of guilty
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this was advantageous to the accused, because "only men who had
served in combat could appreciate the pressures that Herrod must
have been under" (p. 229).
Krichten's testimony was detailed and damaging to Herrod. In
a 1996 letter to Solis, defense attorney Garrison referred to the
Government's presentation as a "sophomoric prosecution." 23 However, Solis's recital of Krichten's testimony suggests to me a contrary conclusion. In any event, the defense countered with evidence
about extensive Viet Cong activity in the Son Thang area a few days
before and even evidence suggesting that the patrol itself had been
fired upon. Herrod's former battalion commander testified for the
defense as to the difficult situation in which the members of the
patrol found themselves. Oliver North, who had paid his own way
to Vietnam to testify for Herrod, was an effective character witness.
Herrod, whose military intelligence test scores were quite high,
also testified effectively on his own behalf. According to him, there
had been some enemy fire, which his team had returned; and some
civilians were killed in the crossfire. He asserted in his defense, "I
do not now, and I did not then, feel that I had killed anyone it
wasn't necessary to kill" (p. 245). Thereafter, Dr. Hayden Donahue, a prominent Oklahoma psychiatrist, and an expert on battle
fatigue among World War II veterans, gave his opinion that Herrod
probably was suffering from this condition at the time of the killings. Having been in extensive combat and faced death on a daily
basis, Herrod's reasoning had been supplanted by instinct.24
After brief rebuttal evidence, the case was presented to the
members of the court-martial. Apparently they were greatly impressed by the skill of the defense team and, on the other hand,
considered the Government's case to be weak. Since there was less
than the necessary two-thirds vote to convict of premeditated murder, the panel considered lesser included offenses and decided on
an acquittal across the boardZ2 Solis poses the question of whether
jury nullification had been operative (p. 256).
must be rendered by a two-thirds vote, the mathematical odds favor an accused tried by
seven members than by six or nine; challenges are often exercised with this in mind.

23. Letter from Denzil Garrison to Gary Solis (Jan. 4, 1996).
24. Solis expresses well-grounded doubt that the doctor correctly arrived at his diagnosis

of battle fatigue. Pp. 247-48.
25. Pp. 253-55. Solis - apparently on the basis of interviews conducted many years later
with some of the court members - recounts that initially the vote was four to three on the
premeditated murder charge, although memories differed as to whether the majority was for

conviction or acquittal. "Unaccountably, as the seven officers considered the lesser offenses,
the vote swung not toward conviction of a less serious charge, as one would expect, but more
strongly toward acquittal." Pp. 254-55.
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Rm _ATH

shortly after his acquittal -

Herrod re-

turned to the United States for out-processing from the Marine
Corps. His twenty-two months as a Marine had included fifteen
months in Vietnam, including two months of unauthorized absence
and six months of pretrial confinement. In December 1970, he finally received the Silver Star for which he had been recommended
long before. Around the same time, Krichten and Boyd both completed their Vietnam tours of duty and were honorably discharged.
Schwarz and Green were transferred to a naval prison in Portsmouth, New Hampshire to serve their respective sentences.
During the Vietnam War twenty-seven Marines were convicted
of murder and other crimes against civilians, and only in seven cases
was confinement adjudged for less than ten years. Schwarz's life
sentence was not unusually severe but Green's sentence was remarkably lenient. 26 It was the task of Maj. Gen. Charles F. Widdecke, the commanding general of the First Marine Division who
had convened the four general courts-martial, to review the
Schwarz and Green convictions. In light of Herrod's acquittal,
Widdecke's staff judge advocate -

his legal advisor

-

recom-

mended that Schwarz's sentence be reduced to twenty years confinement. Displaying extraordinary leniency toward a Marine
convicted of fifteen premeditated murders, the general reduced the
confinement from life to one year. He similarly reduced Green's
sentence. Thereafter, the Navy Court of Military Review affirmed
the findings of guilt and the reduced sentences. Both Schwarz and
Green received dishonorable discharges.
Subsequently, the convictions and sentences, as reduced, of
Schwarz and Green were affirmed on appeal. No clemency was
granted either accused by the Navy Discharge Review Board which could have changed the characterization of the dishonorable
discharge. Later, James H. Webb, who had been a contemporary of
Oliver North at the Naval Academy and also served as a Marine
officer in Vietnam, took a great personal interest in Green's case
and helped present it to the Board for Correction of Naval
Records. 27 In 1978, that Board changed Green's dishonorable discharge to a general discharge - which, although not an "honorable
discharge," is "under honorable conditions." Green never learned
of this partial vindication because in 1975 he had killed himself af26. The sentences adjudged against the twenty-seven Marines were not extraordinary
when compared with sentences of civilian courts for similar misconduct. Pp. 266-68.
27. Pp. 283, 289. Webb, who in 1978 authored Fields of Fire, a book based on his experiences in Vietnam, at a later time became Secretary of the Navy. Pp. 287-88. See JAMES H.
WEBB, FIELDS OF FIRE: A NOVEL (1978).
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ter unsuccessfully seeking to attack his court-martial conviction collaterally in a federal district court (p. 291).
CONCLUSIONS

Solis's qualifications to write Son Thang are unique. He served
in the Marine Corps for twenty-six years, including two tours of
duty in Vietnam as an assault amphibian officer - the first in 1964
as a platoon leader and the second in 1966 as a company commander. Subsequently, after becoming a lawyer, he served for
more than eighteen years as a judge advocate, tried more than 450
cases as chief prosecutor for the First and Third Marine Divisions,
and later served two terms as a general court-martial judge before
retiring as a lieutenant colonel in 1989. His 1989 book, Marines and
Military Law in Vietnam, is an excellent history of Marine Corps
courts-martial in that conflict (pp. xiii-xv).
Probably as a result of his own unique experience, Solis does a
remarkable job of providing his readers an understanding of the
mental processes of the five members of the killer team. His account of the investigation that was undertaken makes clear that at least in some instances - commanders and military lawyers are
willing to unearth and disclose the possible existence of embarrassing war crimes perpetrated by American servicemembers. 28 His explanation of the American military justice system is understandable
and free of military jargon. His insights into the tactics of both
prosecutors and defense counsel are excellent.
Sois concludes that although the Son Thang "trials were reminders of humanity's aspiration to do justice," on a more basic
level "the Son Thang trials were a failure" (p. 293). The results of
the trials show that the military justice system carried out its
prosecutorial function "deficiently, its effort wanting in several significant respects" (p. 293). In his view, the potential significance of
the suspected offenses was such that Marine lawyers should have
been involved initially in taking the statements of the killer team
and of other potential witnesses. The absence of this participation
created a significant risk that the statements obtained would be
held inadmissible at trial - and indeed some statements were objected to, although unsuccessfully. Solis also believes that more experienced lawyers should have been assigned to both prosecute and
defend the general courts-martial arising out of Son Thang. He
writes, "If the 1st Division lacked the requisite specialists, then
28. Maj. Robert Blum, who conducted the pretrial investigation of the Son Thang killings, later served as a military judge in the Marine Corps and retired as a colonel. P. 76. In

1957, Blum was my student in a military law seminar at the U.N.C. School of Law, and I had
a great respect for his ability and seriousness of purpose. I was pleased that my favorable
impression then is confirmed by Solis's account of the pretrial investigation Blum conducted.
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prosecutors, defenders, and administrators sufficient to the task
should have been brought to Hill 327 from other in-country commands, even from state-side commands, if necessary. It had been
done before when multiple homicides were to be tried" (p. 294).
Solis criticizes the prosecution for granting Krichten immunity too
quickly and then not adequately monitoring him.29 Finally, Solis
notes the question raised by some experienced judge advocates as
to whether the military justice system can function effectively under
wartime conditions in places like Vietnam (p. 296).
Without being Pollyannish, I must express my own view that
under the circumstances the military justice system worked remarkably well at Son Thang - especially when one considers that the
Military Justice Act of 1968 had made major changes in the system
only a few months before the Son Thang killings and that those
changes were still being assimilated. Admittedly, any prosecutorial
decision to grant immunity - either testimonial or transactional to a co-accused has a potential for inequity; but I am hesitant to
criticize the choice made to immunize Pfc. Krichten.30 I also do not
criticize the prosecution's use of separate trials. Separate trials,
rather than a joint trial, do create additional administrative burdens
for the prosecution and permit defense counsel in the later cases to
learn from the mistakes of their predecessors. However, in this instance I believe the use of separate trials was a wise choice - especially since any accused could have obtained an automatic
severance by exercising his statutory right to have enlisted members
on his court. Moreover, the wisdom of the choice to try Schwarz
first was confirmed by his conviction of twelve premeditated
31
murders and the life sentence the court-martial handed down.
Although the success of the civilian counsel in obtaining acquittals for Boyd and Herrod would suggest the wisdom of utilizing the
services of such attorneys - especially if rendered at the attorney's
own expense - I would not infer that the military lawyers who
prosecuted were simply outmatched. For example, even in a case
involving a war crime, the accused usually has not been recommended for a Silver Star and cannot call as a character witness
someone - in this instance Oliver North -

whose life he has saved

29. P. 295. Moreover, Solis would have referred to trial the charges against Lt. Ambort
on the premise that this company commander "like Lieutenant Calley's superior, Captain
Medina, should have been made to account for his actions. If, like Medina, he be acquitted,
so be it." Pp. 295-96.
30. Admittedly, at Boyd's trial the prosecutor - a different prosecutor from the one who
tried Schwarz - was apparently surprised by Krichten's favorable testimony to his good
friend Boyd; and perhaps this reflected inadequate preparation. Pp. 196-97. However, if a
prosecutor tries to control an immunized witness - which Solis seems to suggest be done this tactic may give rise to persuasive defense complaints.
31. Presumably, these favorable results would have strengthened the Government's hand
for plea-bargaining purposes.
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in combat. Moreover, that psychiatric testimony on battle fatigue
might create a doubt as to the mens rea of an accused should not be
too surprising in an era when acceptance of the abuse excuse is not
uncommon.

In short - with the possible exception of General Widdecke's
extraordinary reduction in Schwarz's sentence from life imprisonment to one year of confinement - I would not view the outcome
32
of the Son Thang trials as examples of "so-called military justice.
Instead the results fall within the wide range not uncommon for
contested cases in many contemporary systems of justice. Certainly, none of these trials could be unfavorably compared with that
of O.J. Simpson. Of course, I do not want to suggest that the military justice system was flawless - whether in 1970 or today. Many
improvements have been made in the interval; and others are probof
ably needed. 33 For example, in combat areas some streamlining
34
resources.
conserve
to
appropriate
be
might
justice
military
The most important achievement of Solis's Son Thang, however,
is to make clear that Americans in uniform, like soldiers from other
countries, may commit war crimes. In most instances, as in the trials at Son Thang, the offenses committed will not be charged as war
crimes -- that is, the accused will not be prosecuted under provisions dealing with violations of the law of war based on congressional power under Article I, section 8, clause 10. Instead, where
servicemembers on active duty are involved, the charges will be
preferred under routinely used articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice - such as Article 118, 10 U.S.C. § 918 (murder), or
Article 120, 10 U.S.C. § 920 (rape) 35 - which rely on congressional
power "[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces. '36 Regardless, however, of the charge that
might be preferred or of the court, military or civilian, that might
try the case, it is important that Americans be constantly aware that
our own servicemembers have committed war crimes in the past
32. Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court in O'Callahanv. Parker,395 U.S. 258, 266 n.7

(1969), overruled by Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987), refers to "so-called military
justice." To me, this description seems unfair.
33. For example, I have already noted that in my opinion the Uniform Code should be
modified to allow the accused an opportunity to obtain a result available in any federal crimi-

nal trial - namely, trial by jury (court-martial members) and sentencing by judge. See supra
note 20.
34. Perhaps special courts-martial - which can impose punishments of up to six months
confinement, partial forfeitures of pay, reduction in grade, and a bad conduct discharge -

could be conducted by a military judge alone, rather than requiring the assembling of court
members.
35. However, under the "offenses not capital" clause of Article 134 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1994), a servicemember could be tried by a court-martial

for a violation of the War Crimes Act.
14.
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
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and may commit them in the future. This awareness will in turn
generate efforts by the armed services to screen recruits,3 7 to educate servicemembers about conduct that might constitute a war
crime, and to explain to them that the defense of obedience to superior orders will not be available with respect to actions that
should reasonably be perceived to be war crimes.
Son Thang is a well-conceived and well-executed explanation of
an important event in recent American history. Readers of the
book will obtain a much better understanding of what conduct may
constitute a war crime and of the difficulties in successfully prosecuting alleged war criminals.

37. Solis points out that two members of the killer team had scored very low in mental
tests and probably would never have been recruited under the standards usually applied by
the Armed Services. Pp. 116-18. However, it is sobering to recall that Herrod, who led the
team, had a substantially above-average grade on his military intelligence test.

POLICE AND THIEVES
Rosanna Cavallaro*
VIRTUAL JUSTICE: TIm FLAWED PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN
AMERICA. By H. Richard Uviller. New Haven: Yale University

Press. 1996. Pp. xvii, 312. $37.50.
"Whatever it is, you should clean up this city here because this city
here is like an open sewer, you know? It's full of filth and scum, and
sometimes I can hardly take it."'
What is it about New York City that has, in the last few years,
spawned a series of books attacking the criminal justice system and
describing a community in which victims' needs are compelling
while the rights of the accused are an impediment to justice? Why
does this apocalyptic vision of the system persist, despite statistics
demonstrating the sharpest decline in the city's and the nation's
crime rates indecades? 2 What explains the acute detachment from

the accused that is at the core of this series of books?
In VirtualJustice: The Flawed Prosecutionof Crime in America,

Richard Uviller 3 adds his voice to those of his fellow New Yorkers,

including Professor George Fletcher and Judge Harold Rothwax,
4

who have recently advocated reforms of the criminal system.

Among the reforms they advocate are sharp constrictions of the ex-

clusionary rule, the right to counsel, the privilege against selfincrimination, the peremptory challenge, and the admissibility of
* Associate Professor, Suffolk University Law School. A.B. 1983, J.D. 1986, Harvard. Ed. Thanks to my loving family: Dave, Emma, and Sophia.
1. TAXI DRIVER (Bill Phillips Production 1976) (quoting the character Travis Bickle
speaking to presidential candidate Charles Palatine).
2. Violent crime in New York City fell 34% in the period from 1990 through 1995, compared with a national drop of just 6.5%. See William Glaberson, Safety and Numbers: A
Special Report: Crime in Region Is Dropping, but Some Pockets Defy Trend, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 1997, at Al.
The decline in New York City's murder rate has far exceeded that in the nation as a
whole: the City experienced 972 homicides in 1996, fewer than half of those in 1990. See
Michael Cooper, Steep Drop in Random Killings Signals Shift in New York Crime, N.Y.
TviMs, Dec. 29, 1996, at A25.
3. H. Richard Uviller is Arthur Levitt Professor of Law at Columbia University School of
Law.
4. See GEORGE FLETCHER, WITH JUSTIcE FOR SOME: VicTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL
TRIALS (1995); HAROLD J. RoTHWAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRMNAL JUSTICE

(1995). Professor Fletcher teaches at Columbia University Law School. Harold J. Rothwax,
who died in October 1997, was a judge of the New York State Supreme Court as well as a
lecturer at Columbia University Law School.
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expert testimony.5 Although ostensibly examining these same issues with the balance of a scholar rather than the voice of an advocate, Uviller's wish list is remarkably congruent with those of the
more contentious Fletcher and Rothwax. And like the work of
Fletcher and Rothwax, the premise of Uviller's analysis is flawed:
the procedural protections he critiques simply have not effected
dramatic changes in the investigation and prosecution of crime and
the sentencing of defendants.
Criminal justice in New York City is, like the city itself, hardly a
national prototype. In terms of volume alone, the system is peculiarly burdened.6 In addition, New York presents combined
demographics of race 7 and class, 8 of access to education, 9 housing,10
employment," and of the availability of weapons' 2 and drugs that
5. See FLETCHER, supra note 4, at 28-33, 229-36, 254-55 (use of expert testimony); id. at
250-51 (peremptory challenges); ROTHwAx, supra note 4, at 35-65 (exclusionary rule); id. at
88-106 (right to counsel); id. at 66-87, 186-97 (privilege against self-incrimination).
6. Of the 1,864,000 violent crimes reported nationally in 1994, 497,960 occurred in the
nation's cities. Of this number, 136,522 - 28% of all urban violent crimes - were committed in New York City. Breaking this statistic down by crime, New York City was the scene of
72,540 (11%) of the nation's 659,870 robberies, 2666 (2.5%) of the nation's 106,014 forcible
rapes, 1,561 (6%) of the nation's 24,526 murders, and 59,755 (5%) of the nation's 1,135,000
aggravated assaults. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, CRIME IN THE UNrrED STATES: UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES: 1994, at 60, 138, 238 (1995).
New York City employs 38,000 police officers, more than any other police force in the
country. See Amnesty Intl., United States of America: Police Brutality andExcessive Force in
the New York City Police Department 3 (June 1986).
7. For example, 47.9% of all persons in New York City were non-Hispanic white, 26.3%
black, 22.1% Latino (Hispanic), 6.5% Asian or Pacific Islander, and .3% American Indian,
Eskimo, or Aleut. See BUREAU

OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,

1990

rHE POPULATION: GENERAL POPULATION CHARACrERSTICS: UNITED STATES

CENSUS OF

468 tbl. 266

(1992).
8. The Census Bureau estimates that 16.3% of families in New York City had incomes in
1989 that were below the poverty level. See BUREAU OF =HE
CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF THE POPULATION: SUMMARY OF OCCUPATION, INCOME, AND POVERTY CHARACTERISTICS:
METROPOLITAN AREAS 77 tbl. 3. In 1996, approximately
1,007,000, or 11.7% of New York City residents received public assistance and 15.7% received food stamps. See David Firestone, A Portraitof the City, Paintedby the Numbers, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, at 43.
9. In 1990, 31.7% of New Yorkers over age 25 had not completed high school. Twentythree percent had a bachelor's degree or higher education. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS: URBANIZED AREAS at 15 tbl. 1. The public school system in New York is precip-

itously close to collapse. In the past year, the system has experienced the most severe
overcrowding in decades, with 91,000 more students registered than it can comfortably accommodate. See Pam Belluck, Classes Open in New York City, in Closets, Hallways, Cafeterias, N.Y. TmEs, Sept. 5, 1996, at Al.
10. In New York City in 1996, some 107 families sought emergency housing daily. There
were 5693 families in temporary shelter, staying an average of 223 days. There were 336,000
families on the waiting list for public housing. See Firestone, supra note 8.
11. The Bureau of the Census reported a 9% unemployment rate in New York City in
1990. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS: URBANIZED AREAS

at 38 tbl. 2.

12. The Mayor's Management Report for 1996 reported that police confiscated 12,631
weapons in 1996 and 14,861 in 1995. See Firestone, supra note 8.
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appear nowhere else in the United States. This does not, however,
prevent Uviller, and other observers, from extrapolating from New
York's experience to conclusions about "Criminal Justice" and the
"Prosecution of Crime in America." Reliance on so idiosyncratic a
model cannot help but produce distortions, and this is one of the
pitfalls of Uviller's book.
Those distortions can perhaps be explained and even corrected
by examining them as products of a distinctly New York sensibility.
Certain crimes have become as closely associated with New York
City as Broadway and the Empire State Building. These crimes
contribute to the sensibility I try to describe in this review, and I
believe that they might go some way toward explaining the subject,
tone, and point of view of Uviller's book. The 1964 murder of
Catherine "Kitty" Genovese is perhaps the oldest, in our contemporary consciousness, of a long series of episodes that have come to
define the New York criminal paradigm: inexplicable brutality met
by outrageous indifference. It is now a fixture of urban mythology
that Kitty Genovese's assailant committed three separate and ultimately fatal assaults on her, leaving and returning repeatedly, while
her neighbors listened to her screams for thirty-five minutes without calling the police. 13 More recent examples include attacks on
young women in Central Park in 1989 and again last year,14 the
deaths of the young daughters of Joel Steinberg and Awilda Lo-6
pez,' 5 and the controversial subway shootings by Bernhard Goetz.1
These cases have shaped the city's consciousness of itself. Many
New Yorkers live with the impression that they are under siege and
cannot walk the streets, ride the subway, or enter Central Park
without falling prey to criminal offenders. There is a corresponding
impression that all offenders in New York City are inhuman sociopaths, Zodiac killers, and Sons of Sam.' 7 Media coverage in New
York and nationally compounds the fear of crime, 18 not only by de13. See, e.g., Joseph P. Fried, Killer of Kitty Genovese Is Denied a New Trial, N.Y. Tums,

Nov. 14, 1995, at B4.
14. See, e.g., Michael T. Kaufman, New Yorkers Wrestle with a Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
28, 1989, at Al (noting that "[a] week after a jogger was raped and left grievously injured in
Central Park during a rampage by teen-agers, New Yorkers are wrestling with often complex
and paradoxical feelings about the crime").
15. See Frank Bruni, The Case of Alisa: A Child Dies, and the Questions Abound, N.Y.

Tdams, Nov. 24,1995, at B1; Joe Sexton, Mother of Elisa Izquierdo Pleads Guilty to Murder in
a Pivotal Child-Abuse Case, N.Y. TnIEs, June 25, 1996, at B3.
16. See generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF DEFENSE: BERHaRD
Go= ANDrTHE LAW ON TRIAL (1988).

17. See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, Zodiac Case Suspect Remains an Enigma, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15,1996, at A51; Howard Blum, The Suspect Is Quoted on Killings: "It Was a Command
I Had a Sign, N.Y. Tudrs, Aug. 12, 1977, at Al.

18. See THE

REAL

WAR

ON CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE

COMMISSION 69 (Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996) [hereinafter THE REAL WAR ON CRIME]
(noting that the National Criminal Justice Commission [NCJC] reported that "[c]overage of
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voting disproportionate attention to the extremes, 19 but also by
conveying the sense that few criminals are caught and fewer still are
convicted or punished. 20 Of course, none of these impressions is
accurate. The vast majority of crimes and offenders are ordinary,
the same as one would find elsewhere in the country, although
more numerous. Furthermore, New York City crime rates have
dipped dramatically in recent years, demonstrating unambiguously
that New York is a safer place now than it has been in a long time. 21
Yet the mythology of crime in New York seems to transcend the
truth. Consequently, a bunker mentality persists among longtime
denizens of the city, who cling to a grim image of their own community that they could, if they would, relinquish.
With fear of crime - rather than facts about crime -

dominat-

ing the debate, the legislative landscape is littered with minimum
mandatory sentencing provisions, 22 "three strikes" statutes,23 modifications of the juvenile justice system to allow youthful offenders
to be tried as adults and sentenced to adult correctional facilities, 24
reintroduction of the death penalty or broadening of its reach, 25
and crusades to diminish the quality of inmate life. 26 Recordcrime on the three major network television news shows tripled from 571 stories in 1991 to
1,632 stories in 1993 - despite the fact that crime declined slightly over that period" (citing
1993 - The Year in Review, MEDIA MONITOR Jan.-Feb. 1994)).
19. See generally PHILIP SCHLESINGER & HOWARD TUMBER, REPORTING CRIME: THE
MEDIA POLITICS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 184 (1994) (quoting DoRIs GRABER, CRIME NEws
AND THE PUBLIC 39 (1980) ("[An] exaggerated picture is presented of the incidence of the
most violent kinds of crime, while the incidence of lesser crimes is minimized[.]"); THE REAL
WAR ON CRIME, supra note 18, at 71 ("Newspapers also tend to present a distorted view by
focusing most of their attention on sensational crimes rather than the vastly more numerous
nonviolent offenses.").
20. The proliferation of "real life" entertainment television programs like America's Most
Wanted and Unsolved Mysteries, as well as the emphasis on unsolved violent crimes in television magazine programs like 60 Minutes, 20/20, and Hard Copy fuels this misperception. See
THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supranote 18, at 70 (noting that one scholar has coined the term
"mean world" syndrome "to describe how heavy viewers of television violence increasingly
feel that their own lives are under siege."), citing George Gerbner, Television Violence: The
Art of Asking the Wrong Question, CURRENTS IN MODERN THOUGHT at 396, July, 1994.
21. See Glaberson, supra note 2.
22. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 et seq. (minimum mandatory for cocaine and crack
possession).
23. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 1997 Supp.) (providing an "indeterminate term of life imprisonment" for convicted offenders with two previous convictions for
serious violent felonies).
24. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 6 (1990) (requiring certain offenses committed
by juveniles to be tried in the adult system).
25. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 7, 1995, ch.1, § 2, 1995 N.Y. Laws 1 (reinstating death penalty in
New York as of September 1, 1995); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,108 Stat. 1795 (1994 Crime Bill) (adding 23 new offenses for which
the death penalty may be imposed including espionage, racketeering, and caracking).
26. See, e.g., Neal R. Pierce, Dos and Don'tsfor SanerPrisons,28 NATL.J.1653 (Aug. 3,
1996) (quoting former Massachusetts Governor William Weld for his view that prisons
should be "a tour through the circles of hell").
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breaking percentages of people - particularly men of color -

are

28
behind bars, 27 and prison construction projects have exploded.

The political rhetoric that propels these initiatives is bipartisan.

In the judicial branch, these same forces produced New York
Judge Harold Rothwax, who toured the radio call-in show circuit to
promote Guilty: The Collapse of Criminal Justice, a book that

boasts of his conversion from a civil libertarian and defense attorney to an angry conservative disgusted by both criminal defendants
and the attorneys who represent them. The book brims with righteousness and fury, unabashedly condemning all defendants 29 as
well as their counsel.30 While it enjoyed a great deal of attention in
27. See THE REAL WAR ON Cnnm, supra note 18, at 101-03 (noting that AfricanAmerican men are incarcerated at a rate six times that of white men, although they make up
less than seven percent of the population, and that, in 1994, one out of every three AfricanAmerican men between the ages of 20 and 29 in the entire country was under some form of
criminal justice supervision (citing MARC MAUER, AMERICANS BEHIND BARs: THE INTERNATIONAL USE OF INCARCERATION, 1992-1993 (Sept. 1994); MARC MAUER & TRACY HutING, YOUNG BLACK AMERIcANS AND Tm CRIuMNAL JUSTCE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER

(Oct. 1995))).
28. See THE EDNA McCONNELL CLARK FOUND., AMEP.cANs BEHIND BARS 5 (1992)

(reporting that "[i]n fiscal 1989, $6.7 billion was spent on the construction of new prison
space across the country, a 73 percent rise over the previous year," that this construction
"increased state and federal capacity by 128,000 beds," and that New York State opened 27
new prisons between 1983 and 1990 (citing Corrections Compendium)).
29. In a defining anecdote, Judge Rothwax tells of a conversation he had with his mother
early in his career as a lawyer:
When I was a fresh, young defense attorney, one of my first cases was a man who was
charged with robbery. I took my job as his advocate very seriously. During that period,
I was visiting my mother and I proudly told her, "I'm representing a man accused of
robbery."
She frowned. "What did he do?"
"He's charged with robbing an old man coming home from a store," I told her.
She looked at me with horror, and I could see the pride in her son the lawyer quickly
slipping away. "How can you represent a man like that?"
I explained patiently. "Well, Mom, he tells me he's not guilty."
My mother gazed at me pityingly, as though I was the most naive creature on earth,
and said with a sigh, "Son, if he can rob, he can lie."
I often think of my mother's words on that day. They serve as my reminder, a tickler
to my conscience. Even the most sacred idea is open to scrutiny. And even as we search
for truth, we all too often give credence to a lie.
RoTHWAX, supra note 4, at 34.
30. Judge Rothwax argues, "There are many places we can look for a cure to the out-ofcontrol adversary system. But perhaps the best place to start is with a serious reevaluation of
the role of the defense attorney." Id. at 139. His premise is that "[s]adly, the culture that the
defense lawyer inhabits today is one that says it's okay to push the envelope, to brush against

the ethical barrier and occasionally slip over." Id. at 130. In one of his less vitriolic passages,
Judge Rothwax observes that:
Given the probability that the defendant is guilty, the defense attorney knows that
the defendant will win only if counsel is successful in preventing the truth from being
disclosed -

or, failing that, misleading the jury once it is disclosed. So, when the de-

fendant is guilty, the defense attorney's role is to prevent, distort, and mislead.
Id. at 141 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 135 (claiming that defendants, most of whom
are guilty, are "yearning neither for an accurate reconstruction of the facts nor for an errorfree trial").
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the popular press,31 it was dismissed
by legal scholars and jurists as
'33
"lopsided," 32 and a "jeremiad.
With Virtual Justice, Uviller takes Judge Rothwax's populist
theme into the academic setting, couching in disarmingly bland
prose the same radical thesis: that many of the rules of criminal
procedure that have evolved through the last thirty years of constitutional adjudication hamper law enforcement excessively and
should be curtailed or repealed. Despite the fact that Uviller has
buffed up Judge Rothwax's arguments with some sane discussion
and occasional nods to the counterargument, he ends up right
where Rothwax started. The Collapse of CriminalJustice and The
Flawed Prosecution of Crime in America pander to the same fears
and exploit the same distorted perceptions. The surprise is that
Uviller's sugar coated version of Rothwax's tirade is much harder
to swallow.
I. NYPD BLUES: A PLEA FOR MORE POLICE DISCRETION

Uviller's major point is that the Supreme Court's readings of the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments are not justified. According
to Uviller, "the continuous struggle between effective illegality and
the blunter but prouder tactics of lawful law enforcement" (p. 109)
has been wrongly resolved:
Though the Constitution was certainly drafted with the common-law
model in mind, the fundamental catalogue of rights and obligations
that found their way into the text do not require the full adversary
mode that we have engrafted onto it. The citizen can be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures with far greater scope for
court-sanctioned investigations. Our ingrained notions of the limits of
interrogation and the consequences of silence are not dictated by the
words of the Fifth Amendment that none shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself. And certainly the right to the assistance of
counsel in one's defense does not necessitate the adversary circus or
the lawyerly shield against the fair acquisition of evidence against the
accused defendant. [pp. 309-10]
To prove his point, Uviller examines the criminal process in the
conventional arrest-to-trial sequence, using a "modest collection of
tales" that are fictional but, he says, not "altogether fictitious" (p.
xv) to depict "common and perplexing events in the collection of
evidence and the trial of criminal cases" (p. xv). He then applies his
long experience as a scholar and, more surreptitiously, as a prosecu31. See, e.g., Bernard Gavzer, Is Justice Possible?, BosToN GLOBE, July 26, 1996, Parade
at 1, 4-6.
32. See, e.g., id. at 6 (quoting Professor Yale Kamisar of the University of Michigan).

33. See, e.g., Sol Wachtler, Crime and Punishment, NEw YORKER, July 15, 1996, at 72,74
(reviewing Guilty and other books on criminal justice, with passing reference to Virtual
Justice).

May 1998]

Police and Thieves

1441

tor, to tease out of the narratives an assortment of problems that,
he contends,
produce a system of "virtual," rather than true,
34
justice.
As a result of this choice of narrative structure, the book's tone

shifts awkwardly from the Mickey Spillane diction of the "tales" to
Uviller's own more ponderous analytic prose.3 5 Many of the fic-

tional passages suggest a fascination with the gadgets and jargon of
police work - such as crownlights (p. 29) and bullhorns (p. 243),
"perps" (p. 58), "mopes," and "The Job ' 36 - that is especially discordant with the tone of mastery that dominates the remainder of

the book. While Uviller plainly strives for diversity among his fictfonal characters, with male and female police officers, prosecutors,
and judges, he often slips into hackneyed stereotypes of gender and
34. While acknowledging the "congruence" between the "virtual justice" produced by the
system and the "true justice" for which the system strives, Uviller notes:
But I also know that there are elements in the process - systemic flaws - that tend
to bend virtual justice without distorting its apparent correspondence to true justice. In
places, law fails the needs of the investigators, of the lawyers, of the fact finders; at
critical junctures action is improvised and adversary confrontations cast the players in
roles that do not enhance the reliability of the synthesis. It is these aspects of the process on which I will focus. Here, perhaps, we may see whether the virtual justice generated by the adversary system has an acceptably close correspondence to the true justice
that our collective libido demands.
P. xiv.
Uviller's conception of justice as a response to libidinous demands perhaps explains the
irrationality of many of his criticisms as well as his proposed solutions.
35. 1 am not the first to observe that Uviller strives for authenticity by emulating the hard
boiled prose of writers like Mickey Spillane. See Book Note, The Eyes of the Law, 103
HARV. L. REv. 1390, 1392 (1990) (describing Tempered Zea4 Uviller's earlier book, as
"[s]ounding more like Mickey Spillane than Clifford Geertz"). The comparison stems from
Uviller's rather self-conscious use of "street" language like this:
Detective Bailey reaches over, slips the photo out of the book, and reads the information on the back. So far so good, she thinks. At least it doesn't rule him out. Not like
the victim we had in here last week who described a perp as six-four, maybe five, then
ID'd a shot of a mope five-eight. Or the vic last month who made a positive on a heavy
hitter who was doing four-to-eight at the time the crime went down.
P. 41. In addition, like Spillane's, Uviller's fictional passages often rely upon clich6, like "the
unfinished donut," p. 15, and extremely mannered diction, like "Lauren hijacked Mike's cup,
took a sip of bad coffee, cold now," p. 101.
These narratives contrast abruptly with Uviller's own authoritative, and at times even
patronizing, voice:
In the pages ahead, I shall conduct a short tour of this bedeviled edifice.... Perhaps
an odd, habitual turn of the legal mind will be amusing, perhaps an unsuspected doctrinal wrinde will raise a casual eyebrow. Harmless sport. Disappointing, perhaps, to
some who seek more aggressive commentary. But it is my prime purpose merely to
engage, to reveal, and to share some of the wonder I feel as I wander through these
familiar premises.
Pp. xiv-xv.
36. P. 42. This fascination perhaps has its roots in Uviller's sabbatical experiences "riding" with a division of the NYPD, and documented in a previous book. See H. RicHARD
UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL: A COLUMBIA LAW PROFESSOR'S YEAR ON THE STREETS wrrH
THE NEw YORK Crr PoLicE (1980). Virtual Justice does not refer to this experience.
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ethnicity. 37 All of this makes it somewhat difficult to take the serious stuff seriously.
Although it appears from the opening chapter, "Overview of the
Criminal Justice System," that Virtual Justice is written for an audience of readers who have not received a legal education, much of
the detail would seem to hold little interest for anyone but lawyers.38 Conversely, however, the book is too simplistic for most
lawyers.3 9 Consequently, it occupies an intermediate zone in which
it is both too sophisticated for some and too superficial for others.
In addition, many of the problems to which Uviller applies his
two narrative voices are so esoteric that they merit neither the
overly stylized "tales" 40 he develops in order to frame them nor the
lengthy exegeses he then supplies. For example, Uviller's first issue
- the difficulty police face when seeking a warrant to search a
murder scene if the premises on which the body is found are not
those of the victim - can hardly be said to have a significant impact on the "prosecution of crime in America," as his title promises.
He describes the issue as a "genuine legal hole" (p. 24) formed by
the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment's warrants
clause41 and the impossibility, in his view, of knowing in advance of
37. In one "tale," he writes that "Katherine was swept off her feet by Manuel's legendary
Latin ardor." P. 200. In another, he presents a gay character, Bruce, whose "earliest memory was the time his father had discovered a doll that Bruce had found in the attic and liked
secretly to dress up and play with in his room." Pp. 271-72. Uviller appears to attribute
Bruce's sexual orientation to this episode, in which his father "murder[s]" the "baby," "viciously slamming its sweet bewigged head against the wall until it br[eaks]." P. 272. Later in
the narrative, Bruce's longing for his father's approval drives him to join the Marines. P. 272.
38. For example, in chapter 11, Uviller strives at length to explain the nuances of rules
relating to admissibility of character and conduct evidence, and the risk that exceptions language might swallow the rule against propensity evidence.
39. See, e.g., p. 261 ("In recent years, urged by the women's movement, psychologists
have studied cases of women who eventually strike back after being viciously abused by their
partners over an extended period. From these clinical studies, they have crafted what is now
called the 'battered-spouse syndrome."'). In addition, as this example illustrates, Uviller
often presents well-settled concepts as recent developments.
40. Uviller emphatically denies that these tales are "artificial - the sort of hypothetical
puzzles that generations of law students have grappled with in classrooms, never to encounter again." P. xv. Despite this disclaimer, I think he would be hard-pressed to demonstrate
that many of the tales are, as he insists, "true to life." P. xv. The Arab-American police
officer working undercover to infiltrate the "Islamic Friendship Federation," who, the district
attorney fears, "may be going over," p. 161, is one such unlikely tale.
41. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV ("[N]o warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.").
Uviller attributes this "legal hole" to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), in which it declined to recognize an exception to the warrant
requirement for crime scene searches. Although Uviller explicates the decision in Mincey, he
does so without noting that the 1978 decision was unanimous on this point, and that it refuted
Uviller's position regarding crime-scene searches and, more generally, the needs of law enforcement, by restating the following fundamental principle:
Moreover, the mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never
by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment. The investigation of crime would
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a search "what particular item of evidence might be found on the
scene" (p. 24). Despite qualifications - he notes that "[i]t is...
difficult to say how often warrants are sought for crime scene
searches and with what results" 42 and that "[o]nly those whose security was invaded and against whom the evidence is offered have

standing to exclude it" (p. 24) -

Uviller nevertheless selects that

single issue to epitomize his first chapter heading, "Virtual Legality

in the Field" (p. 13).
This somewhat arcane problem becomes the vehicle for Uviller
to advocate a radical expansion of police power. He proposes statutory authorization for judges to issue warrants to search "the scene
of a recent crime of a certain level of gravity - perhaps named
crimes like homicide, rape, arson, kidnapping" and to allow for the

seizure of evidence "notwithstanding the inability of the police to
particularly describe in advance the evidence they are looking for
or to give any specific reason to think they will find it" (pp. 24-25).
This proposal sounds very much like a general warrant, 43 a practice

that Uviller concedes was "a primary abuse by the colonial police
44
- one of the precipitating causes of the revolution, some say."
Yet, as throughout VirtualJustice, Uviller urges this result-oriented
always be simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the Fourth Amendment reflects
the view of those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person's home and
property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal law.
Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393 (citation omitted). Certainly, one might critique the position implicit
in Mincey that no search or seizure may take place except pursuant to a warrant as lacking
historical or textual support, see, e.g., AKH-L REED AMAR, TH CoNsTrruroN AND CRImINAL PROCEDURE: FrsT Pxun CwLEs 4 (1997) (characterizing the Mincey rule as a "per se"
approach to the Fourth Amendment that is plainly contradicted by a variety of historical
sources), but Uviller does not bother to do so. Instead, he simply announces that the rule
should be abrogated because it impairs law enforcement.
42. Pp. 26-27. There is nothing in Virtual Justice to suggest that Uviller attempted to
gather such information. Moreover, Uviller offers no estimate of the frequency of the "legal
hole" created when the premises to be searched are those as to whom the particularity requirement cannot be satisfied.
43. See Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (P.C. 1763) (British decision declaring general
warrants unconstitutional); 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 134-44, 142 (L. Kihvin Wroth
& Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965) (explaining why writs of assistance, a kind of general warrant,
were illegal, including that "A man's house is his castle; and while he is quiet, he is as well
guarded as a prince in his castle. This writ, if it should be declared legal, would totally annihilate this privilege."); Tracey Maclin, The CentralMeaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 197, 224-26 (1993) (explaining one basis of the opposition of James Otis,
Jr., to general warrants - that they could be issued to a customs officer who could search all
private citizens' homes or businesses without judicial oversight or accountability for the life
of the warrant).
44. P. 23. Again, reasonable minds might differ on whether it was the specter of a general
warrant that produced the language of the Fourth Amendment, see generally Carol S.
Steiker, Second Thoughts About FirstPrinciples,107 HARV. L. REv. 820, 822-24 (1994) (citing examples of debate on the historical evidence of the Fourth Amendment's meaning), or
whether, instead, the Warrant Clause was adopted not to "reassure[ ] a search target" but to
"bar[ ] a target from suing after the fact," AMAR, supra note 41, at 15. But Uviller ought to
give' some critical context for the proposals that he offers on so fundamental a point as this.
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curtailment of a core civil liberty to free law enforcement from
what he views as cumbersome and unnecessary technicalities, 45while
offering very little legal or empirical support for the change.
Uviller suggests that his statute ought to be defensible as a variation on an inspection warrant, 46 even while confessing the critical

distinction: the inspection warrant has an administrative purpose
while his crime scene warrant is all about finding evidence of a
crime to be used to prosecute an individual. 47 His reasoning becomes increasingly sloppy once the issue is joined; as the chapter
draws to a close, he pleads, "Still, it does seem reasonable, doesn't
it? And reasonability, remember, is at the heart of the Fourth
Amendment .... ",48
As the book progresses, Uviller becomes more bold and expands his suggestion from the relatively infrequent context of crime
scene searches to the far broader assertion that law enforcement
agencies ought to be authorized to conduct door-to-door searches
for firearms under this same rubric of administrative inspections.
Noting only that the statute authorizing such a power "would have
to be meticulously fair and even-handed" (p. 105), he pays mere lip
service to the concerns that such a radical expansion of police
power provokes. Acknowledging that "[a]ggressive police patrol
carries an unmistakable whiff of fascism," he then brushes this concern aside with conclusory ease: "Believing as I do, it's hard to
deny that the program is compatible with basic values of our society" (p. 108). Instead, Uviller unconvincingly repeats his refrain
that "the key concept in the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness
... a flexible idea [that] should take account of the urgency of social

necessity as well as' 49the unavailability of lesser intrusions to accom-

plish the purpose.

This sequence is repeated in succeeding chapters, as Uviller catalogs a series of problems he sees in the criminal system, without
45. Uviller makes no effort, for example, to root the "crime scene" approach to searches
in any source of authority, either textual or precedential. His "solution," it seems, is not so
much to be applauded for its creativity as closely scrutinized for its anomaly.

46. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
47. Uviller ignores this distinction in his suggestion that Camara supports his proposal.
Compare p. 26 ("My argument, I must confess, is not quite as neat as it appears. These
inspection searches -

along with their warrantless siblings, the 'inventory searches'

.

..

-

are frequently justified by their administrativeaspect, a benign purpose compared with law
enforcement objectives.") with Camara, 387 U.S. at 530 ("Since the inspector does not ask
that the property owner open his doors to a search for 'evidence of criminal action' which
may be used to secure the owner's criminal conviction, historic interests of 'self-protection'
jointly protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are said not to be involved, but only
the less intense 'right to be secure from intrusion into personal privacy."' (footnote
omitted)).
48. P. 26. The remainder of the sentence quotes the Amendment in full.
49. P. 105. Uviller offers no proof that a lesser intrusion - like a warrant based on
probable cause - is unavailable.
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attempting to substantiate them. He does not show that these
problems occur with a frequency that matters, but instead characterizes them as grave enough not only to warrant his and our attention, but also to justify significant changes in criminal procedure.
He laments the "inescapable conundrum" (p. 50) that an equivocal
photo identification from a book of mug shots - "I can't be sure.
The guy who robbed me looked meaner, angrier, you know what I
mean? But it could be him" (p. 41) - coupled with a second witness's equivocal statement that the suspect "could be one of the
[people in a photo array] but I really can't say for sure" (p. 42),

does not amount to probable cause to arrest an individual and compel him to appear in a lineup. The "problem" in this scenario, as
Uviller sees it, is that the police do not get to arrest the person that
they have determined - or, more accurately, predetermined, given
that there is insufficient evidence for arrest - must have committed the crime.
Once again, the remedy is far more dangerous than the illness:
Uviller recommends adoption of a "Non-testimonial Identification"
amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a solution
he attributes to "[s]ome unsung hero" of "more than twenty years
ago" (p. 51), whereby "probable cause" would be watered down to

"reasonable grounds" when police seek authorization to order an
individual to appear in a lineup or to provide other nontestimonial

evidence such as fingerprints, blood, and urine (p. 51). Uviller does

not even consider the potential impact of this enhanced police
power on citizens, let alone offer any analysis of competing rights
and interests.50 Instead, he masks the significance of the change he
proposes by describing it as "[n]eat, simple, and - as far as I can
see -

perfectly constitutional" (p. 51).

The danger of Virtual Justice is in such glibness. Unlike
Rothwax, who boldly announces his contempt for the criminal defendant and considers it a virtue that his reform proposals will have
painful costs for that constituency, 51 Uviller dissembles, presenting
controversial proposals as obvious boons and exploiting the tone of
the scholar to disguise his bias as wisdom.
Like his colleagues Judge Rothwax and Professor Fletcher,
Uviller is also highly critical of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for
Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations. 52 In the Fourth Amend50. I use the term "interests" rather than "rights" to avoid the circularity of defining the

contours of the Fourth Amendment "right" by reference to the standard of probable cause.
More important, I think it is crucial to reject the subtle distortion implicit in the use of the
term "rights" to describe the power exercised by law enforcement and other governmental
authorities.
51. See RoTmwAx, supra note 4, passim.

52. Pp. 69-70. Uviller, like Rothwax, advocates a rule of judicial discretion rather than
the automatic remedy of the exclusionary rule. Pretending to ambivalence at first, he con-
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ment context, he characterizes it as a "baroque minuet" (p. 80),
"that ugly old monster" (p. 86), and a rule that causes us to "suffer
the anomaly of lost prosecutions of guilty criminals in order to protect people against unreasonable invasions of security" (p. 85). Yet
again he offers almost nothing to support his contention. Certainly,
much is available in legal literature as to the empirical evidence of
the exclusionary rule's cost, even if that evidence's significance is
debated.5 3 Instead, he announces in conclusory fashion that the exclusionary rule is "the prime distortion factor in criminal verdicts,
the gunk that clogs the court docket" (p. 86). Would his recommendations about the rule differ, one wonders, if he were aware that in
one four-year period, the Second Circuit did not affirm a single sup54
pression order?
II.

WHAT'S GOING ON: POLICE PRACTICES IN NEW YORK CITY

IN THE 1990S

Uviller's uncritical depiction of law enforcement is particularly
surprising for a number of reasons. Prior to Virtual Justice, Uviller
wrote Tempered Zeal,55 an account of his experiences during a sabbatical with the New York City Police Department. Tempered Zeal
not only acknowledged, but also expressed concern about, the frequency of police perjury with respect to Fourth Amendment issues
such as warrants and searches. He described the "most common
form of police perjury" as "the instrumentaladjustment," which he
defined as "[a] slight alteration in the facts to accommodate an unwieldy constitutional constraint and obtain a just result. '5 6 As Uviller explained:
[C]ops may insert a little invention to fortify the probable cause upon
which a fruitful search was predicated. Add a small but deft stroke to
cludes that "on balance, I trust judges. I do not believe that the exercise of judicial discretion

is a roll of the dice. And I think that the solution to the perplexing dilemma is probably in

resort to good sense and an educated decision on whether exclusion is appropriate in all the
complex circumstances of the particular case." P. 70.
53. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An EmpiricalReassessment, 90 Nw.

U. L. REv. 387 (1996) (evaluating several empirical studies calculating the impact of Miranda
in eleven American cities as well as Britain and Canada); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's
PracticalEffect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REv.

500 (1996) (responding to Cassell); Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grandlllasion of Miranda's Defenders, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1084 (1996) (responding to Schulhofer).
54. See Gerald B. Lefcourt, Responsibilitiesof a Criminal Defense Attorney, 30 Loy. L.A.
L. REv. 59, 64-65 (1996). As it happens, Uviller's recommendation - more frequent use of
radio hookups between officers in the field and judges and magistrates with the authority to
approve a warrant application - is hardly the "godsend" or the "beautiful deliverance," p.
85, that he congratulates himself for proposing. Predicated as it is on another unproven conclusion - that "It]he prime reason police do not go to court before they enter secure spaces
is logistical. It's a hassle," p. 84 -

Uviller's hyperbole only underscores the superficiality of

the solution.
55. See UVILLER, supra note 36.

56. Id.at 115-16 (emphasis in original).
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the facts - say, a visible bulge at the waistband of a person carrying a
pistol. Just enough to put some flesh on the hunch that actually induced the officer to give the man a toss; it might make all the difference. Or a police officer, understandably eager to have the jury hear
the bad guy's full and free confession, might advance slightly the moment at which the Miranda warnings were recited to satisfy the
courts' insistence that they precede the very first question in a course
of interrogation. That sort of thing. Although no one admitted it to
me in so many words, I think most police officers regard such alterations of events as the natural and inevitable outgrowth of57 artificial
and unrealistic post facto judgments that release criminals.
Given these observations, it is surprising that Uviller never puts two
and two together: reducing probable cause to reasonable cause,
coupled with the frequent "invention" that "fortif[ies]" probable
cause, means a dramatic double reduction in the standard of proof
for investigatory arrests - once in the word and once in the deed.
What Uviller describes as a "hunch" beefed up by an "instrumental
adjustment" is, under his proposal, watered down still further. At
what level do we then find ourselves: bias? 58
In the eight years since Tempered Zeal, the issue of perjury
among police, particularly New York City's officers, has received
extraordinary scrutiny, and the evidence available to Uviller and
others clearly demonstrates that the problem he not only acknowledged, but purported to justify, has only been exacerbated. The
1994 report of the Mollen Commission, charged with investigating
allegations of police misconduct in New York City, presented a disturbing picture of police perjury that was so pervasive that the term
59 The Commission reported
"testilying" was coined to describe it.
57. Id. at 116. Uviller dares to defend police perjury by distinguishing between "[p]erury
that creates artificial evidence" and thereby "distorts the data being considered by the jury,"

on the one hand, and "lies that result in a more complete picture of the events on trial." He
actually applauds this latter category of perjury as "contribut[ing] to the accuracy of the
verdict." Id. at 117.
58. Most disturbing is the prospect of illegitimate factors, like race and class, assuming an
even greater role in the exercise of discretion by law enforcement officials than they do under

present constitutional standards. Racism already forms an all-too-common basis for the
"hunches" that Uviller celebrated in Tempered Zeal See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the CriminalJustice System, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1660, 1661 n.5 (book review)
(citing cases in which courts have approved use of race as a factor in exercise of police discretion); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214
(1983); Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters" - Some Preliminary Thoughts About
Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 243 (1991).
There are certainly sufficient examples in the popular press of this kind of law enforce-

ment, from Mark Fuhrman's braggadocio in the OJ. Simpson case to the manipulations of
racism by Susan Smith and Charles Stuart. The recent controversy surrounding U.S. District
Judge Baer's suppression of evidence in a drug case in the southern district of New York
stemmed in part from his express acknowledgment of what more often lurks beneath the

surface of many, if not all, criminal proceedings: that people of color have qualitatively different expectations of and experiences with law enforcement. See infra notes 75-76.
59. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT 36 (1994)
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on such practices as "turnover arrests, ' 60 "collars for dollars,"' 61 and
other forms of systematic perjury. 62 The prosecutors who work
with these officers demonstrated a level of knowledge that amounts
to complicity: as one anonymous Manhattan A.D.A. noted, "No
one looks down on it .... Taking money is considered dirty, but
perjury for the sake of an arrest is accepted. It's become more casual. And the civil libertarians have
no effective response to it. It's
63
almost an intractable problem.
During this same period in which Uviller bewailed the increased
burden that current rules of criminal procedure have imposed on
law enforcement, the New York City Police Department was ripped
apart by a succession of scandals in precincts in the Bronx, 64 Manhattan, 65 Brooklyn, 66 and Queens, 67 involving an estimated 300 officers 68 who used their status as police systematically to rob, beat,
(Milton Mollen, Chair) [hereinafter Mollen Commission Report] ("Several officers also told
us that the practice of police falsification in connection with such arrests is so common in
certain precincts that it has spawned its own word: 'testilying'); see also Joe Sexton, New
York Police Often Lie Under Oath, Report Says, N.Y. TIMEis, Apr. 22, 1994, at Al [hereinafter Sexton, Police Often Lie] (noting that "the commission 'was told of officers up to the rank
of captain being actively complicit in and even encouraging warrantless searches and subsequent perjury'); Joe Sexton, Types of Perjury Common Among Police Officers Are Detailed,
N.Y. TIMES,Apr. 23, 1994, at A27 [hereinafter Sexton, Types of Perjury].
60. Sexton, Types of Perjury, supra note 59 ("A police officer arrests a suspect but has
plans for the weekend and doesn't want to spend the next day in court. So he asks his partner not only to take credit for the arrest, but to take the witness stand in front of the grand
jury as well.").
61. Clifford Krauss, Corruption in Uniform: The Overview: 2-Year Corruption Inquiry
Finds a "Willful Blindness" in New York's Police Department,N.Y. TIMEs, July 7,1994, at Al
("[I]n a practice called 'collars for dollars,' officers sometimes took short cuts to make more
arrests to earn more overtime and earn promotions to coveted assignments.").
62. See id.
("The commission also found that officers who were otherwise doing their jobs
to fight crime falsified records often to obtain convictions. It noted that while street narcotics
enforcement units are prohibited from entering buildings to make arrests, members of such
squads typically falsified papers to make arrests that actually occurred indoors appear as
though they were made on the street.").
63. Sexton, Types of Perjury,supra note 59, at 28; see also Sexton, Police Often Lie, supra
note 59 (reporting that Brooklyn's district attorney himself acknowledged that "police officers often tried to get around the problem of needing probable cause" by lying about the
events surrounding an arrest); infra at n. 82 (comparing the ethical roles of prosecutors and
defense counsel with respect to perjurious witnesses).
64. See Adam Nossiter, Two Officers Convicted in 30th Precinct, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 7,
1996, at B3 (reporting that "[m]ore than a sixth, or 33, of the officers from the 30th Precinct
[in the Bronx] were arrested.., on charges ranging from perjury to stealing drugs, cash and
guns").
65. See Clifford Krauss, Bratton Says Corruption Sweep Involves Dozens More Officers,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1994, at Al.
66. See Joseph P. Fried, Officer Arrested in Inquiry of 73d Precinct,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
1994, at B3 (describing a "rogue band" of about a dozen officers in the 73rd Precinct in
Brooklyn who conducted "hundreds of illegal raids in the Brownsville area").
67. See Clifford Krauss, 3 from Queens Precinct Indicted in Theft of $1,400 from Man,
N.Y. TIMms, Mar. 29, 1995, at B3.
68. See Robert D. McFadden, Three More in PrecinctAre Accused, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,
1995, at B1.
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and harass citizens. The Mollen Commission described "well organized police 'crews' terrorizing minority neighborhoods" and
noted that they were "more akin to street gangs: small, loyal, flexible, fast-moving and often hard hitting. ' 69 They engaged in a prac-

tice cryptically referred to as "doing doors" drug dens for plunder" 70 -

"illegally raiding

and routinely used "sapgloves" -

lead-

lined gloves - and heavy flashlights to assault men,
women, and
71
teenagers that they encountered during these raids.
Moreover, since the publication of VirtualJustice; New Yorkers
witnessed an episode of police brutality that was as shocking for its
cruelty as for its suggestion that at least some police officers believe
they are free to act with complete impunity. The officer charged
with shoving a wooden rod into the rectum and then the mouth of
Abner Louima is alleged to have borrowed a pair of gloves from a
colleague in the public lobby of the stationhouse, stripped Louima
from the waist down in that public lobby, and then taken him in
handcuffs to the bathroom where he committed the assault. After
the attack, the officer is alleged to have led Louima to the holding
cell with his pants around his ankles and to have then walked
through the stationhouse hallway brandishing the stick.72 In the period following disclosure of the assault, many observers suggested
that Mayor Giuliani's law enforcement policies had created that cli73
mate of perceived impunity.
While Uviller did not focus his book on these extraordinary episodes of corruption, his anxiety that law enforcement is inadequately equipped to address the problem of crime is significantly
undermined by their existence. The anxiety, it would seem, is better suited to the prospect of these same officers enjoying a broader
range of discretion and authority. Quite simply, it is a problem of
credibility for Uviller to have omitted all reference to these contemporaneous developments.
69. Corruption in Uniform: Excerpts from What the Commission Found: Loyalty over
Integrity, N.Y. TIMEs, July 7, 1994, at B2.
70. Selwyn Raab, Similarities in Inquiries into Crimes by Officers, N.Y. Tsmms, Oct. 3,
1993, at A38.
71. See Selwyn Raab, DetailingBurglars in Blue: Violent Search for Booty, N.Y. Tnvms,
Sept. 30, 1993, at B3 (quoting one ex-officer's testimony before the Mollen Commission that
he participated in five raids per day, that he used to "tune people up," a "police word for
beating people up," that "his sergeant encouraged him and two other rookies to assault
everyone found in suspected drug-trafficking locations," and that he did not fear arrest or
dismissal because of these activities because "[w]ho's going to catch us? We're the police.

We're in charge.").
72. See Dan Barry, Two More Officers Held in Attack on HaitianMan, N.Y. TIMES,Aug.
19, 1997, at Al.
73. See Dan Barry, Charges of Brutality: The Overview: Leaders of PrecinctAre Swept
Out in Torture Inquiry, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 15, 1997, at Al.
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Uviller also fails to address an ancillary, and perhaps more insidious, problem that arises from police abuse: judicial tolerance of
these practices. The heated public controversy surrounding the decision of U.S. District Judge Baer to suppress evidence seized by
New York City police officers from the automobile of an AfricanAmerican woman on a Washington Heights street demonstrates
how pliant even life-tenured judges can be in the face of public and
political pressure about crime. 74 Judge Baer initially found, based
in significant part upon the officers' lack of credibility, that the police lacked a reasonable suspicion that the defendant's car was involved in criminal activity at the time of the stop.75 He
subsequently reversed himself, credited the testimony of the police,
and rejected that of the defendant. 76 Additional examples of judicial capitulation to anticrime rhetoric and prosecutorial pressures
have surfaced nationwide. 77 Uviller does not address the impact
74. See Linda Greenhouse, RehnquistJoins Fray on Rulings, Defending JudicialIndependence, N.Y. Tnvms, Apr. 10, 1996, at Al (reporting that presidential candidate Bob Dole had
suggested during a campaign appearance that Judge Baer should be impeached for his ruling
and that Second Circuit Chief Judge Newman characterized the criticism as an "extraordinary intimidation").
75. See United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232, 239-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that
one officer's testimony "is at best suspect" and that he could not "keep from finding [the
officer's] story incredible" and also expressing concern that the other officer involved was
never called to testify although "presumably available to corroborate this officer's
gossamer").
In addition, Judge Baer observed that in light of the findings of the Mollen Commission
that permitted "residents in this neighborhood... to regard police officers as corrupt, abusive and violent," "had the men [alleged to have run at the sight of the officers] not run when
the cops began to stare at them, it would have been unusual." 913 F. Supp. at 242.
76. See United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacating 913 F.
Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that defendant's "story is now less convincing" and that
"with more evidence and upon review, the Government's version is more credible").
Indeed, Judge Baer did not merely reverse himself but concluded his opinion with a
somewhat cloying apology and self-flagellation: "[u]nfortunately, the hyperbole (dicta) in my
initial decision not only obscured the true focus of my analysis, but regretfully may have
demeaned the law-abiding men and women who make Washington Heights their home and
the vast majority of the dedicated men and women in blue who patrol the streets of our great
City." 921 F. Supp. at 217. The passage stands in stark contrast to his earlier sense of being
"shatter[ed]" by the lack of security of people of color in their own communities, 913 F.
Supp. at 240, and his acid observation that "the same United States Attorney's Office which
brought this prosecution enjoyed more success in their prosecution of a corrupt police officer
of an anti-crime unit operating in this very neighborhood," 913 F. Supp. at 242.
77. See, e-g., Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 673 N.E.2d 552 (Mass. 1996) (reversing a trial
court determination that a juvenile charged with homicide was amenable to rehabilitation
and should therefore be tried in juvenile rather than adult trial court); Judy Rakowsky, Judge
Dismissedfrom O'Brien Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 4, 1997, at Al (reporting that supreme
judicial court, exercising "power of general superintendence," removed trial judge after reversal to "eliminate controversies and unnecessary issues in further proceedings and in any
appeal").
Carol Steiker has noted that even if the judicial will to address flagrant police misconduct
existed, an array of procedural doctrines has either emerged or been greatly expanded that
has had the effect of precluding any relief. See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in ConstitutionalCriminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MiCH. L. REv. 2466, 246869 (1996).
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that reduced standards for police intervention might have when
conjoined with an increasingly superficial judicial review of police

conduct.
IlI.

EMPATHY AND CoNTEMPT: THE ROLE OF
DEFENSE COUNSEL

Using similarly specious arguments to advocate radical reforms,
Uviler shows disgust and frustration with a number of other wellestablished rules of criminal procedure, such as the right to counsel78 and the right against self-incrimination. 79 But he reserves his
78. Uviller's subheading for his chapter on this part of the criminal process says it all:
"Dramatic, Deceitful, and Dilatory Assistance." P. 132. Here he is arm-in-arm with Judge
Rothwax, see RoTHa x, supra note 4, at 79-82 (arguing that "interrogation and trial have
disparate goals" and that "straightforward questioning in a nonhostile, nonthreatening environment... [is] the very essence of respect"), advocating a limit on the assistance of counsel
that would keep counsel out of the investigatory phase of all criminal proceedings and allow
them a role only at the trial itself:
As we have seen, critical stages may occur outside the courtroom - at lineup identifications, for example, and interviews with police or their covert agents at which some incriminating admission may be elicited. But the core of the counsel clause (the true
meaning of the provision, some - like me - would argue) is the promise of professional assistance at the most critical stage: courtroom proceedings.
Pp. 136-37; see also H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A
Reconsideration of the CurrentRules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLuM. L. Rav. 1137, 1138
(1987) (characterizing the right to counsel as "the villain of the piece" and arguing that the
right to counsel has been misapplied as "an artificial device of cloture on government efforts
to obtain cognitive evidence").
Uviller ignores - or purposely avoids accounting for - the basic principle of trial advocacy holding that preparation in large part determines one's likelihood of success at trial.
Assistance in the courtroom only is too little too late. But see id. at 1169 (arguing that
"[m]ost" of the "critical" stages for purposes of the assistance of counsel "occur after the case
has crossed the courtroom threshold, of course, but some may arise during the investigatory
or preparatory stages").
In addition, Uviller does not account for the fact that the prosecution largely controls the
time of indictment and hence the time that the right to counsel attaches. See, e.g., United
States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988) (declining to construe no-contact rule of
ethics as limited to the moment of indictment, because "[t]he timing of an indictment's return
lies substantially within the control of the prosecutor.... [who] could manipulate grand jury
proceedings to avoid its encumbrances").
79. Pp. 123-31. Again, Uviller here is in perfect harmony with Rothwax, see ROTHwAX,
supra note 4, at 79 (criticizing Miranda'sreasoning as "result[ing] in a system where we deny
people the opportunity to take responsibility for their criminal acts"), arguing, as did the
judge, that "[t]he social imperative that has been with us at least since people began to write
about social imperatives is that, along with their taxes, citizens owe the government a duty of
disclosure." P. 111. This position amounts to little more than an expression of frustration
with the drafters of the Fifth Amendment, which cannot more plainly state an abrogation of
this duty in the context of criminal proceedings. Cf RomwAx, supra note 4, at 230-31
("What would be so wrong with a system that requested a defendant to testify in a court of
law, on the record, and in the presence of his lawyers and the judge, after a showing of his
probable guilt had been demonstrated by the evidence?").
Uviller reveals his prosecutorial bias quite plainly at the chapter's end when, in response
to the proposition that either "[a]li but spontaneous confessions could be banned ... [o]r...
the moment of official accusation could be advanced to the point of arrest and the attached
right of counsel decreed unwaivable except in the presence of counsel," he states, "[1looking
boldly at the prospect of a law enforcement landscape stripped utterly of confession evidence, we cannot suppress a shudder." P. 130. He prophesies that if confessions are to be
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particular contempt for criminal defense attorneys, presumptuously
imagining a typical such lawyer and her attitudes toward her work
and her clients in a manner that demonstrates a profound unfamiliarity with those who do this work. 0 He proudly declares that he
has
actually dared to take the question to several acquaintances in the
defense bar. "How can you do it?" I asked. "Case after case, year
after year. Putting your own integrity on the line for a clientele that
is, in the overwhelming proportion, guilty and ungrateful?" Most lawyers do not quarrel with the premise - at least those who know me
well enough to be candid. 81
I do quarrel with the premise, and I am not alone.82
suppressed based upon Fifth or Sixth Amendment grounds, "[p]ublic anger would be so intense, [he] can see the return of the lynch mob." P. 130.
80. Pp. 280-82. Uviller's fictional public defender turned judge, Karen Meadows, follows
a trite trajectory from "[y]outhful idealism" that "inclined her to serve those she thought of
as 'victims of the system,"' to the discovery:
that something was happening to her attitude. And she didn't like it. It started when
she noticed a new, urgent tone in her voice as she told her friends, wryly, as she had so
many times before, "I just wish I could have a client I like once in a while." It was not
that she had never had a client who just might be innocent. Even some of the guilty ones
had stories that could break your heart. But for the most part, her clients were indifferent, suspicious, unrepentant, and ungrateful. And, let's face it, they were in the main the
predators of her community. Every now and then as Karen stood to challenge, discredit,
even humiliate a victim of her client's callous aggression, she asked herself, Why am I
doing this? There must be a better way to have fun while earning a living.
Pp. 280-81.
81. P. 151. As if this were not bad enough, Uviller then offers his own answer, underscoring his contempt with such trivializing justifications as "It'sfun," a category of rationale that
he describes as "All my life, I've wanted to sass a cop and get away with it. Now I do that
almost every day - and get paid for it!" P. 151.
Uvillers's tirade against defense counsel spans several chapters and contains such observed truths as:
The defense lawyer, born to the role, is a person who is more concerned with appearances and perceptions than with underlying facts; who puts greater reliance in "personality" (including his or her own) than in knowledge; who has little concern for general
public disapprobation despite a high ego investment.
P. 153.
Perhaps as bad as these distortions are the arrogance and condescension that accompany
them. Uviller assures his readers that "I'm sorry, but I believe that in a calmer frame of mind
even [defense attorneys] will recognize the traits in themselves and colleagues." P. 153. He
observes, helpfully, that "[p]erhaps for this law professor, at least, the work of the defense
Bar in the adversary system would seem less reprehensible if so many did not feel called
upon, as a matter of diligence, to lie for their clients." P. 155.
Uviller attributes ego and "personality" only to defense counsel, and, worse, makes only
defense counsel responsible for the perjury of their witnesses. For him, prosecutors can do
no wrong. See infra note 82 (comparing ethical roles of prosecutor and defense counsel).
82. Like Rothwax, Uviller also embraces a remarkably lopsided vision of the respective
roles of prosecution and defense. He believes, inexplicably, that for prosecutors, "public
responsibility ... is considerably broader than control. The prosecutor can do little, for
example, about police brutality or perjury." P. 158. For defense counsel, conversely, Uviller
proposes that "[s]urely, the lawyer should do more to discourage perjury" than raise a
"rather mild objection" to his client's story. P. 232. Rothwax similarly limited his criticism to
defense attorneys based upon his view that "[i]n a court of law, only the prosecution is assigned the task of seeking the truth." RoTHwAX, supranote 4, at 129. Why? Every lawyer is
responsible to the same extent for his or her own witnesses, and the rules of professional
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The experience of those who practice as criminal defense attor-

neys is far different from the cartoon that Uviller offers as incontrovertible truth. Lawyers for those charged with crimes who face the
full weight of the state's power suffer not from a contempt for those
they represent, but rather from an overabundance of care that is
continually challenged by the many biases latent in the criminal jus-

tice system. It is8 3an excess of empathy, not the detachment that
Uviller supposes.
Charles Ogletree writes about this characteristic of the public
defender's relationship to his or her clients:
My relationships with clients were rarely limited to the provision of
conventional legal services. I did not draw rigid lines between my
professional practice and my private life. My relationship with my
clients approximated a true friendship. I did for my clients all that I
would do for a friend. I took phone calls at all hours, helped clients
find jobs, and even interceded in domestic conflicts. I attended my
conduct in this area make no distinction that is contingent upon the lawyer's role at trial. See
MODEL RuLEs OF PRos'assiONAL CoNDucr Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1995) (prohibiting "[a] lawyer"
from offering evidence "that the lawyer knows to be false").
Uviller further absolves the prosecution of responsibility for witness testimony by arguing
that "if (as is sometimes the case) the prosecutor simply does not know whether the identification her witness swears to is accurate... the prosecutor is entitled to bring the facts out
fairly and fully and let the jury decide." Pp. 192-93. Uviller's views on the respective roles of
prosecution and defense echo those of Justice White in his partial dissent in United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218,256-57 (1967), which is so lopsided as now to be deemed reversible error
if read to a jury. See e.g., Bardonner v. State, 587 N.E.2d 1353, 1358-61 (Ind.Ct. App. 1992)
(reading Wade language during voir dire "not only negates the defendant's presumption of
innocence, but also runs afoul of [the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct]"). Compare p.
232 ("[Tihe prosecutor is obliged to refuse to call witnesses believed to be false and to dismiss charges against a defendant believed to be innocent. Defense counsel is not charged
with any public responsibility to the truth.") with Wade, 388 U.S. at 256 (White, J., dissenting)
("Law enforcement officers.., must be dedicated to making the criminal trial a procedure
for the ascertainment of the true facts surrounding the commission of [a] crime.... But
defense counsel has no comparable obligation to ascertain or present the truth."). Why is
there no comparable entitlement on the part of defense counsel to be uncertain, and to present to the factfinder evidence that he or she does not "know" to be false? See infra text
accompanying notes 83-86.
83. See, e.g., Michael J.Lightfoot, On a Level PlayingField,30 Loy. L.A. L. Rav. 69, 73,
78 (1996) (criticizing the "one-sidedness" of the criminal system and noting that "young
[criminal defense] lawyers learn after a short while that, for many clients, there is little they
can do to achieve results that seem to be objectively rational and fair. The sense of hopelessness can become overwhelming to the point that it compromises the lawyer's dignity"); Lefcourt, supra note 54, at 61-62 ("Representing an innocent client is an easy situation for the
public to support. In practice it is the hardest because of the overwhelming fear of loss.").
Even James S. Kunen, author of "How Can You Defend Those People?". The Making of
a CriminalLawyer and a harsh critic of his criminal experiences, described feelings of empathy during his experience at the Public Defender Service in Washington, D.C.:
Nor can you afford to feel a lot of sympathy for the clients ....Some of them earn the
courthouse epithet "dirtball," but most of them are likable enough when you're trying to
help them, and you'd have to be a moral moron not to see that they are victims, too. It's
just that too much sympathy for the clients gets in the way of doing your job. You have
to sell them on the advantages of doing five years instead of ten. You have to watch the
iron doors closing behind them allthe time.
"How CAN You DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE?": THE MAKwnG OF A CRnmNtAL LAWYER 143
(1983).
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clients' weddings and their funerals. When clients were sent to
prison, I maintained contact with their families. Because I viewed my
clients as friends, I did not merely feel84justified in doing all I could for
them; I felt a strong desire to do so.

In the real world of crime victims, as opposed to the tabloid world
of true crime stories and America's Most Wanted, the capacity for
empathy is surprisingly strong and seems to be inversely proportional to our distance from the object.85 Not surprisingly, juries
presented with the "stories" of actual people respond, as do their
counsel, with
empathy and compassion, not with contempt and
86
detachment.
It is in this respect that Uviler's rhetoric begins to echo the
crime rhetoric of the city from which he writes, accepting as truths
things that are either distorted or in doubt, and then constructing
elaborate and unnecessary remedies on their backs. The fundamental characteristic that unites Uviller and his cohorts with the
police - and against existing rules of criminal procedure, criminal
defendants, and their lawyers - is a want of empathy. Like Travis
Bickle,8 7 they rage against a tidal wave of crime that exists in the

imagination, fueled by the media and by the isolation from others
that is part of modem urban life.
It seems reasonable to ask that before we embrace changes that
impair fundamental rights, there should be some demonstration
that the flaws are real and have costs. If, instead, the flaws are
imagined or the costs, if any, are minimal, then the only justification
84. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public
Defenders,106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1272 (1993). Ogletree surveys the literature in this area
and notes that defense attorneys experience "burnout" most often because of excessive
caseloads, see id. at 1268, n.112 (citing NATIONAL INsT. OF JusTIcE, AssESSINo CRIMINAL
JusrICE NEEDS 4 (1984)), as a result of which they must "appear regularly in court without
adequate preparation or sufficient time to meet with clients," id. (citing Stewart O'Brien et
al., The CriminalLawyer: The Defendant's Perspective,5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 283, 301 (1977)).
This source of burnout evinces an empathy with clients, rather than a disdain of them.
85. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy andFalse Empathy, 84
CAL. L. REV. 61, 76-79 (1996) (discussing norm theory, which holds that "reaction to a[ ]
person in distress varies according to the normalcy or abnormalcy of his or her plight in
[another's] eyes"). Delgado uses norm theory to explain why "[w]e find it easy to empathize
with the victims of crime... particularly if they are middle-class people like us." Id. at 89.
86. See generally Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1932 (1991) (noting that "most punishment now tends to take place out
of public view ... [especially] in densely populated urban settings, where anonymity and
disinterest in others' lives often are governing rules of public interpersonal relations. Accordingly, the public can distance itself psychologically from the process and results of punishment"). This is certainly true in capital cases, in which the object of defense counsel is to
"humanize" the defendant and thereby enhance jury empathy, a phenomenon wellillustrated by the respective defenses of, and sentences imposed upon, Timothy McVeigh and
Terry Nichols, co-conspirators in the Oklahoma City bombing. It also accounts for the recent
success of so-called abuse excuse defenses, in which a jury relieves an offender of criminal
liability on grounds that the community outside the courtroom finds suspect or contrived.
See generally ALAN M. DERSHOWrrz, THE ABUSE ExcusE (1994).
87. See TAxi DRIVER, supra note 1.
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for the reforms that Uviller advocates is the bare political preference for a different allocation of power between government and
individual. In that case, give me Judge Rothwax, a wolf in wolf's
clothing, rather than the sheepishness of Virtual Justice.

RETROACTIVE TRIALS AND JUSTICE
Stephan Landsman*
EVIL ON TRIAL. By Carlos Santiago Nino. New Haven:
Yale University Press. 1996. Pp. xii, 220. $27.50.
RADICAL

Call miracle self-healing:
The utter, self-revealing
Double-take of feeling.
If there's fire on the mountain
Or lightning and storm
And a god speaks from the sky

Human beings suffer,
They torture one another,
They get hurt and get hard.
No poem or play or song
Can fully right a wrong
Inflicted and endured.

History says, Don't hope
On this side of the grave.
But then, once in a lifetime
The longed-for tidal wave
Of justice can rise up,
And hope and history rhyme.

The innocent in gaols
Beat on their bars together.
A hunger-striker's father
Stands in the graveyard dumb.
The police widow in veils
Faints at the funeral home.

So hope for a great sea-change That means someone is hearing
The outcry and the birth-cry
On the far side of revenge.
1
Believe that a further shore
Of new life at its term.
Is reachable from here.
Believe in miracles
And cures and healing wells.

Seamus Heaney's moving words remind us that we live in an
extraordinary time when, at sites of grave injustice ranging from the
halls of government of Argentina and South Africa to the killing
fields of Bosnia and Rwanda, "The longed-for tidal wave/Of justice
can rise up,/And hope and history rhyme."
Writers have attempted, in very different ways, to come to terms
with the swelling of the tide of justice. For example, the philosopher Alan Rosenbaum, in a recent book about the prosecution of
Nazi war criminals,' argues that virtually every person implicated in
the Nazis' genocidal assault on Europe's Jews should be prosecuted
to the full extent of the law.2 His uncompromising position is "that
not'bringing suspected Nazi criminals to trial is flagrantly immoral
and a serious assault on the basic values of civilization and on the
conception of a democratic, rights-based society." 3 For
Rosenbaum, moral factors always trump
"rebuttable considerations
'4
like time and resource expenditures."
* Robert A. Clifford Professor of Tort Law and Social Policy, DePaul University, College of Law. B.A. 1969, Kenyon; J.D. 1972, Harvard. - Ed.

1. SEAMUS IEnEiuy, THE Com AT TROY 77-78 (1990). This excerpt appears on the
masthead of the journal Double Take.
2. See ALAN S. ROSENBAUM, PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS (1993).

3. Id at xi.
4. Id.at 1.
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Rosenbaum's dismissal of the practical stands in striking contrast to the approach taken by Carlos Santiago Nino's 5 Radical Evil
on Trial. The late Professor Nino's work is, in essence, a painstaking assessment of the practicality of retroactive justice. 6 Nino traces
the pragmatic pursuit of justice in Argentina and a number of other
nations as each struggled to replace an oppressive regime with a
popularly chosen successor. In doing so, he provides insight into
the nature and likely prospects of contemporary efforts to secure
justice around the world.
I. THE

STORY OF ARGENTINA

Carlos Nino was deeply involved in Argentina's transformation,
in the middle 1980s, from a military dictatorship to a democracy.
He was a personal adviser to President Rail Alfonsin, who oversaw
the country's transition. Because of Nino's personal involvement
with events and personal relations with some of the actors, passages
of his book read more like a memoir than a scholarly assessment.
But Nino succeeds in making his retelling of Argentina's story more
than the reminiscences of a witness to history. In his hands, Argentina's recent struggles become a didactic experience from which
powerful lessons may be derived about the practical prospects for
retroactive justice.
In March 1976, the military launched a coup to oust Isabel
Per6n from the Argentine presidency. Once in power the military
junta curtailed civil liberties, dissolved Congress, and replaced independent judges, government officials, and university personnel
with ideologically vetted substitutes. Harsh antisubversive legislation was adopted, and a reign of terror was initiated. Alleged subversives and other opponents of the regime were abducted,
tortured, and killed - all without the slightest justification or explanation. Many of those who disappeared were never heard from
again, and those who were released eventually told of the most brutal mistreatment. Jewish detainees were frequently the target of
anti-Semitic atrocities. Eventually, the military claimed that these
grievous human rights abuses were justified by the exigencies of
Argentina's "dirty war" against terrorism (p. 56). Even the military, however, conceded that the targets of its torture and murder
campaign were seldom terrorists but rather "individuals considered
5. Professor Nino "held a chair in philosophy of law at the University of Buenos Aires
and, starting in 1986, was a regular visiting professor at the Yale Law School." P. 207. He
died suddenly and tragically in 1993 while the manuscript of this volume was still unfinished.

Final preparation of the book was overseen by Professor Owen Fiss.
6. By "retroactive justice," Nino means legal proceedings that were not begun, or even

possible, at the time the crimes were committed but have been made feasible by the fall of a
repressive regime and its replacement by a democratic successor. P. viii.
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threatening to the consolidation of the military's political, social,
and economic power" (p. 58).
As time passed, Argentine resistance to the military's abuses
grew. A number of human rights groups spearheaded this resistance, including Servicio de Paz y Justicia, whose leader, Adolfo
P6rez Esquivel, received the Nobel Peace Prize after two years of
detention (p. 59). Weekly demonstrations by the Madres de Plaza
de Mayo underscored, for the world, the fact that thousands had
disappeared. From about 1979 on, outside pressure, most particularly from the United States, began to focus substantial attention on
military abuses and generate calls for redress and reform (p. 60).
By 1980, the military's grip on Argentina was beginning to slip,
due in part to internal and international pressure, but also reflecting
the impact of a substantial economic downturn (p. 60). In December 1981, the military replaced its junta leader, General Eduardo
Viola, with General Leopoldo Galtieri. The military's position continued to deteriorate, and massive antigovernment demonstrations
took place in the early days of 1982. In what seemed a desperate
bid for public support, the military launched an invasion of the
Falkland Islands, a small chain of British-controlled islands off the
Argentine Coast. The British responded to this military adventure
by sending an armada to retake the Islands. The Argentine army
was overwhelmed and surrendered on June 14, 1982. This military
disgrace led to Galtieri's fall and further eroded the military government's standing (p. 61).
By 1983, it had become clear that civilian replacement of the
military regime was only a matter of time. The military attempted
to insulate its members from liability by declaring that all acts undertaken during the dirty war were committed pursuant to "superior commands" (p. 62) and were, therefore, perfectly lawful as
"due obedience" (p. 64). Civilian leaders unanimously rejected this
claim, and the Radical Party's candidate, Alfonsfn, promised that, if
elected, his government would put on trial those who were responsible for gross abuses of human rights. Faced with an enormous
pool of potential defendants, Alfonsfn labored to identify those
who should be targeted for prosecution. He chose to focus on the
planners of repression and those who acted beyond the scope of
orders, rather than those who had simply abducted and tortured in
the regime's name. He made this distinction because he was convinced that otherwise there would be far too many defendants. In
Alfonsfn's view, this likely would provoke the military into armed
resistance. In September 1983, the military promulgated a "self amnesty" law (p. 64). Alfonsfn rejected this gambit out of hand, while
the other leading candidate, Peronist Italo Luder, seemed to equivocate about its legitimacy. Many in Argentina - including, per-
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haps, the military - believed that the Peronists, who had never lost
an open election, would take control of the government, thereby
foreclosing the prospect of prosecution. Alfonsin, however, surprised the pundits by garnering fifty-two percent of the vote aided, it would appear, by his strong stand regarding prosecutions.
Once in office, Alfonsn set his government about the task of
discovering the fate of all those who had disappeared. He also
sought to determine who ought to be tried for human rights abuses.
His three fundamental principles were:
1. Both state and subversive terrorism should be punished.
2. There must be limits on those held responsible, for it would be
impossible effectively to pursue all those who had committed crimes.
3. The trials should be limited to a finite period during which public
enthusiasm for such a program remained high. [p. 67]
Alfonsfn seemed to be searching for a realistic prosecutorial agenda
that would appear evenhanded - hence the focus on subversives as
well as the state - and would balance the demands of justice with
the realities of limited judicial resources, the military's violent opposition to widespread punishment, and a predictable decline in
public enthusiasm if trials dragged on for too long. While struggling
to fix this agenda, Alfonsfn also set about reforming the judiciary by
removing those judges compromised by adherence to the dubious
legal initiatives of the military regime (p. 72).
Political and judicial realities led Alfonsin to curtail the reach
and focus of his campaign for retroactive prosecution even further.
As a means of garnering military cooperation and re-establishing
the armed forces' credibility, Alfonsfn arranged to give military
tribunals the first opportunity to consider charges against military
defendants. These courts had the power to narrow the reach of
prosecution substantially. According to Nino, Alfonsin was more
concerned with the future than the past - with establishing the
rule of law and deterring future violations of human rights. He conceived this as a necessary orientation in a still-divided Argentina
facing an ongoing threat of military insurrection. Alfonsin did not
want to bury the past, but he was not wedded to seeking criminal
convictions of all those involved in past wrongdoing. As Nino summarizes, "While the pursuit of truth would be unrestricted, the punishment would be limited, based on deterrent rather than
retributive considerations and on the need to incorporate every sector in the democratic process" (p. 68). This formula reflects the
Argentine effort to forge a compromise that would punish grave
misdeeds but leave society intact. This approach outraged human
rights organizations, which bitterly attacked the government. Their
protests had the ironic effect of drawing them into a bizarre alliance
with the military, which also vigorously challenged Alfonsfn's
approach.
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Recognizing that a limited number of prosecutions could not deliver a full accounting, Alfonsfn determined to serve the cause of
truth - or full disclosure - by creating what, in recent days, has
come to be known as a truth commission. 7 The task of this executive branch commission, referred to as CONADEP (the acronym of
its Spanish title), was to review fully the questions of dirty-war-era
torture and abduction. Its report was to be made within 180 days.
It was authorized to hear complaints from victims, receive voluntary testimony, and demand written statements from public officials
(p. 72). Human rights organizations initially refused to contribute
representatives to CONADEP, and the military viewed it With open
hostility. Yet the commission moved forward briskly. Complaints
poured in, and CONADEP examined thousands of charges. It also
inspected 340 clandestine detention centers and struggled tirelessly
to secure the identification of the remains of murder victims (p. 79).
Eventually, rights organizations began to cooperate, as they observed the seriousness and scope of CONADEP's work. At the end
of its allotted time, CONADEP issued a massive report detailing
the workings of the military government's torture and disappearance machinery. This report, entitled Nunca Mds (Never Again),
was a powerful indictment of the old regime. CONADEP also
presented the courts with 1086 cases for judicial review (p. 80).
While things moved forward rapidly for CONADEP, the military tribunals stalled. Their delays in considering the cases referred
to them and their hostility to retroactive justice eventually led to
the removal of the atrocity charges from military jurisdiction. In
the meantime, armed forces unrest grew and threats of revolt
multiplied.
Alfonsfn renewed his efforts to narrow the ambit of prosecution.
The civilian courts, however, would not cooperate. They asserted
jurisdiction over a broad range of the crimes that the prior regime
had committed. In April 1985, while disputes raged about a
number of other cases, the "big trial" (p. 82) of the leaders of the
military junta began. This proceeding was fraught with symbolism
as the new judiciary sat in judgment of the leaders of the once allpowerful armed forces. When, at the start of the proceedings,
counsel for one of the defendants behaved disrespectfully, his disciplinary arrest was immediately ordered. The message concerning
the shift in power could not have been clearer.
The judges presiding at the big trial heard an extraordinary array of witnesses - 832 in all. These included military and civilian
7. See generally Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A Com-

parative Study, 16 HUM. Rrs. Q. 597 (1994); Stephan Landsman, Alternative Responses to
Serious Human Rights Abuses: Of Prosecution and Truth Commissions, LAW & CoNTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 81.
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leaders, as well as torture victims, forensic scientists - who had
examined the remains of victims - and a host of others (p. 84).
One troubling aspect of the trial was its seeming disregard of most
evidentiary restrictions - especially those concerning relevance
and hearsay. The absence of evidentiary constraints meant that
there was virtually no way to keep the case focused on the defendants in the dock. Instead, the court was inundated with questionable evidence touching on all aspects of the military's dirty war.
Hearsay was in constant use. The court was provided with lengthy
secondhand recitations about the work of a number of investigative
bodies, including the United Nations Human Rights Commission,
CONADEP, and even the U.S. Department of State. In addition,
the court heard a great deal of even more troubling hearsay, like
the testimony of French Admiral Antoine Sanguinetti who
recounted a meeting with Gen. Jos6 Montes [not a defendant at the
trial], a foreign minister of the military government, during which he
had inquired about the French nuns who had disappeared; Montes
replied that it was strange to evince concern about those nuns when a
manager of the Peugeot factory had been assassinated by the guerrillas. [p. 83]
This testimony intimated the callousness of all members of the military leadership and associated the defendants - whether fairly or
not - with the disappearance and murder of a group of innocent
nuns. In the end, a powerful case was made against the defendants,
but a great deal of extraneous material was injected into the lengthy
proceedings. The army reacted violently to the case. The trial was
branded - not altogether unjustly -

a "political show" (p. 84), and

increasingly strident threats were voiced against Alfonsin's government. The defendants and their counsel complained that
CONADEP had framed a case to convict them unjustly - a charge
that was hard to refute because of the court's reliance on a summary of CONADEP's work rather than on firsthand evidence.
Outside the courtroom, a series of bombings took place and tensions grew.
Concerned because of military unrest, in October 1985, Alfonsin
arranged an ex parte meeting with the judges presiding over the big
trial. At that meeting the President pressed the judges to embrace
publicly the principle of due obedience and thereby excuse those
below the rank of military leader from retroactive liability (pp. 8687). The judges rejected this proposal, and in December 1985,
found five of the nine big-trial defendants guilty of a host of criminal charges. In March 1986, Alfonsin again met secretly with the
judges to urge them to accept the due obedience idea (p. 90).
When this gambit failed, the President began to explore other
means of cutting off retroactive prosecution. One of these was a
proposed executive instruction to military prosecutors that pending
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cases against military leaders be concluded speedily and that cases
against subordinates be halted immediately with acquittals. This
proposal provoked the resignation of Judge Jorge Torlasco of the
federal court of appeals and a chorus of protests from human rights
organizations (p. 91). It was withdrawn, but not before it had the
boomerang effect of stiffening judicial opposition to compromise.
All during this period, military resistance and violence escalated,
eventually calling into question the survival of the government.
Faced with what he perceived to be irreconcilable pressures
threatening to tear Argentina apart, Alfonsin proposed and secured
the passage of a "'full stop' law (puntofinal)" (p. 92) that imposed
a sixty-day cutoff date on the filing of retroactive charges. This law
was enacted in December 1986, despite substantial popular opposition. It too boomeranged, resulting in the hasty filing of hundreds
of new criminal charges to beat the legislatively imposed filing
deadline. During Easter week in 1987, the simmering military unrest came to a boil. Military officers in a number of localities voiced
open defiance of the government. Despite Alfonsin's courageous
handling of the immediate crisis - he went unarmed to a rebel
base and talked its commander into surrendering - conditions continued to deteriorate (pp. 98-99). The political difficulties of the
government were compounded by a sharp economic decline.
Alfonsfn struggled desperately to rein in the prosecutions. To this
end, in June 1987, he convinced the Congress to adopt a due obedience law that protected virtually all soldiers below the rank of commander. As a matter of political strategy, this solution came too
late. In September 1987, Alfonsfn was voted out of office and replaced by Peronist Carlos Menem. With hyperinflation running
rampant, Menem was invited to assume the presidency early. He
did so and almost immediately issued pardons that freed many of
the military leaders most responsible for the dirty war (p. 103). The
following year Menem also pardoned the junta leaders convicted in
the big trial.
The lessons to be drawn from the Argentine experience are
many, some of them encouraging, but others sobering in the extreme. Democracy did triumph by sweeping away a repressive military regime. At the heart of that triumph was the will of the
Argentine people to elect a president - Alfonsfn

-

who promised

to prosecute those who had grossly violated human rights. Democracy's victory was enhanced by the work of courageous political
leaders, judges, and prosecutors who pressed cases against torturers
and murderers despite profound risks. Perhaps as significant was
the vindication of the principle of full public disclosure of the truth
about the crimes of the past. By means of a truth commission CONADEP - Argentineans explored and then publicized all that
had happened during the dirty war. CONADEP was an unalloyed
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success. It worked speedily, uncovered the true history of a tragic
time, and made that history public. It did so without provoking a
violent military response. In a dangerously riven society,
CONADEP began the process of healing through full disclosure.
Its success, and the success of other truth commissions in countries
like Chile, 8 has not gone unremarked. In South Africa, Nelson
Mandela's government turned to a truth commission to expose and
explore the crimes of the apartheid era. 9 This choice speaks
volumes about the perceived power of truth as a tool for social
reconstruction.
The story is much less encouraging when the efficacy of criminal
prosecutions is considered. The criminal process worked too slowly
and too elaborately. It raised hopes that it could not satisfy and
fears that it allowed to fester. Argentina's big trial was a real victory for the rule of law. But it came at enormous cost. The concept
of unbridled prosecution eventually became a stumbling block. The
832-witness proceeding swept virtually every sort of charge and
every imaginable kind of proof into the public arena. For the military, this meant that every soldier had become a potential target for
prosecution. For the victims, this seemed to signal an opportunity
not just for social justice but for personal vindication. For human
rights organizations, this appeared to be the beginning of a process
to review every wrong done by the armed forces.
Argentina simply could not afford such a broad-ranging process.
It had neither the judicial resources nor the political will. Although
Alfonsin recognized this, he could never effectively channel the
proceedings. Moreover, the big trial invited both friend and foe
alike to assume that personalized criminal proceedings would become the norm. Alfonsin tried, through the full stop and due obedience laws, to impose prudential limits. In each case, his effort was
seen as too little, too late. In both instances, the government's
strategy boomeranged: first fueling a hectic rush to get cases filed,
and then a cynicism that paved the way for mass pardons. The government's dilemma led it to dubious ex parte negotiations with the
judiciary and indecisiveness that alienated friends and encouraged
foes. The trial mechanism and retroactive prosecution are critically
valuable tools in reasserting the power of the law, but they are no
panacea. Such tools must be used thoughtfully so as not to exhaust
the political and social resources of a fledgling democracy. This is
not an invitation to abandon trials, but rather a call for their judi8. Nino discusses the work of the Chilean Commission of Truth and Reconciliation. Pp.

37-38; see also Jos6 Zalaquett, Balancing Ethical Imperatives and PoliticalConstraints: The
Dilemma of New Democracies ConfrontingPastHuman Rights Violations, 43
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1425, 1434 (1992).
9. See generally Tma Rosenberg, Recovering from Apartheid, THE Nnw
18, 1996, at 86.
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cious use in the service of the broader aim of establishing a decent
and durable society.
II. A

TAXONOMY OF

IssuEs

AFFECTING THE FEASIBILITY OF

RETROACTrVE TRIALS

Nino does not rely exclusively on the Argentine experience in
attempting to assess the practical prospects of mounting retroactive
trials to punish those responsible for massive human rights violations. Rather, he reviews events in more than a score of countries,
ranging from post-1945 Germany to 1980s Chile. He concludes that
while every nation's situation is unique, there are certain positive
factors that facilitate trials as well as certain negative ones that pull
in the opposite direction. He lists the following as positive factors:
" coercive nature of the process of transition
* legal discontinuities
" heinousness of the abuses
* absolute and relative quantity of the abuses
* social identification with the victims of the abuses
* sharpness of the trials
* leadership [p. 126]
Nino argues that the virtually ideal setting for retroactive justice
was post-World War II Germany. By force of arms, the victorious
allies had smashed the Nazi regime completely. The Germans had
no means of mounting effective opposition to trials. All the Naziera laws and rules that might have been used to justify barbarous
and criminal conduct had been swept away. Indeed, the Nazis'
overarching racist dogma had been dealt a death blow. The heinous and vast nature of the Holocaust was becoming apparent to all
those willing to make inquiry. Although the German people did
not embrace Jewish and other victims, the victims were an object of
genuine -

if belated -

humanitarian concern amongst those who

prosecuted. The trials, while far from sharply focused, did not become absolutely unwieldy. The first prosecution concentrated, at
least nominally, on twenty-four named individuals and moved at a
pace that yielded a decision within ten months. 10 Successive trials
moved more swiftly still. Towering leaders, particularly the Nuremberg chief prosecutor, Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson,
drove the process toward a decisive and morally justified goal. Yet,
despite all this, the prosecutorial process ran out of energy long
before all those involved in awful criminal acts had been identified
or prosecuted. Even the so-called de-Nazification program faltered
10. For a detailed description of the Nuremberg proceedings see TELFORD
(1992).

ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS

TAYLOR,

THE
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as the political realities of the Cold War made prosecution less attractive and German reconstruction more important.11
Few cases will have as many positive factors as Nuremberg. Indeed, many prosecutions will be inhibited by a range of problems.
Nino identifies a series of such negative factors, including:
* consensual nature of the transition
" time span between deeds and trials

* social identification with perpetrators of abuses
* diffusion of responsibility
* cohesion of the perpetrators [p. 127]

If Germany was a virtually ideal setting for retroactive justice,
Spain in the 1970s was its antithesis. Throughout that decade, Spain
moved at an accelerating pace toward democracy. The death of the
Spanish dictator Francisco Franco in 1975 opened the way for fullscale reform. Rather than prosecute Franco-era officials for the
suffering they inflicted on Spaniards from 1939 onward, Spanish
legislators, in October 1977, "enacted a general amnesty of all politically motivated crimes" (p. 17). The next year a constitution was
adopted that firmly closed the door on retroactive justice. Nino
suggests that the consensual nature of the Spanish transition - accomplished without force and through incremental steps toward democracy - undermined social support for trials (p. 17). Moreover,
the most serious human rights violations committed by Franco's
government had occurred during and shortly after the civil war,
which ended in 1939. There was, over time, a blurring of memory
as well as an amelioration of divisions between pro- and antiFranco citizens. Many had lived, worked, and even prospered
under the slowly reforming Spanish dictatorship. In the end, there
was, according to Nino, a strong social consensus to "let bygones be
bygones" (p. 17).
Most shifts from oppressive regimes to democracy fall somewhere between these two extremes. In each case, Nino argues,
there will be factors pushing toward and away from criminal prosecution. Nino's taxonomy suggests that large numbers of prosecutions will seldom be either feasible or popular. The key goal of
most states following the fall of an oppressive regime is not trials,
but the establishment of a durable democracy. Retroactive prosecution may be an important step in that process, but it is not an end
in itself. It must be harmonized with an array of other concerns.
While the absolute shattering of the old regime may open the way
for broad-based legal proceedings, even here practical limits on the
scope and duration of trials will eventually be reached. Increasingly, therefore, truth-commission inquiry has been substituted for
11. See CAROLYN WOODY EISENBERG, DRAWING
To DIVIDE GERMANY, 1944-1949, at 372-74 (1996).
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retroactive prosecutions. The goal has not necessarily been to punish past criminal conduct, but rather to publicize it. In such instances, knowledge, rather than retribution, has been judged to be
the fundamental building block of the future.
III.

LEssONs ABOUT RITROACTrVE TRIALS THEMSELVES

Despite significant impediments, the world, over the past half
century, has had significant experience with retroactive prosecution. Although it appears that the Nuremberg experience has created an enduring expectation that grave human rights abuses will be
tried elaborately, the Argentine experience suggests that such trials
are not without pitfalls. Nino remarks:
[E]ven when the perpetrators of human rights violations are prosecuted, widespread criticism typically surfaces. Some people are disappointed at the contrast between the expectations of justice and the
limited results of the strenuous proceedings. Others feel guilty about
the omissions, recognizing that the ensuing power relations were responsible for the trials' shape. Still others feel great hypocrisy when
those integrally involved in the abusive regime escape punishment,
even retaining important public positions, or when those who were
silent in the past suddenly become vociferous advocates of retroactive
justice. Some grieve for victims of human rights abuses who were not
sufficiently compensated, rehabilitated, or acknowledged. Others feel
resentful when the victorious foreigners form tribunals that are biased, or when those foreigners press for rigid standards of justice
which their own societies do not follow and which ignore the difficulties of nascent democracy. Still others realize that the popular impact
of the trials is rather superficial and fleeting. [pp. 39-40]
Nino's initial observation in this passage underscores the problem of selectivity that the decision to prosecute poses. It is inevitable that a far smaller number will be prosecuted than are actually
responsible. The difficulties of gathering proof and mounting trials
necessitate narrowing the field of potential defendants. Often, as at
the first Nuremberg trial, the defendants are chosen so as to serve a
symbolic as well as an individual role in the criminal proceedings;
they are tried not only for their own deeds but as proxies for all
those who acted similarly. This means that others who may be
equally guilty will not be tried. Such an arrangement is obviously
open to criticism, but difficult to avoid so long as there are inadequate means to prosecute everyone.
The symbolic overtones of many prosecutorial decisions in retroactive justice cases carry other serious implications for the trials
that are mounted. First, a mixed prosecutorial agenda - pursuing
both actual and symbolic guilt - will often result in greater reliance on evidence regarding the character of the defendant than
otherwise might be the case. Nino explains that this perhaps sur-
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prising phenomenon arises out of a desire for retribution, heightened by the representative nature of the defendant and amplified
by the felt need to redress all the wrongs perpetrated. As Nino sees
it, retribution is only legitimate if deserved by the offender. "[T]he
desert of the offender is gauged by his character - i.e., the kind of
person he is" (p. 140). Hence, character evidence becomes a critical
part of the proof despite many evidentiary systems' strong reservations about such material because of its prejudicial impact. 12 Indeed, concerns about prejudice are most powerful when the crime
charged is vast and the defendant is viewed as a representative of a
group of malefactors.
A second result of a mixed-agenda prosecution is that when opportunities to bear witness are limited - because of a paucity of
trials - and when the proofs presented are designed to serve symbolic as well as defendant-specific purposes, traditional notions of
relevance likely will be stretched. Those with particularly poignant
stories will be allowed to testify even though what they have to say
has little direct bearing on the charges. It may be impossible for
humane prosecutors to deny incredibly deserving victims an opportunity to confront their oppressors and address the world regarding
their suffering. Moreover, the prosecutors often will either face a
surfeit of proof or conceive their role as requiring an expansive
presentation. In either case, they will find it exceedingly difficult to
13
winnow their evidence.
A related evidentiary consequence of the mixed-objective prosecution is heightened use of hearsay materials. While many judicial
systems impose no bar on hearsay, most view it as an inferior and
often troubling form of proof 1 4 Yet it is likely to be particularly
heavily relied upon in retroactive justice proceedings. Because expanded notions of relevance make the words and deeds of many
more actors germane at trial, past writings and summaries of previous inquiries are necessary to allow the introduction of more proof
without an endless queue of witnesses. Further, as events of importance to the trial slip further and further into the past, the dulling of
12. The American position is succinctly set forth in FED. R. EvrD. 404(a): "Evidence of a

person's character or a trait of character is not [generally] admissible for the purpose of
proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion .... "
13. Such forces seem to have been at work in Argentina's big trial, in which an astound-

ing 832 witnesses were called. Many told harrowing stories of torture and loss that were only
tangentially related to the defendants in the dock. Even Nino's brief description of the trial

makes it abundantly clear that relevance was viewed in the most elastic terms despite the
impact of such an approach on the length and sharpness of focus of the trial.
14. See 30 CHARLES ALAN WmG-T & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACrICE

AND PROCEDURE § 6324 (1997) (discussing, at length, the nature of "the hearsay dangers").
On the European recognition of the dangers associated with hearsay, see MInUAN R.
DAmA9KA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRiFr 15-16 (1997) (discussing European awareness of and caution in using hearsay materials).
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memory and effects of natural attrition make it ever more likely
that hearsay will be needed as a substitute for living recollection. 15
Experience suggests trials are likely to be more effective if they
are speedy and sharply focused. While the big trial had substantial
value to Argentina, its length and lack of focus afforded the military
an opportunity to mount increasingly effective resistance. Nino
concludes that "[1]ong proceedings tend to undermine the success
of trials, since public support, so vital for the success of the enterprise, may fade with the passing of time, as happened in Argentina
after 1986" (pp. 124-25). He is similarly critical of "unwieldy" proceedings (p. 125). The tendency toward symbolism, lengthy witness
lists, marginal evidentiary presentations, and hearsay all interfere
with expeditious and narrowly focused proceedings, thereby jeopardizing the very cause they seek to vindicate.
IV. RETROACtiVE TRIALS IN OTHER CONTEXTS
Nino's taxonomy presumes the recent replacement of an oppressive regime by a democratic successor. As Nino recognizes, this
is not the only context in which retroactive trials may arise. They
may occur when a particularly odious malefactor is seized long after
the conclusion of his criminal career, as was the case with Adolf
Eichmann. Alternatively, trials may be mounted at the behest of
the outraged world community in response to massive human rights
violations, as in the cases of both Bosnia 16 and Rwanda. 17 In these
cases, the dynamics of prosecution may differ somewhat from those
outlined above.
A number of the positive and negative factors Nino identifies as
affecting prosecution will not apply with nearly the same force in a
setting like the Eichmann trial or a United Nations Tribunal proceeding. In such cases, no transition to democracy colors proceedings or generates pressure for celerity. The applicable law, rather
than serving as a barrier to prosecution, is likely specifically to allow the court to prosecute the alleged acts, as was the situation in
the Eichmann trial,' 8 or may have even been enacted to found the
tribunal.' 9 In neither case is a past legal regime likely to create
impediments to prosecution. Political constituencies or populations
sympathetic to the defendant are far less likely to have any signifi15. For example, Argentina's big trial relied on vast quantities of hearsay from agencies
like the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and CONADEP as well as a number
of individuals. Pp. 83-84.
16. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doe. S/Res/827
(1993) (approving the Yugoslavia Tribunal).
17. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955
(1994) (approving the Rwanda Tribunal).
18. See The Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 1950, S.H. 57.
19. See supra notes 16-17.
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cant impact on the society or international body mounting the case.
Yet a number of the forces identified by Nino are still likely to be at
work and to influence proceedings. In the Eichmann case, for example, awareness of the grievousness of the Holocaust had grown
with time, and this played a major role in dictating the course of the
prosecution. Similarly, there would never have been an Eichmann
trial were it not for the intense identification of the prosecuting
state with the victims of Nazi genocide.
The factors of growing awareness of the crime and identification
with its victims heightened the symbolic importance of the
Eichmann trial for Israelis.2 0 Based on Nino's analysis, this would
lead one to predict that Israel would mount a sprawling trial, seek
to tell the story of the entire Holocaust, disregard evidentiary restrictions, and focus a great deal of attention on Eichmann's character. The Eichmann proceedings bear out these predictions. The
Holocaust story and Eichmann's character became central focuses
of the case. 21 The prosecution called 121 witnesses who described
in detail the entirety of Nazi genocide - whether it had anything to
do with Eichmann or not.22 The government also introduced a
mountain of documents, including the forty-two-volume record of
the Nuremberg proceedings, the 3500 pages of the defendant's pretrial interrogation, and more than a half-dozen books.23 The documentary material was laced with all sorts of hearsay, and the
witnesses stretched notions of relevance to the breaking point.24
Perhaps the best example of the court's attitude toward character
evidence was its admission of a 1946 statement by Dieter Wisliceny,
who, at the moment of his statement, was trying unsuccessfully to
barter information for his life:
I considered Eichmann's character and personality important factors in carrying out measures against the Jews. He was personally a
cowardly man who went to great pains to protect himself from responsibility. He never made a move without approval from higher
authority and was extremely careful to keep ifies and records establishing the responsibility of Himmler, Heydrich and later
Kaltenbrunner....
20. See TOM SEGEV, THE SEVENTH MILLION: TiH

ISRAELIS AND THE HOLOCAUST 323-

86 (Haim Watzman trans., 1993).

21. Id. at 350-54.
22. Id
23. 9 TRIAL OF ADOLF EicHmANN RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE DisTRIcr COURT

OF JERUSALEM (Trust for the Publication of the Proceedings of the Eichmann Trial in cooper-

ation with the Israel State Archives and Yad Vashem trans., 1992) [hereinafter TRIAL OF
ADOLF EicmANm] (Vol. 9 provides a microfiche of all exhibits submitted at trial.).

24. See GIDEON HAUSNER, JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM 322-408 (1966), for a detailed description of the Eichmann proceedings. Hausner was the chief Israeli prosecutor in the Eichmann
case.
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Eichmann was very cynical in his attitude toward the Jewish Question. He gave no indication of any human feeling toward these people. He was not immoral, he was amoral and completely ice-cold in
his attitude. He said to me on the occasion of our last meeting in
February 1945, at which time we were discussing our fates upon losing
the War: 'I will laugh when I jump into the grave because of the feeling that I have killed 5,000,000 Jews. That gives me great satisfaction
and gratification.' 25
Not only, were such character analyses regularly admitted, they
were zealously pursued by the court. At one point in the proceedings Judge Halevi - one of the members of the three-judge Jerusalem District Court trial panel - asked a key witness, Pastor
Heinrich Grilber:
Dr. Griber, you said that as a man of religion, a clergyman, you are,
and always were, interested in the motivation of the people who were
involved, and therefore you took notice of the character of the Accused, Eichmann. You said that you encountered the glacial manner
of a man who is like a block of ice or marble and with a deep hatred.
You said that, at first, you could not understand such a man at all that is until you experienced the concentration camp. Is this behaviour not like the behaviour
of Hitler and his henchmen which he
26
used as an example?
Conviction and punishment had everything to do with being like
Hitler. Hence, character proofs of the sort Anglo-American-Israeli
evidence rules generally frown upon were energetically sought.
In the end, the problems of duration and focus so prominent in
Argentina's big trial also affected the Eichmann prosecution. The
trial lasted four months, and the decision took another four months.
The trend toward lengthy prosecutions was exacerbated later, when
Israel undertook its second Nazi war-crimes trial - that of John
Demjanjuk in 1987. That trial lasted more than a year, became preoccupied with questions of the defendant's character, and foundered on misidentification. 27 These Israeli trials, like the ones Nino
considers, have a great deal to teach us about the difficulties of retroactive prosecution. As the world moves forward with tribunals
for Bosnia and Rwanda and debates the structure of a permanent
international court, 28 the lessons to be learned from past experience
are especially valuable and deserving of attention.
25. 1 TRIAL OF ADOLF EIcHMANN, supra note 23, at 201.
26. 2 TRIAL OF ADOLF EicHMAN, supra note 23, at 750.
27. See TOM TEiCHOLZ, THE TRIAL OF IVAN T=E TERRIBLE (1990), for a detailed description of the Demjanjuk trial.
28. See NOUVELLES ATUDES PANALES No. 13, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
OBSERVATIONS AND ISSUES BEFORE THE 1997-98 PREPARATORY COMMITTEE; AND ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1997).
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V. ARE, RETROAcTrvE TRIALS WORTH T=n EFFORT AND RISK?
Having reviewed the practical difficulties, Nino eventually turns
his attention to the critical question of whether retroactive trials are
worth the risk. He begins his examination with a discussion of the
work of several scholars who have argued that prosecution is a mistake in settings like Argentina's - and perhaps more generally.
Samuel Huntington suggests that when political costs significantly
outweigh moral gains, trials should be avoided altogether. 2 9 According to Huntington, even in the best of circumstances only the
very highest leaders of a repressive regime should be tried - and
30
these few only if the cases can be concluded in one year or less.
is courting political unrest and
Otherwise, the new government
31
eventual blanket pardons.
Nino also considers the arguments of Bruce Ackerman, who, in
a volume entitled The Future of Liberal Revolution,32 argues that
postrevolutionary democracies often possess substantial moral capital but limited organizational resources. To get bogged down in a
series of difficult retroactive trials is to risk squandering what little
organizational resources exist, while frittering away moral capital.
Ackerman, therefore, argues:
It is simple to squander moral capital in an ineffective effort to right
past wrongs - creating martyrs and fostering political alienation,
rather than contributing to a genuine sense of vindication. Moral capital is better spent in educating the population in the limits of the law.
There can be no hope of comprehensively correcting the wrongs done
over a generation or more. A few crude, bureaucratically feasible reforms will do more justice, and prove less33divisive, than a quixotic
quest after the mirage of corrective justice.
Nino rejects these provocative assessments of the value of retroactive proceedings. He concedes that trials pose immense risks but
sees prosecutions - at least in limited numbers - as "great occasions for social deliberation and for collective examination of the
moral values underlying public institutions" (p. 131). His sense is
that they can provide constitutive moments fundamental to the construction of a democratic tradition. In this view, trials are less important as a means of adjudicating individual guilt than as
declarations of social values and concerns. They teach about the
scope and nature of atrocities, showcase the rule of law, reduce the
29. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWaEmET CENTURY 231 (1991).
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. BRUCE AcKERmAN, THE FtrrRE OF LIBERAL REvOLUTION (1992).
33. Ia- at 72-73.
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demand for private vengeance, and orchestrate public deliberations
about the benefits of democracy (pp. 146-47).
I find myself troubled by the extent of Nino's emphasis on the
symbolic value of trials. They are, and should be treated as, a vital
means of establishing the proposition that criminals can expect to
be called before the seat of justice. We may not, as a practical matter, be able fully to achieve this end, but our goal ought to be to
signal such an intention. While the political symbolism of trials is
important, its value may be overstated. Using trials as political or
social symbols tends to expand them, to call forth more evidence,
more witnesses, more focus on character, and more hearsay. This
may amplify public discourse - at least momentarily - but it may
also set an untoward precedent. Such an approach intimates that
all human rights trials should be conducted this way and is likely to
produce slow, expensive, and overtly political proceedings. It
would seem to me to be better to encourage the development of
fairer, faster, simpler, more efficient trials. The thousands in
Rwandan jails need to be tried, but the paraphernalia of Nuremberg is unlikely to be able to do the job. Societies, and even the
world at large, may need some modicum of symbolism, but we
should not lose sight of individualized justice and its essential tools,
including rules of evidence, respect for prudential limits based on
the concept of relevance, and a commitment to convict only the
right person for the right offense. We should be mindful that justice
is dispensed on a continuing basis and that our goal ought to be the
creation of a truly workable system that can achieve the rule of law
worldwide.
CONCLUSION

A great deal may be learned from Nino's work.3 4 First, reality
counts. In thinking about retroactive justice it is important to consider carefully the scope and focus of the prosecutions to be
mounted. Sprawling, unfocused cases that pursue goals other than
34. Unfortunately, it must be noted that Nino's book is seriously marred by editorial
failure to identify and correct glaring lapses in spelling, grammar. and printing. Perhaps the
lapses may be explained by Nino's untimely death during the editorial process. Still, there
seems little excuse for the Yale University Press's editors not catching the misspelling of the
word "planned" as "planed" (p. ix), for describing the vast number of Stalin's victims as
"unaccountable" rather than innumerable (p. 21), for using the word "then" instead of
"them" (p. 136), and for dropping what appears to be at least one whole line of text (p. 161).
This list of errors is far from exhaustive. It should be noted that there are also substantive

errors in the text. On page 83, for example, "Erik [sic] Stover" is described as "the director
of the American Science Association." In reality Eric Stover was Staff Officer for the Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. See THE BREAKING OF BODIES AND MINDs: TORTURE, PsYc~iATRuc
ABusE, AND THE HEALTH PROI'nSSIONs at xiii (Eric Stover & Elena 0. Nightingale eds.,

1985). Surely the job can be done better. A book with so many important things to say
deserves better editing and proofreading.
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the conviction of a particular defendant for a specified crime are
likely to generate serious justice-system problems. If not adequately addressed, these problems may defeat the prosecutorial effort. Second, alternatives to trials such as truth commissions may
sometimes serve the interests of society more effectively than trials.
Finally, if trials are to take place, they should be fast, simple, clearly
focused, and sensitive to questions about the quality of the evidence. All these points need to be kept in mind as the world inches
toward the monumental step of fashioning an international criminal
court.

THE COLOR LINE OF PUNISHMENT
Jerome H. Skolnick*
RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW. By Randall Kennedy. New York:
Pantheon Books. 1997. Pp. 538. $30.

If "the color line," (in W.E.B. Du Bois's 1903 phrase and prophecy) 1 was to be the twentieth century's greatest challenge for the
domestic life and public policy of the United States, the law has had
much to do with drawing its shape. No surprise, this. By now, legal
theorists accept that law does not advance in preordained fashion,
immune from the sway of political interest, belief systems and social
structure. Still, it is hard to exaggerate how powerfully the law has
shaped the life chances of Americans of African heritage, for good
or ill, and in ways that we scarcely think of today.
The act of interracial marrying, for example, does not today
evoke visions of criminality, although it once did. Thirty-nine states
- including states in the North and West - had at one time passed

2
laws forbidding intermarriage between persons of different race.
Many of these laws were still in effect following World War II. If a
black man had married a white woman in Virginia in 1966 the marriage would have been void ab initio, and they would each have
been guilty of a felony. Loving v. Virginia,4 the 1967 case that freed
interracial couples to marry, is only a footnote in Randall Kennedy's Race, Crime and the Law, but that is understandable.
The anti-miscegenation laws arose out of racial theories asserting that the children of "mixed" marriages would be defective. In
one respect, these laws were often breached in practice. Black
women were taken or raped regularly by white men who were
rarely, if ever, punished (p. 35). Such children were sired in uncounted numbers, and then denoted as "Negro." The laws
criminalizing intermarriage thus delegitimatized the offspring of relations between white men and black women so that they could not
* Claire Clements Dean's Professor Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley.

B.B.A. 1952, City College of New York; M.A. 1953, Ph.D. 1957, Yale. - Ed. A version of
this book review also appears in Tim AMERICAN PROSPEcr, July-Aug. 1998, at 90-95.
1. W.E.B. Du Bois, THE SouLs OF BLACK FOLK 35 (First Vintage Books 1990) (1903).
2. See FOWLER V. HARPER & JEROME H. SKOLNICK, PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY 96-99
(rev. ed. 1962).

3. For example, California's law forbidding most interracial marriage was in effect until
1948, when it was invalidated by the Supreme Court of California. See Perez v. Lippold, 198
P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
4. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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inherit their father's property. In another respect, the laws were
rigorously enforced to prevent black men from having consensual
sex with white women under any circumstances, including marriage.
These laws implied that no rational, adult, white woman would
agree to have sex with a black man. Any breaking of the sex-color
line taboo between a black man and a white woman could be and in the peculiar logic of the deep South should be - considered
the moral equivalent of rape, even if blessed by the sacrament of
marriage.
In the context of such racial theorizing, accusations of rape
against black men made by white women were rarely disbelieved.
Such accusations were likely to draw the unbridled viciousness of
white vigilantes, who remained unpunished for the crimes they
committed while carrying out lynchings - which often included
whipping, torturing, burning, and eventually hanging the victim the "strange fruit" of Lillian Smith's acclaimed novel.5 Southern
court records show that when a black man was accused of murdering a white man, he was usually not lynched, but was given a trial
and, if found guilty, capitally punished. 6 The accusation of rape, by
contrast, was more likely to evoke the hot-blooded savagery of a
lynching.
The institutions of southern justice -

police and courts -

typi-

cally ignored the crimes committed by those participating in the
lynching. Southern blacks passed around stories, which became
legends, about sex, terror, and the meaninglessness of the official
legal order. Lynching maintained the caste superiority of whites
and the bloody etiquette of cross-racial sex, and it undermined any
trust Americans of African descent might have had in the legal order. "Nothing has more nourished dreams of racial revenge," Randall Kennedy, a former law clerk to Justice Thurgood Marshall and
a Professor at Harvard Law School, writes, "than the knowledge
that buried in American history are scores of black victims of lynching whose murderers, though known, escaped punishment" (p. 49).
No RACE-BASED LAW ENFORCEMENT

This ignominious history of legal theory and practice is a necessary preamble to any understanding of race and crime in America
today. For this reason, one has to wonder whether America is now
ready for the message throughout Randall Kennedy's recent book
Race, Crime, and the Law -

that in enforcing the criminal laws, the

courts and the police should never base their judgments and actions
on race.
5. LILLIAN SMITH, STRANGE FRUIT (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1992) (1944).

6. See E.M. Beck et al., The Gallows, the Mob, and the Vote: Lethal Sanctioningof Blacks
in North Carolinaand Georgia,1882 to 1930, 23 L. & Socy. REv. 317, 329 (1989).
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Kennedy's position is scarcely that of a reflexive radical on the
complex and polarizing issue of contemporary race and crime. He
discusses and deplores how African Americans are doubly victimized by crime and argues that "the principal injury suffered by African Americans in relation to criminal matters is not
overenforcement but underenforcement of the laws."'7 Randall
Kennedy, like Jesse Jackson, recognizes that disproportionate black
criminality leads to understandable fears among potential victims,
whether black or white. And like his mentor, Justice Marshall, he
does not excuse "thuggery" when perpetrated by blacks. Kennedy's fair-mindedness concerning race and crime is further illustrated when, in discussing the now-mythic beating of Rodney King,
a black victim of white police, Kennedy points out that the case was
more complicated than is generally acknowledged by those familiar
only with the portion of the videotape shown on television. At the
Simi Valley trial, defense attorneys focussed the jury's attention on
King's behavior leading to the beating. He was, after all, drunk,
driving at high speed, and resisting arrest. Some use of escalated
force was probably justified against him, although not the fifty-six
powerful blows that were actually inflicted. At the Simi Valley trial,
Kennedy reminds us, defense attorneys were able to point to subtleties that clouded the issue of whether the police harbored racist
intent.
Kennedy unfolds his thesis - that the courts and the police
should never base their judgments and actions on race - in discussions of five major issues: (1) the use of race as an indicator of
suspiciousness; (2) the use of race-based peremptory challenges; (3)
7. P. 19. Homicide victimization rates for black males and females continue to be higher

than for other segments of the population. Black males were 8 to 9 times more likely than
white males to have committed a homicide during 1996; most of these homicides were intraracial. In 1996, about 9 out of every 10 murders involved victims and offenders of the
same race when the race of the offender was known. See James Alan Fox, Trends in Juvenile
Violence: 1997 Update (November 1997) (available at <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/tjrfox.htm>. Thus, as overall crime rates decline, so does crime committed by and
against blacks.
Overall, violent crime dropped in 1996 in the United States to levels not seen since 1973.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUsTcE, Criminal Victimization, 1996:
Changes 1995-96 With Trends, available at <http:llwww.ojp.usdoj-govlbjs/abstractlcvl996.
htm>. New York City's remarkable crime decline has received the most publicity, and deservedly so. In 1990, New York City experienced 2,245 homicides. That figure dropped re-

markably in 1996 to 983 homicides. The year 1997 saw yet another drop to 770. In the first
three months of 1997, 281 homicides occurred. In the first three months of 1998, only 141
homicides have been reported. Interview with Michael Farrell, Deputy Commissioner for

Policy and Planning, New York City Police Department (April 2, 1998). In fact, crime is
dropping all over the United States, from Los Angeles to Cleveland, to Boston, even to
Washington, D.C. The F.B.I. reported that the homicide rate fell 9 percent in 1996. Federal
Bureau of Investigation Press Release, October 4, 1997. As crime declines generally, so does
the level of black criminality. This may help to undermine fears of crime committed by

young black males, who are responsible for most of the crime by blacks.
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the death penalty; (4) race-based jury nullification; and (5) racebased disparity in punishment.
THE PROPRIETY OF RACE

As

AN INDICATION OF SUSPICIOUSNESS

Kennedy devotes a significant portion of his book to a related

issue, but one more subtle than police brutality. "By too easily permitting the police to use race as an indicia of suspiciousness," he

writes, "courts also derogate from the idea that individuals should
be judged on the basis of their own, particular conduct and not on
the basis - not even partly on the basis - of racial generalizations" (p. 157). He asserts that it is never appropriate for police to

use color as a proxy for criminality. Kennedy does, however, distinguish between cases where police act on the basis of a detailed description as opposed to "the use of racial categories as a

probabilistic sorting device.., to demarcate groups of persons who,
because of their race, are viewed as more risky than other persons"

(p. 137 n.*).
He recognizes that race can signal heightened criminality, just as
it can indicate other "sociological facts," for instance, greater risk of
early mortality, fewer employment opportunities, lower income and
substandard housing. But such "sociological facts" do not, he says,
"mean that the legal system ought to permit police to engage routinely in racial discrimination" (p. 145).
Kennedy points to a number of state and federal cases where
courts have permitted police to stop and question someone who is
"out of place": in a white neighborhood, as part of a drug courier
profile, or in border checkpoints to subject the driver to questioning
or search.8 Kennedy deplores the legal doctrines permitting police
to equate blackness with increased risk of criminality because of the
distrust, anger and discord they generate.
What are the probabilities of black violence? "It is beyond foolishness to regard American violence as solely, or mainly, or even
distinctively a black problem," write Franklin Zimring and Gordon
Hawkins. 9 In part, they say, this is because American blacks tend
to reside in places where social conditions precipitate the greatest
violence by all races and partly because tendencies to lethal violence seem to be endemic to the United States. 10 Nevertheless, in
statistics generated by the Bureau of Justice Statistics in connection
8. See State v. Dean, 543 P.2d 425, 427 (Ariz. 1975); United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d

391 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,506 U.S. 1040 (1992); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 563-64 (1976).
9. FRANKLiN E. Znmu.IN

10. See id.

& GORDON HAwINs, Cxivm is NOT THE PROBLEM 79 (1997).
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with the President's Initiative on Race 1 we find that crime is disproportionatelya black problem. Although most victims of violent
crime are white (seventy-five percent in 1995), blacks are victimized
at higher rates than whites. Blacks have higher arrest rates for violent crime than other segments of the population, although most
persons (fifty-four percent) arrested for violent crime in 1995 were
white. Moreover, despite recent declines, both homicide victimization and commission rates continue to be higher for blacks than for
other segments of the population. At each age, black males are
about-eight to nine times more likely than white males to have committed a homicide during 1996.12

If that is so, it raises a troublesome question: Is it necessarily
wrong for police to be color conscious? We rely on police to be
sensitive to subtle cues in their visual world. In my observations of
police in the early 1960's, I developed the concept of the "symbolic
assailant," that is, "persons who use gesture, language, and attire
that the policeman has come to recognize as a prelude to violence.' 3 More generally, police who are patrolling an area are supposed to develop a conception of the normal. They are supposed to
understand who belongs there and which buildings generally have
lights on in the darkest hours of the early morning. They are supposed to notice an older man parked in front of an elementary
school. Is he a grandfather picking up a grandchild or a sexual
predator? Kennedy would argue that such observations are legitimate. But suppose a police officer sees two black teenagers walking in a white neighborhood at two o'clock in the morning? In a
society where the residential color line has so often been drawn,
should we ask police to ignore the race of the teenagers? And if we
did, would they?
Even if courts were to forbid police from noticing race, can
courts actually affect police conduct in this delicate area? Will police simply not list race when it actually was a factor in stopping and
questioning someone who fits a proffle or appears suspicious to the
police even if legal doctrine says they may not? Consider the following case. A police detective sees two men, Chilton and Terry,
"casing" a jewelry store. Lawyers familiar with the landmark 1968
case of Terry v. Ohio14 know the rest of the story. The officer questions the men, decides that a crime is afoot, proceeds to pat them
down, discovers guns and arrests them, along with a third man.
11. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Justice, "Question and Answer" document
specially prepared for the President's Initiative on Race (November 17, 1997).
12. 1d
13. JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JusTicE WrmouT TRIAL 44 (3rd ed. Macmillan Press 1994)
(1966).
14. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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Detective Martin McFadden testifies that he had been patrolling in
plainclothes at two-thirty in the afternoon, in an area of downtown
Cleveland that he had been patrolling for thirty years. He says he
saw something odd about these men. "Now, in this case
when I
15
looked over they didn't look right to me at the time.'
The Warren court, while understanding that McFadden had less
than probable cause to conduct his search, deferred to the practical
needs of policing and permitted the limited pat-down search of
Chilton and Terry and the seizure of their weapons, a major doctrinal shift in the law governing when police can lawfully stop and
frisk suspects. Not mentioned in the Supreme Court decision is that
the suspects were in fact black teenagers, as the N.A.A.C.P. Legal
Defense Fund brief' 6 pointed out at the time. But was McFadden
necessarily a racist? After all, Terry and Chilton were behaving suspiciously, they turned out to be armed and evidently were about to
commit a crime. Yet is it credible that McFadden took no notice of
their skin color but simply their behavior as part of what made
them not "look right" to him at the time? More troubling, is it
possible for a police officer not to factor skin color into his or her
perceptions of not "looking right" in a society where skin color is so
salient?
These are unsettling questions, especially for those like Kennedy - and me - who would prefer to erase skin color as a legitimate indicator of anything. As normative aspirations go,
Kennedy's desire to eliminate race as an indicator of suspiciousness
is commendable. It is a standard to which we and the courts should
aspire. But I expect that in the real world of social and color stratification, disproportionate black criminality, and racism, it is inevitable that police will continue to use race as an indicator, as
McFadden must surely have done. And like McFadden, especially
if courts say that police cannot use race as an indicator, they won't
report that they did, and will testify that what they saw was solely
odd behavior.
RACE AND THE JURY

Kennedy's insistence that skin color be irrelevant in the processing of those accused of crime extends as well to jury selection. Not
until 1986 did the Supreme Court hold that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to
exclude blacks from juries. Since then it has outlawed raciallybased peremptory challenges for the defense as well. 17 Judges can
15. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.
16. Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae in

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Nos. 63, 74, & 67).
17. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).

1480

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:1474

exercise more authority over attorneys in a courtroom than they
can over police on the street. Kennedy is skeptical that courts can
actually prevent prosecutors or defense attorneys from using peremptory challenges to shape the racial composition of the jury.
Like Justice Marshall, he favors eliminating these challenges altogether, arguing that it is probably the only way to restrain attorneys
who use race as a criterion in jury selection (p. 229).
THE DEATH PENALTY

Other components of the criminal justice system are more amenable to doctrinal authority. The Supreme Court could, if it chose,
abolish the death penalty, but the present conservative court is not
about to do so. Kennedy is masterful in describing the doctrinal
zigs and zags of death penalty jurisprudence, and offers an especially careful and knowledgeable analysis of the statistical data on
race and execution.
In the most recent major Supreme Court case, McCleskey v.
Kemp, 18 the defense introduced a study showing that when victims
were white in Georgia, perpetrators were four times more likely to
be condemned to death than when victims were black. The Court
conceded that the system was skewed against blacks who murdered
whites, and against black victims, but held that the question was
whether officials had discriminated against McCleskey in this case,
not systemically. The Court ruled that they had not. As Kennedy
recognizes, it would be a gruesome kind of affirmative action that
sought to reduce racial discrepancies in capital punishment by "leveling up" and executing more blacks who murder black victims (p.
344).
Kennedy's discussion of racial fairness in the administration of
the death penalty is careful, knowledgeable and nuanced, but his
own position on the larger question - support or opposition to the
death penalty - is relegated to a footnote (p. 345 n.*). I thought
this a mistake, since what he says makes much sense, and deserves
the kind of careful elaboration he gives to the question of racial
fairness. Kennedy doesn't regard capital punishment as "unconstitutional per se;" but opposes it partly because he fears mistakes and
partly because he deplores "the lethal, collective, bureaucratic anger that the state displays when it puts a person to death" (p. 345).
But something else is hinted at in the footnote, a change of
heart from fervent abolitionist to mild opponent. Kennedy writes
that when he clerked for Justice Marshall he was forced into
"[c]onstantly reading about the horrible crimes perpetrated by murderers sentenced to death" (p. 345). Evidently, the brutality of the
18. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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murderers and the pain of the victims cooled his abolitionist fervor.
It is not easy to develop a purely rational position on capital punishment, although Justice Blackmun's argument - that the death penalty cannot be administered fairly - comes closest.
JURY NULLIFICATION

Punishment is altogether a difficult issue, especially when one
can predict that a particular race or class will be disproportionately

represented in the punishment apparatus. Some African-American
legal scholars, notably Paul Butler in the Yale Law Journal,have
advocated that black jurors nullify the evidence in cases where the
black defendants are charged with what he describes as "nonviolent, malum prohibitum offenses, including victimless crimes like
narcotics offenses."'19
Kennedy will have none of this. Agreeing that African Americans have often been treated unjustly in the system of criminal justice, he rebuts Butler point by point, arguing that Butler bases his
position on a one-dimensional vision. Yes, Kennedy acknowledges,
the prosecution of the Scottsboro boys2o was "horrible, [and] racially motivated," but both state and federal authorities intervened
"in an extraordinary fashion" ultimately preventing their execution
(p. 300). Similarly, Rodney King's victimization was later followed
by the imprisonment of the perpetrators of the brutality after a federal civil rights prosecution. That aside, Kennedy avers, jury nullification will scarcely advance the cause of broad social reform that
Butler advocates. Those who engage in nullification will have to
say that they ignored the evidence for a larger cause, and few jurors
are willing to do that. The jurors in the O.J. Simpson case, for example, did not admit to nullification of the evidence although one
of the black members of the jury reportedly stated after the verdict,
"We've got to protect our own" (p. 310 n.t).
DRUG PENALTIES

Nevertheless, major scholars have argued that the criminal justice system, particularly the Draconian sentences given to black
drug offenders, are needlessly and unfairly harsh. 21 Part of the difficulty may arise from our lack of a traditional moral sense about
the dangers of drug use and sale. We commonly share an aversion
to murder, armed robbery and burglary, and regard these as serious
19. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 715 (1995); p. 296 (quoting Butler).

20. See Weems v. Alabama, 141 So. 215 (Ala. 1932) for the Scottsboro Boys' appeal to the
Alabama Supreme Court for their rape conviction. In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932),
the Supreme Court held that the defendants had been denied effective assistance of counsel.
21. See MICHAEL ToNRy, MALIGN NEGLECr 188-90 (1995).
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crimes deserving punishment. Moreover, one doesn't have to be a
law professor steeped in penal codes to understand - and approve
that intentional murder deserves the highest punishment the law
can inflict, with armed robbery and burglary following in an ordinal
sequence.
Our intuitions with respect to drug penalties are much less clear.
What is the just desert for selling a few marihuana cigarettes? How
about five or five hundred grams of cocaine? Should sale of crack
be penalized differentially? Criminologists, including yours truly,
have written and testified against the mammoth penalties for sale
and use of drugs spurred by the war on drugs, and especially against
its Draconian consequences for black youth who sell small amounts
on the street.22
The most extreme example of a law discriminating against African-American males is the federal law which penalizes those who
sell 500 grams of cocaine powder, an amount larger than what most
street dealers possess, with a minimum of five years imprisonment.
Yet a person selling five grams of crack cocaine, a relatively trifling
3 The color
amount, is also subject to a five-year minimum penalty23
line is drawn sharply here. In 1993, the Bureau of Justice Statistics
issued a report showing that the average sentence served by black
prisoners in Federal prison (seventy-one months) was forty-one
percent longer than the average served by whites (fifty months),
while in the early 1980s the average time served by blacks was comparable to that of whites. 24 This did not happen because federal
judges had turned into racists. The overriding reason was the 100:1
rule in the federal sentencing statute enacted by Congress in 1986,
along with stiffer mandatory minimums for violent and gun
crimes.25
This is not to say there is no difference between crack and powder cocaine; crack cocaine is powder cocaine dissolved in water,
with baking soda added, then heated, then dried into hard, smokable pellets. In effect, if someone has cocaine, with little knowledge
or effort they can easily create crack. Street samples of crack, for
example, range from ten percent to forty percent cocaine by weight.
Although cocaine and crack are not identical, they are not so different pharmacologically as to justify vast differences in punishment.
So the structure of the current guidelines is equivalent, if eggs were
22. No one has been more critical or effective than Michael Tonry. See id.
23. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (1995) (discussing the 100:1

rule).
24. DOUGLAS C. McDoNALD & KENNETm E. CARLSON, U.S. DEPr. OF JUSTICE, SENTENcNG IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: DOES RACE MATrER? 38, 42 tbl.3.4 (1993).

25. See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 § 6371
(1988).
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illegal, to punishing the possession of omelets at 100 times the possession of raw eggs.
Two other big differences distinguish powder from crack cocaine. Powder cocaine is more likely to be sold in larger, more expensive amounts behind tightly closed doors. It is consequently
harder to catch those who sell it than those who sell crack, sold
mostly in crack houses or apartments known to neighbors and the
police, or in the streets. Powder cocaine is the drug of the affluent,
while crack is the drug of the poor. And because it is sold more
openly, it is more threatening to community safety and cohesion, It
is this feature of crack that has led many African-American politicians, and Randall Kennedy, to be more sympathetic to the distinction in penalties. "Surely," Kennedy writes, "it would be just and
sensible for a government to punish more severely a person knowingly distributing a poison in a low-priced (say five-dollar)
container as opposed to a high-priced (say fifty-dollar) container
even if the poison in the two containers was otherwise identical" (p.
383).
But John P. Morgan and Lynne Zimmer, who carefully examined the evidence on the supposedly different effects of crack
and powder cocaine, conclude that data from the National Institute
of Drug Abuse show "that relatively few cocaine users actually become 'dependent' -

whatever their route of administration - but

that smoking cocaine by itself does not increase markedly the likelihood of dependence. '2 6 They recognize that smoking cocaine produces a shorter and more intense high than nasal insufflation of
cocaine in powder form. They argue further that crack has been
made available to those parts of the population who are most vulnerable to the abuse of drugs.
But why should we legislate more severe punishment for persons selling the five-dollar containers to low-income street buyers if
we learned that the sellers were themselves young, black, and poor,
while the more affluent fifty-dollar sellers could afford to deal behind closed doors where they can cut up the powder into five-dollar
containers to be sold to the street sellers? Why should we punish
retailers more than wholesalers? After all, we demand capital punishment for large-scale cocaine traffickers. Moreover, one could argue, as Tonry does, that "the architects of the War on Drugs should
be held morally accountable for the havoc they have wrought
among disadvantaged members of minority groups."2 7
26. John P. Morgan & Lynne Zimmer, The Social Pharmacologyof Smokable Cocaine, in
CRACK IN AMERICA: DEMON DRUGS AND SOCIAL JUSnCE 144 (Craig Reinerman & Harry

G. Levine eds., 1997).
27. ToNRY, supra note 21, at 104.
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At the conclusion of the book, in the very last paragraph, Kennedy backs off. He says he doesn't endorse the crack-powder differential. "Even if these policies are misguided," he concludes,
"being mistaken is different from being racist, and the difference is
one that greatly matters" (p. 386). Does Kennedy mean to suggest
that we should censure only the explicit attention to race in law
enforcement, but excuse disparate and punitive impacts so long as
they result from good intentions? In other contexts, he finds that
disparity in sentencing is an important measure of racism. 28
CONCLUSION

Race, Crime and the Law is a work of high legal scholarship and
a cry for constitutional justice. But for me, Kennedy's key chapter
is "Race, Law, and Suspicion" where he deplores a judicial trend
that he says threatens to turn legally and morally wrong police conduct into something that is acceptable. As a matter of principle, I
agree with Kennedy, but believe that he underestimates the capacity of police to work around legal doctrine; especially where police
are in the position of justifying their conduct in a procedural setting.
More importantly, I have trouble reconciling Kennedy's powerful
censure of the use of race in articulating suspicion of crime with his
wishy-washy defense of the crack and powder cocaine distinction in
Federal sentencing. In the real world of criminal law, of police, and
of the courts, enforcement and sentencing policies around drugs
loom far more significantly in the lives of young Hispanic and African-American males than the doctrine Kennedy properly criticizes.
Kennedy might well argue that the disparity of punishment for
rape, for example, is clearly footprinted in a history of racism, while
the crack-powder sentencing disparity was not grounded in racial
motives. That may be true. But in a society with a history of slavery and racial discrimination and with disproportionate criminality
according to race and color that is likely traceable to that history,
can we ignore disparate racial impacts when we are considering
fairness? Perhaps someday, when equality is more of a reality.
But, at present, race remains such a conspicuous factor in crime and
crime policy that we cannot fail to notice sharp differences in the
28. In a Virginia case discussed by Kennedy, Hampton v. Commonwealth, 58 S.E.2d 288
(Va. 1950), the defendant's attorneys showed that between 1908 and 1949, 45 black men, but
not a single white man, had been put to death for rape. P. 312. In Coker v. Georgia, the
Supreme Court prohibited imposing the death penalty for rape on grounds that the punishment was disproportionate to the crime. The death penalty, it held, is so "excessive" for rape
that it violates the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibition.
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Kennedy notes, however, that racial disparity in rape
sentencing still exists in many places, strongly suggesting that disparity is an important measure of racism. Pp. 72-74.
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fate of blacks and whites. As we approach the millennium, the
color line of punishment -

too evident.

especially in the war on drugs -

is all

